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This study examines tne development of monetary management 
In India from 1873 to date, with special reference to the
•V
objectives or standards to which such management has tried to 
conform# .inuring this period# economic opinion about monetary 
objectives has undergone revolutionary changes# curing the fir* 
fifty yeare* the maintenance of a stable exchange rate through 
gold standard mechanism was the objective# 1/urlng the nineteen- 
thirties, Internal stability at a high level of economic activit 
and employment became the aim of currency management# In the 
present decade, the maintenance of a stable international currer 
relation and Internal full employment are both regarded as 
objectives# The introductory chapter of this study reviews the 
development of this evolution#
monetary management is fundamentally an international activi 
though different countries play unequal parts in it# The genera 
course of management has been regulated, for all, by the major 
economies of the world, or, more correctly, by England before 
florid War 1, and after it by England, U*o#A#, oormany and rranee
The function of smaller countries has been one of adaptation#
r
Monetary management in the major economies has thus automatical! 
constituted the main part of the monetary management in a minor 
economy like India# The indigenous aspect of Indian currency
\ * \ I \ i ' : ?'<** * Sft£i f " *  * ife* r '' ' V. . • ,«l '* i * V t  . itis*’** X  V *
management has been the secondary function of adaptation to the 
international framework devised abroad#
Consequently, an analysis of the international gold 
standard of the fifty years, and-of the attempts of the Indian 
management to adjust its system to the international standard, 
constitutes the subject-matter of Chapters II and III* Chapter I' 
analyses the currency warfare of the thirties resulting from the 
efforts of the major economies to assume domestic currency auton 
and its repercussions on Indian currency management* The last tw 
chapters ( V and VI ) examine the problems of Indian currency 
management in the present decade, when the maintenance of an equ 
-brium exchange rate fixed by the international agreement embodi 
in the Bretton Woods system, and of internal full employment, sh 
form the monetary objectives of India*
The speciality of this stud$ lies in internation 
perspective of Indian currency management, in its attempts to lo 
India1s real position in the international monetary set-up durin 
the period under review and in its prescribing the external curr 
relation which India should maintain in the immediate future* Th 
examination of the extent to which the internal monetary object! 
of full employment investment may be pursued in India,in this 
international set-up is another contribution of this enquiry*
PRQJSLMr'i
imirn
OP T iip  STAKBARBS 
OP
CURRENCY.
- THE PROBLEM OP TUB S M  BARBS
OP
liiB IAB GORRBJQf*
TheBiB/Vsutimitied' t o i h ^ ^






It is with a real and deep sense of 
gratitude that X acknowledge ay indebtedness to 
l)Tm Vara Anstey of the London School of JSconomics 
for her helpful adrice and guidance in all the 
stages of this investigation.
My thanks are also due to Miss Thorne 








I. Introduction* • • *
II. Indian Currency Policy and Problems: 
Prom Pluctuating Exchanges to the 
Gold Standard. 1873-1914.
III. Indian Currency Policy and Problems 
The Suspension, Restoration ana 
Liquidation of the Gold Standard. 
1914-1931.
IV. Indian Currency Policy and Problems: 
The Autonomous Currencies of the 
Thirties. 1931-1939.
V. Indian Currency Policy and Problems: 
The Bretton foods Monetary System. 
1939-1947.
VI. Monetary Policy in Relation to the 
Economic Development of India.
VII. The Development of Monetary 






235 - 305 
306 - 347 
348 - 378.
Bibliography • 379- 383
Problem of r'l'iihe'l Standards 
, ■. ' ■- - of % - ;
; I hdl an Currency
j v v ; C h a f f e r \ i:
Introduction*
C H A P T E R  I .
INTRODUCTION
Section I. The Scope of the Enquiry.
The purpose of this enquiry is to examine the development of 
monetary management in India during the last threequarters of a 
century with special reference to the objectives or standards to 
which such management consciously or unconsciously, trieu to con­
form. The significant point in this connection is the fact that 
during the period unuer discussion, the consensus of opinion 
about the very objective of monetary policy has twice undergone 
fundamental changes. During the first fifty years of this period, 
the International Gold standard held the field and a country was 
expected to maintain a stable exchange rate through the gold stan 
dard mechanism. The purpose for which a stable exchange was main­
tained was a high level of international trade. During the 1930'a 
autonomous national currencies come into votoue. The stimulation 
of economic activity was reco^i&ed as the main objective of kone 
tary management and a national currency was considered a means tc 
that end. During the present uecaue of the 1940's, a synthesis ol 
both objectives has been attempted. The maintenance of a stable 
international currency relationship for a high level of interna­
tional trade and an internal full employment policy have become 
the simultaneous objectives of cunency policies of most countrii
These changes in monetary objectives, from the regulation of 
money in accordance with almost the natural laws of the gold 
standard, to the detailed management of modern times, represent 
a continuous evolution of monetary ideas for a much better order 
ing of the economic activities of the world. Money is simply a 
means to securing & desired order of economic activities and it 
does that by facilitating exchange. Mostt economic activities are 
organised on the basis of private property, division of labour 
and exchange. Exchange means Interchange of ^oods and services, 
produced or owned by different persons in accordance with the 
ownership of property ana division of labour. But exchange of 
goods requires a comparison of the value of each tning with the 
values of all others. It is Impossible to compare the values of
' : ' ’ , I '
all things unless the value of each thing is expressible in term
of one common denominator or measure of value. The first require-
the
sent of a society oasea on/atvision of labour and private proper- 
a
tjc is to have/common measure or standard of value wfiich will 
acquaint one with the relative values of all things and will 
facilitate the exchange of one commodity against another.
Not only to facilitate exchange by helping the ascertainment 
of relative values, but also to dispense with the awkwardness of 
barter altogether, it is necessary to have a representative of 
the standard of value which all! be accepted by all in exchange 
for their goods. It is absura to think that the uesires of per­
sons bartering goods will coincide in identical terms as regards 
kind, quality, quantity ana value, when a representative of the
3.
standard of value or money-proper is adopted, this difficulty of 
establishing a double coincidence of desiderata is obviated* A 
person sells his surplus goods for money ana with that money he 
purchases the things he needs* In this case, money serves as a 
medium of exchange, by this division of the process,each part of
the indirect exchange or monetary transaction is maae independent
the
and expedited* by th&s facilitating exchange, money had made/divt 
sion of labour and the modern system of production possible* 
Money is put into circulation ana made to serve as the medium 
of exchange by two sets of persons who may be said to constitute 
the demand and supply sides of money* The supply of money comes : 
from a composite group of persons and institutions comprising th< 
Central Bank and the Government of the country who issue the cur: 
encies and the ordinary banks and savers who hold money as loan­
able funds* The demand for money is offered by entrepreneurs and 
others who generally invest money for productixe purposes* The 
volume of money in circulation, therefore, depends on the action 
and reaction of these demand ana supply forces ana may be said 
to be the product of the physical quantity of money ana its velo 
city of circulation* The volume of money used in exchange is thu 
the same thing as expenditure in a given period of time. As the 
expenditure of some is necessarily the income of others, the for 
mer automatically determines the latter* The bulk of the income 
of the people, particularly of the working classes, is used to 
purchase consumption goods and thereby constitutes the effective 
aemand of the society* ilence the action of the entrepreneurs anb 
bankers, by regulating expenditure and income of the society,
4.
determines also its effective .demand for gooda*
Again, bankers and entrepreneurs by repainting the voltum
of money and thereby exchange ana aivision of labour on the one
hand and effective demand on the other^necessarily determines the
level of economic activity of the society at a ^iven period of tim
When, for example, the entrepreneurs are very optimistic about the
profitability of their prospective Investments and the bankers are
and
also Inclined to follow an easy money policy, the volume of loans/
investment expenditure may increase to the level at which all the
available factors of production are fully employed* At other time
pessimism of the entrepreneurs ana bankers by restricting exchange
ana division of labour on the one hand ana curtailing effective
demand on the other, may keep economic activity at a low level and
thereby render some factors of production unemployed*
j.t is thus obvious that by regulating the conditions of
demand for and supply of money it is possible to adjust the volume
of expenditure and effective demand to such a level as to attain
the fullest utilization of all the available factors of production
The regulation of the volume of effective demand,to level up econo
mic activity to its potential maximumfwas not considered to be a
concern of monetary management upto the twenties of this century*
hut, nowadays, monetary management not only aims at stimulating
effective demand for maximising economic activity, but it aims at
it, not on a national, but on an international scale, so that the
advantages of international division of labour can be secured at
the same time* This comprehensive aim of monetary management has
been tne climax of the development of monetary theories ana practi
ce during the last seventy five years* The remaining part of this
introductory chapter gives a summary account of this evolution of 
monetary management*
Section 2* The objective of Monetary Management from 1873 to 1914* 
The Monetary supplies of the different countries of the world 
from 1873 to 1914 were regulated in accordance with the rules of the 
International gold Standard system* The increase and decrease of the 
supply of money in strict proportion to the increase or decrease of 
the gold reserves of a country were considered to be the essence of
d)
the gold standard rules • Ordinary banks had to keep a minimum ratio 
of cash reserves with themselves and/or in their accounts with the 
Central hank, against their deposit liabilities* When they extended 
their loans very freely and their cash reserves fell below the legal
or conventional minimum, they replenished those reserves by taking
the
fresh loans from the Central Bank* As the loans grafctea by/Central 
Bank became its own deposits, it was able to grant loans almost inoe 
finitely* But the Central Bank itself was obliged to maintain a lega 
minimum of cash reserves against its liabilities, and its minimum 
ratio was far higher than the minimum reserve requirements of other 
banks* Thus, when the Central Bank's liabilities were already touch­
ing the maximum limit, it could not extend further loans to other 
banks when the latter wanted to lend more than what their existing 
reserves permitted* The Central Bank's reserves, therefore, constitu 
ted the ultimate limit of the loan-making power of the banking commu­
nity of the country* Unuer the gold standard regime, the reserves of 
the Central Bank consisted of gold or foreign exchange convertible i;
to ,,ola* The volume of this reserve of the central Bank deeenaed 
(1) * International Currency Experience*, by the League of Nations, 
1944, p. 66.
on the exigencies of the balance of payments situation* 
If the balance of payments of the country was favourable, 
there followed a net import of gold into the oountry, increas­
ing thereby the reserves of the Central Bank, which could, 
and did, extend loans more freely to its scheduled banks. In 
the reverse oase, when the balance of payments was unfavour­
able, there ensued a net export of gold from the oountry, re­
ducing thereby the reserves of the Central Bank which had to 
recall a part of the advances made to its scheduled banks.
The latter were, in turn, compelled to reduce their advances 
to their own clients. Thus the import and export of gold 
led the banks to make a multiple increase or decrease in the 
money supply of the country. The balance of payments situa­
tion of a oountry, therefore, regulated its gold movements 
and the monetary authority, by observing the rules of the 
gold standard game, regulated the volume of money on the 
basis of its gold holdings.
The obvious purpose of the observance of the gold stand­
ard rules by a country was to maintain its balance of pay­
ments equilibrium. When a country had an unfavourable bal­
ance of payments and lost gold in consequence, the prloe- 
level in that country was lowered and this, in turn, reduced 
employment, investment and income in the society. The re­
duction in the price-level lowered the prices of its exports 
in foreign markets and thereby stimulated exports, while the
fall in employment and Income lowered the purchasing power of
the inhabitants of that country and, in consequence, the im­
port of foreign goods* Rise in exports and fall in imports
went on improving the balanoe of oayraents of the country till
7.
equilibrium was reached and the gold export was stopped* The 
attainment of this equilibrium was nasteneo by the opposite 
effects in the gold receiving country*
The balance of payments equiliorium was necessary for provid­
ing the means of payment for the foreign purchases of a country* 
The gold reserves of countries were not generally sufficiently 
great to enable them to liquidate their unfavourable balances by 
shipment of gold only* Ordinarily, only negligible proportions, 
if any at all, of unfavourable balances were met by gold exports 
while the main part, if not the whole of an unfavourable balance, 
was corrected by an increase of exports and a decrease of imports 
Thus, the proceeds of sales of all kinds to foreign countries pro< 
vided the means by which the payments for foreign purchases were 
made* When purchase from foreign countries became greater in 
value than the total sales to foreign countries, the Internationa! 
trade of the country concerned was blocked oy the scarcity of the 
means of foreign payment* On the other hand, when sales to foreigi 
countries stood permanently in excess of purchases from foreign 
countries, foreign trace was choked by the inability of the for­
eigners to meet their obligations* Thus,the position of equality 
between foreign purchase and sale not only provided the means 
of payment of international trade, but also tenued to maximise 
the volume of foreign trade of the country at a given level of 
economic activity*
It is,therefore, obvious that the gold standard , by always 
maintaining the balance of payments equilibrium could claim 
to its credit a hijli level of international trade for
8.
each country. There were, however, other methods of main­
taining balance of payments equilibrium without observing 
gold standard rules. When one country bought goods from an­
other, it had to exchange its domestic money for foreign mon­
ey to make payment for its purchases. The exporters of goodc 
to foreign countries were paid in terms of foreign currencies, 
which they sold to domestic importers of foreign goods in 
terms of domestic money and the importers paid the foreigners 
in their own currencies. Foreign currencies thus bought and 
sold in the foreign exchange market of every country became 
known as foreign exchange. The price of foreign currencies 
in terms of domestic money were termed foreign exchange rates. 
The amount of foreign money which the buyers (importers) were 
willing to buy became greater, when the price of foreign money 
in terms of domestic money became lower. This cheapening of 
foreign money made all foreign goods cheaper and more of them 
were bought by importers. To pay the price of these in­
creased foreign purchases, importers became eager to purchase 
more foreign exchange. A higher price for foreign bills, on 
the other hand, increased the prices of foreign goods all 
round to domestic buyers, importers were willing to import 
less and their demand for foreign money decreased. The amount 
of foreign money supplied in the foreign exohange market vari­
ed with the price paid for foreign money in terms of domestic 
money. When an exporter received more domestic money for his 
foreign bills, his profit from export increased. He was 
stimulated to increase exports to augment his profits; and 
this increased export increased the volume of foreign ex-
9 .
change in its exchange market. In the reverse oase, when 
the price of foreign bills fell, the exporters suffered 
losses, curtailed their exports and reduced the volume of 
foreign exchange in the domestic market. The ultimate ex­
change rate was determined at a point where demand for, and 
supply of, foreign bills equilibrated. The equilibrium in 
the balance of payments was thus brought about by the fluc­
tuations in the exchange rates, whose specific function was 
to bring about the adjustment of foreign purchases and sales.
The system of freely fluctuating exchange rates oould, 
therefore, be considered as an alternative method to the 
gold standard to maintain the balance of payments equilibr­
ium of a country. But, if fluctuations in exchange rates 
were allowed free scope, international transactions were 
bound to be very seriously hampered. Any change in its ex­
change rate would automatically lead to changes in all the 
import and export prices of a country. The effects of 
changes in the exchange rate would not stop with changes in 
prices but would also affect the volume of production of im­
ported and exported goods (and securities) which would thus
be subjected to a constant flux. A substantial fall in the
rate
exchange, might ruin the very important export industries of 
a country, though it would make imports very much cheaper. 
But, if relying on cheap imports, corresponding domestic in­
dustries were given up, the oountry concerned might be de­
prived of those commodities altogether by a rise in the ex­
change rate, a short while after. Thus, under fluctuating 
exchanges both the export and import industries of a country
10.
would become extremely risky. This risk element was bound 
to reduce International transactions to the minimum and 
whatever international transactions were to be carried on, 
would be reduced to bilateral barter^ to mitigate the risk as 
far as possible. A stable exchange rate was, therefore, an 
essential prerequisite for a high level of international 
trade.
Both stable exchange rates and balance of payments equi­
librium were thus found to be equally essential for a high 
level of International trade, but they would go ill together 
and were obviously contradictory, because the sacrifice of 
the one was the means of attaining the other. If equilibr­
ium in the balance of payments was maintained, exchange rates 
would fluctuate and, if on the other hand, exohange rate*were 
kept stable, the balance of payments was bound to suffer. It 
is at this point that the service of the gold standard lay, 
because the system maintained the balance of payments equi­
librium without more than nominal fluctuations (within gold 
points) in the exohange rate. In fact, stability of ex­
change rates was the fundamental characteristic of the Inter­
national Gold Standard system.
Thus, the rationale of the observance of the gold stand- 
ared rules lay in the very necessity of having any internat­
ional trade at all. It Is a well-known fact that the dif­
ferent countries of the world are endowed with different
kav£
natural resources and their peoples/attained different grades 
of Industrial training; in consequenoe, international trade 
oaould confer immense advantages arising from both geographical
and international division of labour. In fact, the attain­
ment of these advantages of International trade was the only 
raison d’etre of the International Gold Standard system.
But the maintenance of the gold standard necessitated a 
fairly heavy sacrifice. When a country under the gold stand­
ard system suffered from an unfavourable balance of payments, 
it was obliged to export gold and to reduce its credit circu­
lation at a multiple rate, which, in turn, reduced its price- 
level. Declining prices reduced profitability of Invest­
ments and thereby investments themselves. When the entre­
preneurs diminished their Investments, they diminished simul­
taneously the volume of employment and income of the society. 
In the reverse case, when a country had a favourable balance 
of payments, it increased its prices, employment and income. 
Thus, the gold standard countries maintained their balance of 
payments equilibrium at stable exchange rates by constantly 
fluctuating the level of their Internal economic activities. 
This involved heavy frictional losses in the oonstant shifts 
of export and import industries of a country and Immense hu­
man suffering in the occasional losses of employment and in­
come. Nevertheless, the attainment of the advantages of in­
ternational trade by observing the gold standard rules regard­
less ofikeiv effects on the level of Internal economic activity 
was the reoognised objective of monetary management In the 
different countries of the world till the First World War In­
tervened and smashed the gold standard system.
12.
Section 3: The objectives of Monetary Management
f r o n T B i n o  19517*   * C-----
‘The maintenance of a high level of International trade 
was not only supposed to be the main objective of monetary 
management, but people were not even conscious before 
World War I that money oould, or should, be managed to at­
tain any other objective. When the International Gold 
Standard system broke down under the*Impact of the war, 
there emerged autonomous national currencies consisting of 
inconvertible paper moneys. A good part of war expendi­
tures in the belligerent countries was financed by printing 
of currency notes. Though excessive issues of paper money 
led to inflationary tendencies in many cases yet it attained 
•che main purpose of commandeering economic resources for war
purposes. In some cases it put unemployed labour and cap-
to
ital in/the production of war materials, while in other 
cases it diverted ecohomic resources from the production of 
civilian consumption goods to that of war supplies. War 
finance thus demonstrated that the supply of money could not 
only be increased almost indefinitely without any reference 
to gold reserves, but this increased money had the same power 
as the pre-existing money to commandeer economic resources 
for a set purpose.
On the termination of the war, a movement was set afoot 
to manage the monetary systems of the different countries 
with the object of stabilising their economic activities.
This new trend of thought advocated the non-restoration of 
the International Gold standard and dubbed it a barbarous
13.
relic. "All of us,n declared J.M.Keynes in 1923, "from the
Governor of the Bank of England downwards, are now primarily
interested in preserving the stability of business, prices
and employment and are not likely when the choice is forced
(1)
on us, deliberately to sacrifice these to outworn dogmas."
The exponents of this school of thought wanted to maintain 
the level of economic activity of the different countries un­
diminished, by utilizing the newly discovered power of manoeuvr­
ing the supply of money without any reference to gold reserves.
It was, no doubt, true that excessive supplies of paper 
money during the war created a measure of inflation which did 
not stop even after the suspension of hostilities. Many in­
digent governments of war-torn Europe continued to increase
the supply of their paper money to run their tottering admin-
the
istrations. In some cases/increased supply of money and con­
sequent Inflation were so excessive that their currencies were 
ruined. These practices caused inconvertible paper moneys to 
be generally discredited but, nevertheless, the extreme elas­
ticity of the supply of money - even maintaining its convert­
ibility in gold - was not lost sight of. Not only currency
almost
notes, but cheque-money as well, could be expanded to/any de­
gree to meet the demand for any high level of economic activ­
ity of a society. It was not for the metallic content that 
a person accepted money - a currency note had no metallic con­
tent. It was not for a government fiat that money was 
accepted - a cheque had no flat, it was simply an optional
(1) "A Tract on Monetary Reform", by J.M.Keynes, 1923. Ch.4.
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money. People accepted a currency note and a cheque quite 
readily because they could make purchases with them as with 
metallic coins and, at the same time, paper money was more 
handy to use and cheaper to issue. Paper money that was or­
dinarily accepted in exchange for goods was simply an I.O.U.
A currency-note, for example, was a ’promise to pay’ by the 
Central Bank of the country. A cheque was also a ’promise 
to pay’ by the drawer of the cheque as well as the bank on 
which it was drawn. The important point in this connection 
lay in the fact that, if mere I.O.U.’s could acquire general 
purchasing power and become money, obviously there could be 
any amount of suoh I.O.U.’s to finance people to any extent.
In fact, a banking community with a Central Bank at its 
apex need not have felt any limit to its money-making power, 
except its own judgement. The ordinary cheque-paying banks 
could take advantage of the banking habit of modern people 
of keeping their cash balances, not with themselves, but with 
banks as deposits and could thereby create any amount of money 
by simply lending deposits to borrowers. Borrowers volunta­
rily took loans in the form of deposits which were then trans­
ferred to the accounts of persons from whom the former made 
their purchases. When the sellers spent their money, the 
deposits were transferred once again in the banks’ books to 
other accounts. In this way, deposit was transferred from 
person to person till it came to the credit of the savers 
where it found a resting place. Deposits with a bank were 
clearly its debts to the holders of such deposits and as a 
bank created these deposits by simply advancing money to bor-
15
rowers, it seemed to possess power to create I.O.TJ.’s of a 
deposit-money type, to any extent.
Although a bank oould create deposit-money to any ex­
tent, yet the money thus created did not belong to the bank. 
Every depositor with a bank was its creditor to the extent of 
his deposit which was consequential to a loan granted by the 
bank to a borrower. In other words, the bank was simply the 
Intermediary between the depositor and the borrower. But 
the peculiarity of the transaction lay in the fact that the 
depositor was under the impression that his money was with 
the bank while the bank had already lent his money, not only 
without his knowledge, but also without his permission and in 
anticipation of his deposit forthcoming. As deposits ulti­
mately passed to the credit of the savers, banking might be 
considered as a device for lending savers1 money to borrowers 
without the savers’ knowledge and consent and often In antici­
pation of their saving. This power of the banks to manipu­
late other’s money appeared like that of creating money out oi 
nothing.
This money-making power of a bank was limited by the fact 
that all the probable receivers of cheques or deposit money 
might not be the bank’s own clients. Loans granted by one 
bank might result not in its own deposits, but in the deposits 
of another bank. Though the mutual demands of the different 
banks on behalf of their clients’ deposits might just balance, 
there were possibilities of inter-bank inequalities of de­
mand. But these inequalities could be very easily adjusted 
if there existed a Central Bank to act as a clearing house.
If in place of one bank, we assume a banking system with a 
Central Bank at its apex, its deposit-making power would be 
extremely elastic.
Again, people converted a certain part of their deposits 
into cash because some transactions could be more conveniently 
done by cash or legal tender money. The banks were, there­
fore, obliged to keep a corresponding reserve in legal tender 
money to meet such demands. But as cash transactions of this 
type constituted a small proportion of the total transactions, 
the reserve requirements of the bank for this purpose were 
quite low. In England, for example, 10$ was the usual figure 
taken for safety’s sake and the banks could extend loans to 
the extent of ten times their reserves. Hius, the bulk of 
the money that effected transactions in an advanced community 
was deposlt-money unoovered by any cash and oreated and safe­
guarded by securities representing the titles fcd real goods 
and properties exchanged. As long as there were genuine 
transactions ifi goods and real properties, these could be 
effected by deposit-money based on the confidence of the pub­
lic in their banks.
The 10$ reserve which the banks generally kept need not 
have been gold reserves. Legal tender money consisting of 
overvalued coins of base metals or ourrency notes could as 
well serve this purpose. For internal purposes, therefore, 
gold reserves were not at all necessary. The confidence of 
the public on which the bulk of the deposit money depended, 
might, however, be shaken on oooasions and a run on banks 
might develop. In such crises, banks would be obliged to
take loans from the Central Bank of the oountry in terms of 
legal tender notes, and oheque money would be replaoed by 
ourreney notes. Notes and deposits, however, were simply 
different types of loan deeds to humour the different prefer­
ences of savers. 'Baking the Issuers of cheques and notes as 
a composite monetary authority, it seemed that the confidence 
of the public in their monetary authority was extremely great 
and on that basis the latter could issue loans and increase 
the supply of money to any desired extent.
Now, if the monetary authority of a oountry freely ex­
tended loans on easy terms to the entrepreneurs, the latter 
would extend their scale of production and would thereby in­
crease the employment and income of the society. By with­
holding and stiffening the terms of loans, the monetary auth­
orities could compel the entrepreneurs to curtail their scale 
of production and thereby reduce the employment and income of 
the sooiety. By adjusting their loan policy, the monetary 
authority could, therefore, maintain a stable level of eco­
nomic activity of a society, and this was what J.M.Keynes and 
other exponents of the new school of thought after World War I 
wanted the monetary authority to do. This new ideal of mone­
tary management was epitomised in the development and perfec­
tion of the Central Banking theory in the twenties, which 
specifically assigned to the Central Bank the task of stabil­
ising the level of productive activity of its society.
But the supporters of the old system wanted to restore 
the gold standard in the pre-war form and to continue monetary
18
management with the old objective of a high level of inter­
national trade. They not only succeeded in rehabilitating 
the International Gold Standard by 1925, but they also carv­
ed out a place for their gold standard in the perfected the­
ory of Central Banking. In addition to the maintenance of 
the internal productive stability of its country, the Central
Bank was also required to maintain its external stability.
the
That is, the Central Bank was to be the keeper of/national 
gold reserve and had to maintain the balance of payments equi­
librium of the country. Simultaneous attainment of both in­
ternal and external stability was thus made the objectives of 
monetary management in the twenties.
The basic incongruity of the two ideals was either mis­
understood or deliberately overlooked. The monetary author­
ities were required to observe gold standard rules as well as 
to maintain internal productive activity, but in practice they 
could not do either t h a n  effectively. Often the two ideals 
were in open conflict. The countries having favourable bal- 
ancej^of payments could not allow the consequential gold im­
ports to exert their full influence on prices, employment and 
investment because that Involved a dislocation of domestic 
economic activity. Gold imports, therefore, began to be in­
creasingly neutralised. In U.S.A., neutralisation of gold 
was pushed to such an extent that the world value of gold was 
made to keep parity with the value of the U.S. dollar. Gold 
movements practically ceased to have any influence on the for­
tunes of American investment, employment and price-level. 
Similarly Prance accumulated a huge supply of gold, second
only to that of U.S.A., but its effect on the French price- 
level was very slight. On the other hand, countries, such 
as Great Britain, which har unfavourable balanoei of payments, 
were not either willing or able to reduce their cost of pro­
duction or employment to the desired extent to restore their 
balance of payments equilibrium, because that involved a dis­
location in their internal economy. Thus, the currency sys­
tem operated in a manner that deviated a good deal from a 
model gold standard. The deficit balances of many countries 
went on increasing and were destined to bring about a crash 
sooner or later.
On the other hand, monetary authorities could not effec­
tively maintain their internal economic stability because it 
clashed with their observance of gold standard rules. An 
internally generated crisis in 1929 brought about a complete 
collapse of the American import market, and confronted most 
of the countries of the world with sharply deteriorating de­
ficit balances of payments. As their gold reserves were re­
quired to the fullest extent to protect the gold standard, 
they could not expand their money supply to arrest the deter­
ioration of internal economic activity. Thus in 1931, not 
only the gold standard broke down, but all the countries were 
at the lowest level of depression. Both international trade 
and domestic productivity sank very low and were on the down­
ward grade.
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Seotion 4; Monetary Management from 1931 to 1956.
The American crisis of 1929, by creating acute balance of 
payments difficulties in many countites and drying up their 
gold reserves, finally broke down the International Gold 
Standard system in 1931. The gold standard was thus revealed 
as a fine-weather-craft which could funotion easily in a per­
iod of prosperity, but was almost certain to collapse if a 
crisis developed in any of the major import markets of the 
world. The management of money in accordance with the gold 
standard rules, so as to have a high level of international 
trade, was thus found to be associated with a sinister functlp 
which was capable of disorganizing the productive activities 
of all the countries of the world and bringing acute distress 
to all in periods of depression. Not only was internal eco­
nomic activity reduced by the depression, but International 
trade itself was diminished to abnormally low figures. The 
depression, therefore, not only broke down the gold standard, 
but also discredited it as a mechanism to maintain raukfcaiftsl- 
ijr a high level of international trade. This, In turn, led 
to the discarding of the very ideal for which the gold stand­
ard stood,simply because it was unattainable. Thus, with 
the liquidation of the gold standard in the early thirties, 
the attempt to regulate money to attain a high level of in­
ternational trade was given up by most of the countries of 
the world. Attention was thenceforward concentrated in the 
maintenance of internal economic activity only.
But the pursuit of a policy of internal stability was 
also found to be fraught with serious complications. It
had long been thought (as, indeed, was oorne out by the conaitioi 
of the proeperity-boom in the twenties) that the monetary authorj 
ties by simply increasing the volume of loans to the entrepreneuj 
could correspondingly increase investments, employment and savin* 
of the society* During the depression the inability of Ureat 
Britain and other deficit countries to expand loans (due to the 
drying up of their reserves) could, therefore, be assumed to be 
the cause why their internal productive activity coula not be 
maintained* After the de-linking of the sterling from gold in 
1931, ureat Britain adopted an easy money policy and her antreprc 
neurs availed themselves of this opportunity to inaugurate an 
expansionary programme which continued throughout the thirties* 
But the situation was fundamentally different in other countries 
ana particularly in surplus countries such as U.B.A. where the 
virulence of depression was particularly acute*
In 1929, U.S.A* had a huge Oold reserve ana, after the onset 
of the depression, her favourable balance expanded and her reser­
ves were strengthened* There was, therefore, no difficulty on hei 
part in adopting a policy of cheap money and thus, as westhou0ht; 
maintaining the internal economic activity from the very beginn­
ing of the depression* But the real difficulty was that the Ameri 
can entrepreneurs become completely impervious to any cheap monej 
policy* They were not willing to borrow money on any conditions 
and were not in a mood to undertake any investments whatsoever* 
It was then found that the extension of loons aid not depend on 
the monetary authority alone* Unless borrowers were forthcoming
to take loans, the monetary author-
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ity could not expand loans by its unilateral efforts* The entrepr 
eneurs, who were so long supposed to be willing to borrow any 
amount of money which banks were reaay to lend, were found to be 
unable to maintain a steady aemand for money* The analysis of the 
causes of entrepreneurial borrowing ana private investment, as 
well as the trade cyclical theory that tried to explain the forme 
phenomenon, drew marked attention from all* Increased discussions 
on the cyclical theory, supplemented by a wealth of recent experi 
ence of the prosperity-boom of the twenties, gave a perfection ar 
clarity of view to the theory which it never before possessed* 
Private investments were observed to follow a cyclical patt­
ern* At times entrepreneurs became feverishly active as a class 
and went on borrowing and investing until a high peak of employ­
ment and production was reached* Prom this peak a recession betoai 
after a sudden outbreak of business failures* Prom that level 
production and employment sank to their lowest depth, only to 
rise once again*
The periodicity of depression and prosperity was caused by 
several factors* During the depression, an economy, almost as a 
matter of course, came to have unemployed labour and capital on 
the one hand and accumulating replacement demand and potential 
innovations, providing good inve/stment propositions on the othe: 
As a result of the combination of these forces, investment reviv- 
ed again sooner or later* With the increase of investment, the 
income of the people went on increasing and the Increased Income 
augmented the demand for consumption goods* The greater demand
for consumption increased,in turn,the demand for capital goods* 
_________________  This justi-
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fled the previous investments and stimulated further invest­
ments and the spiralling up of demand for consumption goods, 
inoome and investment continued until all the unemployed fac­
tors ct production were fully employed.
In the upswing of income and investment, certain dispro-
(1 )
portionalities in investment occurred almost automatically. 
Even after the beginning of the revival, the low rate of inteiv 
est continued for some time more and tended to increase the 
value of capital goods at an accelerated rate while the value 
of consumption goods increased pari passu with income but with­
out any acceleration. Moreover, investment in capital goods 
took a much longer time to increase their supply and thereby 
to influence their price than was the case with consumption 
goods. During this whole period when the increased demand 
for capital goods could not be satisfieddue to their non-com­
pletion in a serviceable form, Investment in capital goods 
industries continued at an accelerated rate until too much 
capital investment was effected. At full employment level it 
was thus found that Investment in capital goods industries was 
much greater than the demand for capital goods (that is, the 
volume of spontaneous saving) at that level while the demand 
for consumption goods was greater than their supply. Moreover, 
once the maladjusted investments were undertaken, they could 
not be corrected by transferring some investment from capital 
goods industries to consumption goods industries. The sus­
pension of the production of capital goods industries before
(1) "Prosperity Decade: A Chapter from American Economic 
History 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 2 9 by George Soule, 1947. pp.275-288.
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a technical point of completion, involved a dead loss on all 
the previous expenditure on that line. On the other hand, 
once completed, it was unthinkable to transfer it to other 
uses. To convert a cotton-loom producing plant into a cot- 
ton-loom, meant scrapping the plant Itself and writing it 
off as a dead loss.
As the supply of capital goods became greater than the 
demand for them at full employment, their prices began to 
fall and the producers thereof found themselves in great 
difficulties.- When the producers1 assets decreased in 
value, the banks began to refuse them further accommodation 
and even began to recall the loans already advanced. This 
necessarily led to business failures and the banks were 
scared and raised their interest rates to prohibitive 
heights. The rise in interest rates reduced the value of 
capital goods at a precipitous rate and caused investment in 
capital goods to be suspended completely. Reduction of em­
ployment led to a shrinking of production and income. The 
consequent diminution of effective demand, in the face of a 
supply that in some cases was still increasing, led to a 
sharp fall in prices. The declining cycle of investment, 
income and prices continued until the rock-bottom of de­
pression was reached.
Over and above these almost mechanical causes of fluctu­
ations in entrepreneurial investment, probably it was in 
their very hature that private entrepreneurs did suffer from 
occasional spasms of bearishness and bullishness. Bearish- 
ness7that led to a deficiency in private investment^origin­
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ated from the entrepreneur’s anticipation of a consumption 
demand which was insufficient to give full employment. But 
deficient Investment resulting from this anticipation of de­
ficiency, made consumption demand still more deficient be­
cause many men were rendered unemployed and without incomes. 
The entrepreneurial anticipation was thus materialised and 
they reduced their Investment all the more, Onoe the spiral 
was on, it was not possible for th© entrepreneurs to get out 
of that vicious circle. Only if the government undertook 
investment in the faoe of the prevailing trend of bearish­
ness, increased demand stimulated by government Investment 
expenditure would begin to Increase the profitability of in­
vestment and would ultimately reverse the trend of bearish­
ness altogether. In the case of extreme bullishness of 
private investment expenditure, a deliberate curtailing of 
government Investment expenditure would reduce private in­
come and would curb the bullishness of private entrepreneurs. 
Thus, fluctuations in private Investment could be eliminated 
by the government if it always stood ready to make up the de­
ficit in private investment whenever the latter showed any 
tendency to slacken.
It was thus apparent that what was needed was not only 
a consistent easy money polioy by the monetary authority, but 
also a compensatory investment policy either undertaken or 
sub vented by the government to maintain a stable demand for 
money. During the first half of the thirties, most of the 
leading countries of the world adopted an antl-cyollcal pol­
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icy of stimulating domestic economic activity, by regulating 
both demand for and supply of money - particularly the former 
• to extricate their economies from the clutches of the Groat 
Depression* On the supply side, the cheap money policy was 
the main device adopted* Tlie low rate of interest was ex­
pected to lower the cost of production of the entrepreneurs 
and to increase the profitability of investment* The novel­
ty of the measure lay in the faot that under the gold stand­
ard regime interest rate could be lowered only when the re- 
serve position was strong and improving* The gold reserves 
of U.S.A. were very big and she could afford to adopt a low 
interest policy. But the situation in Great Britain and 
Germany was exactly the reverse and under orthodox finance 
they had5 to raise their rates of Interest. But in all 
these countries a low interest policy was followed, showing 
thereby that it was motivated by desires of recovery irres­
pective of the reserve position of the countries concerned.
On the demand side, attempts were made to increase the 
purchasing power of consumers, either by direot distribution 
of relief among the distressed, or by direct undertaking of 
investments by the governments which increased the income of 
the employees and thereby their purchasing power. This in­
creased purchasing power (or demand) stimulated economic act­
ivity and production and thereby tended to reverse the trend 
of depression. Due to various favourable circumstances, 
Great Britain was not in need of supplementing her demand by 
any such measures. But in U.S.A. and Gemmany the intensity 
of depression necessitated a vigorous application of these
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demand-stimulating-measures. m  U.S.A. the miseries of 
some sections of the unemployed were so great that the gov- 
eminent had to provide relief on an extensive scale with 
money borrowed from the Federal Reserve Banks. Huge public 
works were also undertaken primarily to distribute relief 
rather than to create employment, or increase production.
All these measures, directly and indirectly, stimulated the 
effective demand of the oountry which could not but give a 
fillip to her productive activity. unfortunately, the fall 
in investment expenditure of the local governments during the 
same period neutralised the demand-stinulatlng-effect of a 
part of the central government's expenditure. Public in­
vestment in Germany, particularly as a part of the rearmament 
programme, increased demand to such an extent that It ran a- 
head of production even at full employment level. Recovery 
attained by these measures varied from moderate prosperity in 
U.S.A., to full employment In Germany - Great Britain stand­
ing in between the two.
Section 5: Monetary Management from 1936 to 1939:
Deliberate Adjustmentof Demand for and Supply of
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Money at Full Employment X evel.
In 1936 when rearmament investment was maintaining full 
employment in Germany, J,11.Keynes published his famous work 
"The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money" In 
which he convincingly argued that public investment, by mak­
ing potentialjdemand effective, was capable of attaining and 
maintaining full employment, provided investment was suffici­
ent in volume and adequate for the purpose. Before 1936, 
monetary policies were not directed to the attainment of full
employment. The object of the policies pursued was either recove 
ry or anti-cyclical, ana their aim was at best to carry the 
economies back to the prosperity level of the twenties. The full 
employment attained in Germany was incidental to the rearmament 
policy. But Keynesian analysis claimed full employment to be the 
continuous objective of monetary policy. His theory at once 
captured the imagination of the scietific world and received the 
adherence of a wide circle of supporters. The full employment
theory as further embellished by Keynes himself and his followeri
the
was epitomised in the theory ojp' full employment budget that was
formulated in the closing years of the thirties and early fortiei
the
The theory of/ full employment budget advocated the undertak­
ing of additional expenditure by the government over and above 
its ordinary financial expenditure, both of which were to be co­
ordinated with private expenditure so as to create full employ-
d)
ment. For such a budget, the government had first of all to 
make an overall estimate of the total expenditure required to 
attain full employment. After ascertaining this total volume of 
expenditure, it was next necessary to estimate the private expen< 
diture on investment and consumption that would be forthcoming 
at the level of full employment and the corresponding national 
income with the existing scale and structure of taxation. Lastly 
the essential and desirable state expenditure had to be estimatei 
Now, this state expenditure, together with private expenditure, 
must make up a total commensurate with full employment. If the
(1) "Monetary Theory", by G.N. Halm, 1946. p. 449
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total exceeded the level commensurate with full employment, the 
excess acted as the inflationary gap which had to be corrected 
either by levying additional taxes on consumption or by reducing 
state expenditure* If the total, on the other hand fell short of 
that commensurate with full employment, the deficiency served as 
a deflationary gap, which had to be rectified by an increased 
Ooverriment expenditure on investment having general social utilit, 
With a full employment budget, not only would the cyclical patter; 
of investment be eliminated but investment at the full employment 
level should also be attained*
There are certain limitations to the success of such a policy 
In the first place, certain factors of production may be in 
short supply. If, for example, all the items of the various 
factors of production were lying idle in huge quantities with 
the exception of machine repairers, a full employment policy 
would have its attempted expansion of production seriously oostru 
cted at the bottleneck of machine repaieers* The machine needing 
repair might keep hundreds of workers and thousands of pounds 
worth of machinery absolutely idle* Attempts to employ all the 
workers on the remaining machines that were in running order woul 
yield sharply diminishing returns* huch attempts would raise cost 
of production very precipitously without increasing appreciably 
the volume of production* In extreme cases, it might be more pro­
fitable to keep a Ooou number of workers on the dole rather
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than in unproductive employment.
In the second place, changes in demand for some commodities, 
or changes in the technique of production in certain lines, are 
almost always occurring in this dynamic world. Because of such 
rises ana falls in individual industries, it becomes necessary 
to transfer labour and capital from declining industries to ones 
which ore thriving. But it is difficult for both labour and 
capital to effect the necessary transfer. The loss of training 
in one occupation, the time ana expense needed to acquire new tra­
ining for another, the break-up of luuu&Ang established societies i 
in declining areas, and the difficulty of housing them in new 
areas, cause great friction and suffering in the movement of 
labour from one industry to another. Transfer of capital is still 
more difficult as it means considerable loss on the values of 
capital goods and it might be less harmful to work half-capacity 
in the declining lines than to re-tool capital equipment for 
other lines. Due to these various reasons, there is likely 
always to be a certain percentage of unemployed men on shift 
from one industry to another. Monetary policy could not possibly 
eliminate this type of unemployment for which the more appropriat< 
cures are organization of labour exchanges, labour training and 
housing accomodation in developing areas for facilitating trans­
fer of labour, anu compensation to the capitalists to secure tne 
transfer of capital. When a monetary policy to secure full employ 
ment is obstructed at some obstinate oottlenecks or at the out-*
N
skirts of structural maladjustments, further expehditure can not
increase proauction but is simply manifested in increasing prices 
In the third place, a full employment policy always faces a 
potential danger of inflation due to the probable pressure from 
labourers for a general rise of wages. With full employment, the 
bargaining power is tilted in favour of the labourers, because th 
atmand for labour tenas to outstrip the availaole suj>ply. Labour­
ers, therefore, can fairly easily enforce a general increase in 
wage rates that is not offset by an equivalent increase in produc 
tion. This increase in wage rates increases costs, which in turn, 
raises the price of commodities in general. The wage-earners will 
suffer as consumers to an extent at least equal to the rise in 
their wage rates and this will impel them to demand a further 
increase in wage rates. A spiral of increased prices and wages 
will thus be started ana would turn into a ^eneral inflation. Pr< 
ssure for high wages, whether sectional or general, being the 
source of an inflationary spiral must be squarely faced and checi 
ed from the start. This uoes not mean that there is no room for 
any increase in wages under a full employment policy. If as a 
result of better training or technical development, the products 
vity of labour increases, then increased wages even to the fulles 
extent of increased productivity, will not raise costs of produc 
tion and prices. But any attempt to increase wages beyond produc 
ivity level will create inflation which will alter tne distribu­
tion of wealth in favour of businessmen ana the wealthier classe 
and to the detriment of wage-earners and other fixed income- 
earners. The propensity to consume of the upper classes being
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lower than that of the poorer classes, inflation tends to diminis 
the effective demand of the society and ultimately to disorganize 
and frustrate the full employment policy itself. The maintenance 
of sufficient expenditure ana the avoidance of inflation are, 
therefore, the two sine qua nons of a full employment policy.
Before the full employment theory was formulated in 1936, Ger 
man (rearmament) full employment was alreauy encountering almost 
all the difficulties enumerated aoove. Her rearmament proauction 
was obstructed by an acute scarcity of some essential raw materia 
Is, on the one hand, and trained labour, on the other. Her 
economjr was, in adaition, subjected to a strong inflationary 
pressure. Germany met the situation by controlling almost all the 
aspects of her economic life including wages and prices.
After 1936, recovery measures in certain countries became 
consciously full employment policies. Sweden provided a model 
example of compensatory government expenditure, without being 
marred by/rearmament programme, to maintain full employment. But 
it was rearmament investment (even before the world war began) 
that attained full employment in alhost all the industrialised 
countries pf the world.
Section 6; The Repercussions on International Trade caused by 
Increased Internal Activity.
The increase in domestic economic activity attained by 
various countries by monetary measures had far-reaching repercu­
ssions on their international trade. The recovery expenditures 
of the different governments tended to energise the waning demand 
of the people by placing purchasing power in their hands. The
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recipients of this new income dia not restrict their purchases to 
domestic products; a part was spent on goods from outside. Hence, 
all these increased monetary expenditures of the governments , 
for whatever purpose they haa been intended, had the inherent 
tendency to turn the balance of payments against the spending 
country. The deficit countries had to take measures to restore 
their balance of payments equilibrium, either to protect their 
gold reserves, or from the sheer necessity of providing the means 
of* foreign payments. Exchange depreciation was the readiest 
method to attain this end. If a country, suffering from oalance 
of payments disequilibrium, depreciated her currency to the 
extent likely to be brought about by market conditions, equili­
brium could be restored without harming others or restricting 
international trade. Hut if depreciation was carried to a 
degree greater than that which competitive forces would have 
brought about, the balance of payments would turn in favour of 
the depreciating country and against ocher countries. In fact, 
many countries having recourse to this device carried the degree 
of depreciation beyond the equilibrium level. Competitive 
exchange depreciation of this type enabled a country to extend 
its foreign markets, increase its exports and thereby increase 
the scope of domestic production ana employment. Hut this automa 
tically meant the restriction of the market for other countries 
and, in consequence, a contraction of their volume of production
and employment •
In order to protect their reserves and to restore their 
competitive position, other countries were compelled to take 
defensive measures, depreciating their own currencies, not 
only by wiping out the advantages of the first depreciating 
country, but by overdoing depreciation and creating competi­
tive advantages for themselves* This engendered counter- 
retaliatory depreciation on the part of the first depreciat­
ing country. The currency history of the thirties recorded 
a complete devaluation oycle of this nature - a persistent 
rate-war. The attempt to seize each others* markets and to 
benefit at the cost of others impelled all to take measures 
against imports and thereby to restrict the volume of inter­
national trade itself. Moreover, it brought an element of 
risk into the domain of international exchange and this in­
creasingly curtailed foreign trade all the more.
In the rate-war of the thirties and the rush for foreign 
markets, it was not economically feasible for all countries to 
have recourse to competitive exchange depreciation. Public 
opinion in Germany and France, for example, was against de­
preciation, because it wrongly identified depreciation with 
inflation. Moreover, depreciation was a costly process: it
meant the exchange of more domestic goods for the same amount 
of foreign goods and, in the case of some countries, it proved 
to be a ruinous process. To prosecute her rearmament pro­
gramme, Germany, for example, required large supplies of for­
eign raw materials which could be supplied by the countries of 
South-East Europe, which were suffering from a scarcity of 
markets for these goods because of keen competition from over-
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seas producers. Despite her own urgent needs for these raw 
materials, Germany was in an advantageous position^being vir­
tually the sole-purchaser. But, on the other hand, she was
the
not in a position to supply manufacturing goods 6f/quality 
and quantity required by these countries. In these circum­
stances, if Germany had lowered her exchange rate, the price 
of her imports would have increased and that of exports 
would have fallen, but the sale of the latter would not have 
Increased an iota. This would have made the means of her 
foreign payments ta shrink all the more. It was, thus, to 
her interest not to lower the exchange-rate, if not to raise 
it, and to make purchases to the limit of her paying capac­
ity. But as the paying capacity itself was meagre, it be­
came necessary to restrict tea imports to the most essential 
goods. For this reason, the German Government took over all 
the foreign exchange available from exporters and other pos­
sessors of foreign money and distributed it among importers 
or other persons who required foreign money. This exchange 
control by the Government was utilised not only for effecting 
a rationed adjustment of demand and supply of foreign exchange 
but also to divert foreign trade into the channels desired by 
the Government. Thus, exchange control not only reduced in­
ternational trade, but it diverted it from its natural 
channels.
Under the impact of exchange, depreciation and exchange 
control, international trade between countries became well- 
nigh impossible. The countries needing to carry on trade 
had to enter into various types of bilateral trade agree-
ments such as clearing and payments systems, reciprocal 
arrangements, bulk-purchase and even direct barter of com­
modities. These trade agreements themselves, however, open­
ed a new vista of international trade, though of a more re­
stricted type than multilateral world trade. By her ingenu­
ous clearing and payments agreements, Germany carved out a cur­
rency area with countries in South-East Europe. Under the 
Cordell Hull system, U.S.A. developed a type of dollar area 
within which trade became slightly freer. The remaining
gold standard countries of western and central Europe were
with-
automatioally found to form a gold bloc,/in which trade was 
less obstructed than between the bloc and the outside world. 
But the most significant currency bloc was the sterling area, 
which was brought into being almost spontaneously by the 
British Empire countries and some non-Empire countries depend­
ing on Great Britain as their main market,by stabilizing their 
currencies in terms of sterling after the breakdown of the 
gold standard in 1931. There was no exohange control within 
the sterling areatand within each of these monetary blocs, 
trade was comparatively more freely conducted than between 
these blocs.
In spite of the mitigating effects of the currency blocs, 
international trade was not only redirected and diminished in 
volume, but it was subjected to all kinds of vexatious con­
trols. Despite a considerable increase in the internal eco­
nomic activity of most of the advanced countries - in some 
cases exceeding the high-water-mark of 1929 - the internation­
al trade of these countries was well below the levels attained
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by them in 1929. Moreover, it was obvious that the expansion of 
their proauction was mainly of an autarchic nature. The very 
necessity of all types of trade restricting devices proved the 
immense advantages tnat coula be derived from a freer internatli 
nal trade. If trade had been free, even a somewhat lesser volum< 
of Internal production would have 0iven a net balance of advanti 
ges to each of the countries concerned. In some cases, the 
autarchic ends of production were so palpably inefficient that 
the enthusiasm for conducting monetary management so as to 
stimulate domestic economic productivity began to wane, particu­
larly during the closing years of the thirties.
Section 7; Simultaneous Attainment of Internal ana External 
Objectives becomes the aim of konetary management in tne 1940ts<
The exigencies of the tteconu World War again compelled 
the belligerent countries to have recourse to tne manufacture oJ 
money to an enormous extent. In some countries such as U.d.A. 
and, to some extent, .England, the war demand put a considerable 
volume of unoccupied labour and capital to work and there was &i 
immense increase in the net volume of production. In countries 
such as India, the net increase in production was relatively 
smaller than the diversion of production from consumption goods 
to war materials. Partly because of this diversion and partly
VA.C
because of^starving of consumption demand, there were inflation­
ary tendencies in all the belligerent countries. In the 
advanced countries such as England, inflation was kept in
check by price control and rationing,
while the same tasks were very inefficiently done in count­
ries such as India and this made the incidence of the war 
burden unnecessarily heavy in the latter countries. But, 
whatever was the relative burden, the fact remains that 
paper money financed this colossal war effort and demonstrat­
ed once again its power to attain a set purpose. This led 
people naturally to infer that in peace-time also paper money 
should similarly be able to finance a correspondingly huge 
productive effort to inorease the volume of consumption goods.
Much more prominently did the war conditions underline 
the immense advantages that international trade conferred on 
the peoples of the world and of which they were being depri­
ved at that time. The advantages of the attenuated inter­
national trade that could be, and was, carried on during the 
war were too immense to be overlooked by anyone. War sup­
plies from America saved Europe from utter destruction. At 
the same time war demand proved extremely beneficial to the 
Amerioan economy. During the thirties, U.S.A. was making 
strenuous efforts to acquire more and more foreign markets in 
support of her domestic production and, despite the adoption 
of various forms of "beggar my neighbour" policy, could not 
get rid of a huge unemployment problem. But during the war, 
demand for war materials not only provided full employment for 
American workers, but held out hopes that in the post-war 
years also reconstruction and development demand would main­
tain this full employment. In India and, to a certain ex­
tent, in all the belligerent and even neutral countries, peo­
ple in general suffered extreme privation: during the war
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years from the ©locking of international trade ana the nonavaila­
bility of foreign consumption ^oods. Moreover, war proauction in 
Inaia could not be expanaea to the aesirea extent aue to the non­
availability of capital equipment ana trained labour from foreign 
countries which were involved in the war. The olockij% of inter­
national trade , therefore, meant an immense economic loss to 
India. War experience thus abundantly demonstrated that the 
maintenance of a high level of international trade was as essent­
ial an economic objective as the stimulation of internal economic 
activity.
Theorists at the same time be^an to argue that the two moi 
etary objectives that hela the field at different times, that is, 
the maintenance of a high level of international trade up to the 
twenties and the stimulation of internal productivity thereafter, 
could be simultaneously pursuea if the different countries of the
d )
world were willing to co-operate on monetary matters. The attain 
ment of the external monetary objectives involving the maintenance 
of the balance of payments equilibrium and stable exchange rates 
was always dependent on international co-operation. The inter­
national Gold standard system that constituted the means by which 
the external monetary objective was pursued, was itself a metnod o
(1) "Preliminary Draft Outline of a Proposal for an International
Stabilization Pund of the United and Associated "ations."
Revised, July 10, 1943, Washington, D.C. (White Plan).
«
"Proposals for an International Clearing Union." Lonaon,
H.M. Stationary Office, Coma. 6437, April 7, 1943.
(Keynes Plan)•
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International monetary co-operation. The existence of the 
gold standard depended on the observance of the gold standard 
rules by the countries participating in the system. This in­
volved the regulation of the monetary supply of a country in 
accordance with its balance of payments situation and gold 
movements. The gold standard prevailed as long as inter­
national co-operation in the observance of these rules exist­
ed. When in the twenties international co-operation in these 
rules was lacking, the gold standard system broke down. Due 
to the absence of this co-operation, the gold standard could 
not be restored in the thirties. The different countries re­
fused their co-operation in the observance of the gold stand­
ard rules (that is, in the maintenance of balance of payments 
equilibrium and stable exchange rates) because that involved 
fluctuations in internal economy. But if the balance of pay­
ments equilibrium (without involving fluctuations in the ex­
change rate) can be attained by methods other than fluctua­
tions in the internal economy, monetary policy can pursue sim- 
Xultanelusly both internal and external objectives. A method 
of this kind is the making up of deficits in balance of pay­
ments of a country by arranging loans from the surplus country 
or countries, or from an International Monetary Fund organised 
for the purpose, so that the deficit country may meet its ob­
ligations without deflationary policies or without fluctuat­
ing its exchange rate. On the other hand, surplus countries, 
by lending out their surpluses, are not required to follow a 
reflationsry policy. Thus the attainment of balance of pay­
ments equilibrium by this method will disturb neither the in-
teroal economy of any country nor its international trade.
The balance of payments difficulties postulated above
a
are generally ofjtemporary or cyclioal nature and the loans 
contracted by the deficit countries are almost automatically 
liquidated on the return of prosperity. There may, however, 
be disequilibrium of a more fundamental nature which may not 
tend to correct itself in the long run. If there are any 
fundamental causes such as different rates of development in 
the technique of production in a particular country and the 
rest of the world, or radical changes in their relative de- 
mand for each others* goods, the particular country concerned 
or the rest of the world, will suffer from an unfavourable 
balanoe, which will go on accumulating and will ultimately 
paralyse international trade for wont of the means of liqui­
dating the balance. Such a disequilibrium can be oorreoted 
only by an appropriate adjustment in the exchange rate. An 
adjustment of exchange rate under these circumstances also 
may cause some disturbance in the existing foreign trade 
transactions, but the advantages of long run equilibrium will 
far outweigh such temporary dislocations.
But whether disequilibrium is temporary or fundamental 
and whether it should be corrected with advanoes from sur­
plus oountrles (or an International Monetary Fund) or by ad­
justment in the exohange rate, it is to be emphasised that 
fixity in exchange rates and equilibrium in the balance of 
payments can be maintained only by International co-operation 
Loans from surplus to deficit countries (or from the Monetary 
Fund) are ex hypothesi international affairs. Adjustment in
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exchange rates also require understanding at least between 
the taoc countries concerned If they are not to lead to far-
reaching stIIs i  such as competitive devaluation. Granted
the
this international co-operation, there is no reason why/mone­
tary objectives of stimulating internal productive activity, 
on the one hand, and attaining a high level of international 
trade, on the other, should not be simultaneously aimed at by 
the monetary policy of a country. A country can apply mone­
tary measures to secure the full employment of its available 
faotors of production and, at the seise time, it can use the 
faotors so effectively that it secures the advantages of in­
ternational division of labour by maximising international 
trade. It is, of course, true that if some countries adopt 
expansionary programmes while other do not, the former will 
increase employment and lnoome faster than the others and 
will, therefore, develop an unfavourable balanoe of payments. 
This will go on accumulating and will ultimately upset the 
mechanism of international payments and thereby throttle in­
ternational trade itself. If, on the other hand, all count­
ries follow an expansionary policy based on the same funda­
mental principles, no balance of payments disequilibrium will 
develop, and all the countries will be in a position to pur­
sue the objectives of maximum production and maximum inter­
national trade.
the attainment of a high level of international trade and 
of domestic eoonomio activity is not, therefore, self-eontra- 
dietory. On the contrary, the maximum development of inter­
national trade is possible only with full employment in all
the countries of the world. When the level of economic activ­
ity in the different economies of the world is lower than 
their respective productive capacities, the scope of inter­
national trade among them becomes correspondingly smaller and 
vice versa. In fact, it has almost Inevitably been observed 
that a high level of international trade has always accompan­
ied and followed a high level of domestic activities of the 
countries concerned. With a low level of internal productiv­
ity, on the other hand, international trade has been found to 
sink very low. Thus, if the productive activities of all 
countries are at their maximum, and if there is no obstacle 
or hindrance to trade among them, their international trade 
should also attain its maximum. The International Gold 
Standard system, which aimed at a high level of international 
trade, did not, and could not, consistently maintain a high 
level of trade simply because it did not concern itself with 
the employment policies of the member countries, but main­
tained a rigorous balanoe of payments equilibrium at all 
levels of employment. Hence, during the depressions, equi­
librium in the balance used to be attained at very low levels 
of economic activity and at low levels of international trade. 
Balanoe of payments equilibrium tended to maximise inter­
national trade only at a given level of economic activity. To 
attain the highest potential level of international trade, 
what is needed is not only :a  balance of payments equilibr­
ium but ctn equilibrium with full employment activities in 
all the countries of the world.
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For maximum internal productive activity to yield the 
maximum international trade, it is absolutely essential that 
trade among the countries be unhampered by restrictions. 
During the thirties, the expansion of the domestic economic 
activities of many countries, which was in some cases phenom­
enal, was not accompanied by a commensurate Increase in in­
ternational trade. This was duB to the prevalence of pro­
tection, exchange control, competitive exohange depredation, 
import control, the quota system and sundry other trade re­
stricting devices. Within living memory, trade among count­
ries was never absolutely free. It was always encumbered 
with all kinds of restrictions and it is similarly encumbered 
now. Hence, the combination of a mdximum internal productiv­
ity with maximum international trade is only a theoretical 
speculation. A situation in which international trade is 
more or less obstructed by artificial barriers is nearer to 
the realities of the economic world.
Accordingly, let us suppose that both XT.S.A. and Great 
Britain have attained full employment but imports into XT.S.A. 
are subjected to high duties. As purchase from America is 
unrestricted, a part of the augmented Income of the British 
people, in consequence of their full employment is almost 
sure to be spent on American goods, the purchase of which will 
fall short of Americans’ purchase of British goods because of 
the American import duty. A deficit balance of Great Britain 
will ensue and this can never be equalised as long as Great 
Britain wfckk maintains full employment expenditure . Equilibr­
ium will be attained only when expenditure and Income in
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Great Britain are reoucea, diminishing thereby xkjs British pur­
chase from America to make them equal British sales to America. 
This will automatically involve partial unemployment and less 
than maximum economic activity in Great Britain. Due to the trade 
restricting policy of America, Great Britain will be able to 
attain neither a high level of domestic economic activity nor a 
high level of international trade* A similar situation will 
arise if, in place of protective duty, we assume America to be 
afflicted with a depression, or assume an excessive volume of 
expenditure in Great Britain.
If Great Britain imposes exchange control and restricts the 
volume of her purchases from America to the value of her exports
to that country,, her additional doses of full employment-expendi-
» . 
ture cannot be spent to purchase America!* goods* With exchange
control. Great Britain can maintain full employment, but this
increased productivity will have no effect in further increasing
her international trade* This increment of production will be of
autarchic type and could be of greater value if trade with
America was free. Though iLrusfficient, this autarchic type of
production is oetter than less production and is more desirable
than the state of unemployment which will otherwise ensue* This
type of full employment with exchange control is also subject to
international approval and, in this case, America* approval*
Though not at all injurious to America, British exchange control
the
may be misinterpreted as a device to restrict/American export 
trade and deserving of reprisals unless Americans are convinced 
that British trade with America can^not increase, in any case
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beyond the limit of her dollar exchange and the abolition of 
British exchange control will not increase her dollar earnings, 
but will only abrogate her autarchic part of production.
Thus granted international co-operation,the monetary policy 
can attain full employment with a high level of international 
trade if there is no undue trade barriers between countries. If 
and when there are serious restrictions to international trade, 
the monetary policy cannot attain the potentially maximum inter­
national trade but for the volume of trade that is possible over 
the barrier, the balance of payments equilibrium must be maintain 
ed to allow that trade to continue. As such an equilibrium is 
likely to leave some unemployment in the society, an autarchic 
full employment policy, unaer the protection of exchange control, 
should utilise the unemployed labour ana other factors of produc­
tion in the expansion of domestic proauction. This also involves 
a measure of international understanding*
Section 8; Major and Minor Economies.
a
The simultaneous maintenance of/ high level of internal econo
♦
mic activity and international trade that has been accepted as th 
objective of monetary management in the present decade is thus 
found to be dependent on the global full employment activity on 
the one h&na and free trade on the other, it is almost axiomatic 
that international traae as an objective of monetary management 
can materialise only to the extent that the countries of the worl 
allow freedom of international exchange. As the matter now stands 
only an international understanding and agreement can liberate to
47.
world trade from the innumerable restrictions tnat are throttling 
it so seriously. The global full employment activity on the other 
hand is dependent on a monetary expenditure that will utilise to 
the full the maximum productive capacity of all the countries of 
the world. If the overall expenditure is greater than what is req 
uired for global full employment, an inflationary pressure will be 
set afoot which will ultimately disorganize the full employment 
policy itself. On the other hand, if the overall expenditure is 
less than is required for global full employment, a depression wil 
set in ana will lower odth the employment activity and the inter­
national trade of the world. The maintenance of the aorrect level 
of expenditure ana effective aemand at tne level of maximum global 
productive activity is therefore the primary need of a sound mone­
tary policy. But the maintenance of this adequate and correct 
volume of expenditure is an extremely difficult task and requires 
complete international understanding and co-operation.
If an lndiviaual country maintains a volume of expenditure 
greater than is required for full employment, it will not only 
turn the balance of payments against itself but will also spread 
a net inflationary effect to the rest of tne world. If, on the 
other hand, its volume of expenditure falls short of its full emp« 
loyfient level, it sends a net dcpressionary pressure to the out­
side world. If the country concerned is a very small economy of 
the world its inflationary or deflationary reparcusoions on the 
rest of the world will be so completely absorbed that its global
effect will
M i
be negligible. Hence, mistakes by minor economies in main­
taining the correct volume of expenditure on one side or the 
other, are not of any serious consequence. There are, how­
ever, a few big countries, each of which is bigger than 
scores of others and the volume of full employment expendi­
ture of each of whom is a very significant part of the world 
expenditure. These big countries may be termed major eco­
nomies as distinguished from all other smaller countries 
which may be styled minor economies. if any of the major 
economies maintains an expenditure considerably greater or 
smaller than its full employment expenditure, it will plunge 
the whole world into a vicious inflationary or deflationary 
spiral which will dimirish both economic activity and inter­
national trade.
Great Britain was the only major economy of the world 
before World war I. She suffered from a great depression 
during the fourth quarter of the 19th century and stimulated 
a deflationary spiral all throughout the world during this 
wfee&e period. She caused both world demand and internation­
al trade to sink to very low levels. During the first deo- 
ade and a half of the present century, Great Britain enjoyed 
a prosperity boom and maintained an expanding volume of ex­
penditure running ahead of her productive activity. She 
spread thereby an expansionary pressure to the rest of the 
world and stimulated world eoonomic activity as well as in­
ternational trade.
After World War I Great Britain ceased to be the only
major economy of the world. She had to share this honour
first with U.S.A. and after 1924 with France ana Germany as well 
Erom 1924 to 1929, all the major economies, with U.S.A. at their 
head, maintained an expanding expenditure and caused both produc- 
tive activity and international trade to rise to very high 
levels. The crisis of 1929, brought the American expenditure ana 
effective demand to a total collapse and this mutilated the vol­
ume of global demand to such a serious extent that the whole wori 
was subjected to a serious deflation ana depression throughout 
the thirties. Both world economic activity and international 
trade sank to very low levels.
f
In the present decade and particularly after the Second Worli 
War, the volume of effective aemand and expenditure maintained bj
the major economies has been far in excess of their respective
productive capacity. Germany, one of the former major economies, 
is l£ing prostrate after the war ana other major powers are main* 
taining for her a volume of expenditure which is by far greater 
than her present productive power. Both Great Britain and France 
have deficit balances ana are spending more than they are produc­
ing. Even U.S.A. is maintaining a high level of apmestic expendi­
ture - at least, comparatively much higher than she maintained
after the first World War. In the twenties her gold neutralizatic
and low price policy combined with her efforts to capture more 
and more foreign markets provided the much needed capital with 
which the productive organization of kfetfc war-shatterea Europe was 
rapidly rebuilt. Since the Second World War, due to a sharp r i s e  
of American prices in 1946, a much greater proportion of
ri' • * \  - r '  r  v ^
production is being appropriated by herself ana only a small pari
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of the deficit expenditure of the other major economies can now be 
met by her surplus exports. There is, therefore, a considerable 
balance of expenditure and effective demand in the major economies 
taken together over their present productive capacity. This excess 
expenditure is maintaining an inflationary pressure throughout the 
world. Inflation, by causing a shift of income from the poorer to 
the richer classes, and by undermining the basis of contract, is 
tending to disorganize the productive system of the world as well. 
Excessive monetary demand and consequent scramble for foreign good£ 
is encumbering and throttling the foreign trade of the world more 
and more. In other words, the present excessive expenditure (and 
effective demand) of the major economies is an obstacle to the 
attainment of either the internal or the external objective of 
money.
During the thirties, when the volume of expenditure and effect 
ive demand fell short of the world's productive capacity, the 
various major economies followed their individual recovery 
programmes, involving the expansion of their respective effective 
demand, but due to their lack of co-operation and absence of co­
ordination in their policies,much of their individual extensions hi 
to be of autarchic type. Moreover, throughout the thirties overall 
global expenditure remained lower than the total productive capacil 
with consequent deflation and depression. The productive activity 
of the world, in spite of some increase in individual cases, 
continued to be low, while international trade was still lower.But 
in the twenties, when the volume of expenditure and effective 
demand ran ahead of the productive activity of the world, the
major economies, by subscribing to the gold standard, co-operatec
to keep the overall expenditure in check and saved the productive
Doom of the period from being disorganized by inflation* Both a
high level of productive activity anu international trade resulte
from this co-ordinated monetary policy* After the Second Wavld
War, when the volume of expenditure and effective demand are rum
ing ahead of the wo^ldfs productive capacity, as it did in the
twenties after the .First World War, only co-operation among the
major economies can keep the increase in expenditure under contrc
o
The effect of a curtailed monetary expenditure by one major ecorjp 
can be easily offset by the augmented expenditure of another* If 
all the major economies keep their respective expenditure ana efi 
ective demand strictly commensurate with their full employment 
activity, both productive activity ana international trade of the 
World can attain their maximum* The attainment of the monetary 
objectives id thus clearly dependent on the co-operation of the 
major economies in their monetary policies*
From the above it is obvious that the monetary policy of a 
minor economy, with reference to the attainment of monetary objec 
tives, cannot be of any great significance* If the major economic 
maintain full employment expenditure, a minor economy, by simply 
maintaining stable exchange rates with them, can attain both^hi^ 
level of international trade and internal productive activity*
If,on the other hand, the policy of the major economies is eithez 
inflationary or deflationary, a minor economy cannot attain a hi£ 
level of international trade by any means* If it maintains a 
stable exchange rate with the major economies, its internal
economy will fluctuate and both the internal economy and inter­
national trade will be half-depressed* On the other hand if it m&l 
tains stability of its internal economy by allowing the exchange 
rate to fluctuate, its international trade will suffer to a much 
greater extent* Its autarchic internal economic activity which car 
be maintained thereby, will be so inefficient ( due to the extreme 
ly limited scope of the division of labour within its meagre 
econsmy ) that it is very doubtful whether it will result in a net 
advantage over the situation which woulo arise if it kept a stable 
exchange relation with the major economies and thereby had its 
internal economy and international trade both half-aepressed* A 
minor economy has, therefore, to choose between half-depressed 
international trade and domestic economic activity, on the one hax 
and autarchic ( and, therefore, inefficient to a gegree) full 
employment, on the other, by weighing the pros and cons of the 
alternatives* The attainment of a monetary objectives by a minor 
economy id thus dependent on whether (a) the major economies are 
maintaining their correct full employment expenditure and thereby 
attaining the monetary objectives themselves and [b) whether the 
minor economy concerned is maintaining a stable exchange relation 
with the major economies*
Section 9 : Monetary Management in India.
India, in spite of her vast area and still vaster populatioi 
is a country whose economic Importance has been far smaller 
than that of any of the major economies of the world • It can , 
therefore, be considered as a secondary or minor economy of the
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world ana its appropriate currency policy can only be one of au&j 
tation to the international currency framework devised abroad* 1] 
fact, currency policy in Xnaia for the last three-quarters of a 
centuryfhas been nothing but conscious or unconscious, successful 
or unsuccessful attempts at adaptation to the international curr­
ency policy^and the main stages of the development of her currenc; 
management have been that of international monetary management* 
The study of the currency policy of Inaia, therefore, necessaril,
involves a study of that of the international ana as such of tne
o
major econjEuies of the time, because the latter automatically 
determined the fundamental outlines ana the main course of her 
monetary management* The indigenous aspect of the Indian monetar, 
policy could only be the secondary function of adaptation to the 
monetary policies of the major economies*
In the following five chapters of this thesis we have traced 
obth the international ana tne indigenous aspects of t he develop 
ment of the Indian currency management from 1873 to 194-7* In 
the following (second) chapter, Indian monetary management aurin 
the first forty-two years of this period, when the maintenance 
of a higher level of international trade through stable 
exchange rates was recognised to be the objective of monetary 
policy, has been analysed* In the third chapter, tne develop­
ment of Indian monetary management during the following 
seventeen years, when the monetary objectives were 
in conflict, has bean reviewed* Chapter four discusses
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Indian currency policy in the 1930’s when the stimulation of 
internal economic activity was recognised to be the main ob­
jective of monetary management. The subject matter of the 
fifth and sixth chapters consists of the problems and policy 
of Indian currency management in the 1940fs when a synthesis 
of both external and internal objectives, that is, a combin­
ation of the maximum levels of both international trade and 
domestic economic activity, is supposed to be the ideal. The 
fifth chapter contains an analysis of the international or ex­
ternal aspect of the Indian currency management,(while the 
sixth chapter reviews the internal objective of a full employ­
ment policy in India. In the concluding (seventh) chapter, 
certain inferences have been drawn from past experiences and 
certain observations have been made regarding the future mone­
tary policy of India with a view to a better attainment of 
both the external and internal objectives of monetary manage­
ment .
4*.
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C H A P T E R  I I .
INDIAN CURRENCY POLICY AND PROBLEMS.
From Fluctuating Exchanges to the 
Standard, 1593-16177
Section 1: The International Monetary
£ltuaEton prior to 15787
Before the discovery of the Spanish-Amerloan mines in 
1492 and, in a much more pronounced manner, after that dis­
covery, both gold and silver coins were used concurrently in
(1)
almost all the countries of the world. From the close of 
the 15th century when Spanish-American gold began to pour in­
to Europe, to 1873, the monetary system of the world may be
(2)
said to have been one of bimetallism. For the first three 
centuries (i.e. up to 1792) it was one of quasi-bimetallism 
or a parallel standard in which both gold and silver coins 
were freely minted and both circulated as unlimited legal ten­
der money. During the last 81 years of this period (i.e. 
from 1792 to 1873) it was one of official bimetallism in
which both silver and gold coins were minted at a legally de­
an
termined ratio and both had/unlimited legal tender character. 
During these four centuries, the ratio of gold to silver var­
ied but little, one weight of gold valuing from 15 to 15|
(3)
weights of silver. During the quasi-bimetallic period, ex-
(1) "Principles of Economics", by F.W.Taussig. 3rd Edition. 
Vol.I. Chapter: •Bimetallism’.
(2) "Gold and the Gold Standard", by E.W.Kemmerer,
New York, 1944, pp.26-39.
(3) Ibid.
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change rates between countries were determined by the market 
rates between gold and sliver in between 15 to 15j weights 
of silver to one weight of gold. The striking stability of 
this market rate in comparison with the rates either before 
1492 or after 1873, is explained by the compensatory action
U )
of bimetallism. Whenever one of the metals became cheaper, 
it was coined in greater abundance than the other metal which 
became more abundant in the bullion market and consequently 
tended to be cheaper. This compensatory action, i.e. the 
tendency of the cheaper metal to crowd into the currency and 
to get scarce in the bullion market, made the ratio between 
the two metals extremely sticky.
During the time of official bimetallism, compensatory 
action was further stimulated by official support and gratui­
tous coinage. The official rate between gold and silver in
European bimetallism occasionally differed from the American
a
rate 4o/minor extents and it was found that each of the two 
continents tended to have a greater abundance of the over­
valued metal and the market rate between the two metals
(2)
stood in between the two official rates. The weaker of the 
two areas at the time tended to lose the undervalued metal
altogether an^made the market rate between gold and silver
‘ (3)
approximate the official rate of the stronger area. More­
over, as long as one country kept bimetallism In operation, 
all the other countries of the world, having gold and silver
(1) "The Purchasing Power of Money", by I.Fisher, 1911.
Chapter 6.
(2) Ibid. Chapters 6 and 7.
(3) Ibid.
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currencies, were knit together as if by a single currency 
system. The unified character of the system was not vitiat­
ed by the fact that the currencies of some countries, such as 
China, were reduced purely to silver while some other countr­
ies, such as England, adopted gold monometallism. Gold and
silver became homogeneous metals for currency purposes at the
(1)
ratio between gold and silver. Even with one country on 
bimetallism, all other countries enjoyed the beneficial ef-
feots of the system without being subjected to the stress and
(2)
strain of its compensatory action.
The bimetallio system of currency manifested Itself both 
in the national and international sphere of economic activit­
ies of the different countries of the world. Gold and silver, 
considered as a homogeneous mass at the existing ratio bet­
ween the two metals, became the standard of value in every 
country whether it had gold and silver monometallism or had 
concurrent gold and silver currencies. In the sphere of in­
ternational exchange, the exchange rates among different 
countries were determined by the ratio of physical quantities 
of money-metals in their respective currencies at the pre­
vailing ratio of gold and silver in the system. Balance of 
payments disequilibrium between oountries was corrected al­
most automatically by physical shipment of money-metals from 
one oountry to another. With stable rates of exchange and 
balance of payments equilibrium, international trade had the
(1) "Principles of Economics", by E.W.Tfcussig. 3rd Edition. 
Vol.I. Chapter: ’Bimetallism*.
(2) "The Purchasing Power of Money", by I.Fisher, 1911. 
Chapters 6 and 7.
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fullest scope for development at the given levels of proauction 
and income in aifferent countries.
The contribution of the bimetallic monetary system (during this 
long period of about four centuries before 1875) to the economic
development of the world was much greater than its seriice as the
i
standard of value in the vaijtous economies of the world, on the 
one hand, and maintainer of oalance of payments equilibrium, on 
the other. Before gold and silver began to pour into Europe (from 
Spanish-American mines from 1492 onwards) economic transactions
both in international ana domestic sectors were mainly carried on
of
by direct barter/goods. Subsequently the continuous imports of bul] 
ion replaced barter by monetary exchange at an ever-increasing rat< 
in Europe ana Asia ana magnified the volume of exchange oy elimina* 
ting the inconveniences of barter. The effect of this increased suj 
ply of money metals was at first more pronounced in the domain of 
international trade. The replacement of international barter by 
monetary exchange brought about a veritable commercial revolution 
and hastened the termination of the self-sufficient economies of ti 
middle ages. The expanaea world market, in turn, stimulated produd 
ive activity in almost every country of the world.
The replacement of oarter by the use of money in the domestic 
sector of aifferent countiies facilitated their exchange and increi 
sea the volume of their internal trade. The development of foreign 
markets in addition, made the volume of traae of each country much 
bigger. nut there was still another source of the expansion of 
domestic proauction of all countries. The ever increasing
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ing supply of money metals from America ran muoh ahead of the 
productive activities of the countries of Europe at the pre­
vailing prices and there was a sustained profitability of pro­
ductive undertakings for centuries. This could not but pro­
vide a great and continuous stimulus to production in Europe 
during this period, which ultimately brought about the In- 
dustrial Revolution in Great Britain.
The part played by money-metals in bringing about a com­
mercial and productive revolution of the world received an ex­
aggerated homage from the economists of the 10th century who 
were known as the mercantilists. The best exposition of 
their theory was given by Sir Thomas Munn- a director of the 
East India Company. The central Idea of the mercantilist 
theory was that the real wealth of a country consisted of 
precious metals (gold and silver) only and that the favourable 
balance of trade was the means to increase the supply of such
metals and to enrich a people. The mercantilist theory re­
ceived much hard criticism at the hands of the utilitarian
economists of the 19th century who saw to its complete re-
(1)
jection by the academic world. Nevertheless, there was an
element of truth in the theory. Though the constantly in­
creasing supply of precious metals ran much ahead of produc­
tive activity yet the latter was considerably below the maxi­
mum potential capacity and every Increase of money-metals, by 
facilitating exchange, led to an increased productivity sev­
eral times greater than the increment of precious metals. It
(1) "History of Economic Thought", by Haney.
Chapter: ♦Mercantilists’.
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la no wonder that in these circumstance* money-metals were consid­
ered to be tne only real wealth* Actually they v.ere a.ore than that- 
they were the creator of wealth* Although many other causes contri­
buted to bring about the Industrial Hevolution - the ever increas­
ing supply of precious mefeal was undoubtedly its most potent cause* 
The economic historians consider 1630 to be the concluding yea: 
of tne first phase of the Industrial Revolution ana the beginning 
of another, Commercial, Revolution* The gigantic volume of produc­
tion brought about by the mechanised system of the Industrial Revo­
lution not only' required mechanised transport for its exchange and 
distribution, but also a correspondingly huge amount of precious 
metals to serve as the medium of exchange* The increasing produc­
tion nearly caught up with the Increasing money-metals and was 
about to wipe out the monetary stimulus to production in the 1640* i
when the Californian feola mines were discovered in 1646 and Austra­
il)
lian gold mines in 1649 * Great Britain had introduced Oola mono­
metallism since 1621 ana the toola coming from the newly discovered 
mines swelled primarily her money-supplies* But due to the prevale­
nce of bimetallism in most of the other countries of the world 
the effect of this increased gold was dispersed on the entire
volume of money of the world* Nevertheless, with gold currency,
this
Great Britain haa an initial advantage in/expanded money supply on
account of the new gold production from the mines* Prom 1850, the
world*s money-eupply again ran much ahead of production*
1rofitabillty of proauction was thereby more than
(1)*Gold ana the Gold htandara, by B*'^*hemmerer, New Yor& ana 
honaon, 1944* p« 60*
maintained and productive activity continued to Increase.
The exchange of the vast volume of Great Britain,s industrial
produce with the rest of the world, knit up the whole world
into one market with Great Britain as ita central forge. The
period from 1850 to 1873 is known as the golden period of
(1)
Great Britain9s economic history, and the lnorease of gold 
did play not an insignificant part in this attainment.
eotlon 2t Monetary Management in India prior to 1873.
India received a good share of precious metals coming 
from the Spanish-*Amerloan mines almost from the beginning of 
the 16th century through her spice trade. Vasco-da-ftame 
discovered the Cape route to India in 1498, shortly after the 
discovery of the Spanish-Aaerlean mines and the merchant 
ships of all the other commercial countries of Europe follow­
ed along this route to India in quick succession. Sploes and 
other rarities of India enabled her to earn large quantities 
of gold and silver, imports of which continued to increase 
with the lapse of years. Increased supplies of precious 
metals enabled India to replace barter exchange by goney to
such an extent that we find Todar Mall - the finance minister
(2)
of Akbar the Great - fixing land revenues in terms of money, 
Instead of by proportions of produoe. The introduction of ex 
monetary ecohomy, by facilitating exohange, must have ex­
panded Indian production. Constant lnorease of precious 
metals must also have increased the monetary profitability
(1) "Industrial and Commercial Revolutions in Great Britain 
in the 19th century", by L.C.A.Knowles, p.144.
(2) "Cambridge History of India". Vol.IV. Cambridge Univers­
ity, 1937. p.463.
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of various industries - particularly those connected with for­
eign trade.
India, moreover, had a double standard from the beginning
of the 16th century. Akbar introduced the Gold Mohur and
Silver Rupee, each having the same weight of 175 grains troy
(1)
and both circulating concurrently. Both the coins were com­
mon measure of value, though they circulated without any fixed 
ratio between them. Market conditions, however, could not 
but establish a relation between them and the Indian ratio 
must have kept parity with the world ratio and thereby India 
seems to have maintained stable exchange rates with the other 
countries of the world. This stable currency relation with 
the other countries must have stimulated Indian foreign trade 
to a very great extent.
When the Moghul Empire broke down and, on its ruins, a- 
rose a large number of independent principalities, the cur­
rency situation beoame anomalous. The Moghuls considered 
the right of coinage as the most unmistakable sign of sover­
eignty and for this very reason, political adventurers also 
issued coins as the first step in declaring their independence. 
These new sovereignty-hunting princes wanted to have each a 
separate coin of his own. With Innumerable new princes in 
the different parts of the country various coins of gold and 
silver with different weights and fineness came into circula­
tion. The country was flooded with myriads of coins which 
not only bore the names of new kings but also were different 
from the Moghul coins in weight and fineness. In most oases,
(1) "The Problem of the Rupee", by B.R.Ambedkar, London, 1923.
p.3.
these were wantonly debased without always altering the denominat-
(1)
ions* a definite class of indigenous bankers grew up who special
(2)
ized in the evaluation of the real worth of different coins and
they were known as shroffs. Once these bankers ascertained the
' • • ) » * «• .
value of a coin, it circulated freely together with othere* Thus
the break up of the political organization simply increased the
multiplicity of both gold and silver coins, all of which circulated
at their metallic value at the existing ratio between gold and
silver* bimetallism thus proved itself independent of diversity of
coins as well as of political organizations*
When the East India Company became the rulers of the country,
they found as many as 994 different coins made of gold and silver
13)
and of varying weight and fineness in circulation* Within their 
territory, the Company suppressed all other coins but their own. 
Next, they tried to establish a legal ratio between their gold coini 
and silver coins* but in all the three Presidencies, into which the 
Company's occupied territories were divided for the purposes of 
administration, this attempt to establish a legal ratio was more or
14)
less a failure* The underlying reason for these failures lay in 
the fact that the Indian ratio differed not only from the then 
bimetallic ratio in Europe, but each of the three Presidencies 
had its own different rate* Their failures simply demonstr-
(1) "Indian Currency" by H.M* Macleod, p.13. Quoted by
lather and beri in their 'Indian Economics', Vol.11, 
bombay,1945* p.251*
(2) "The Problem of the Rupee" by b*R. Ambedkar, London,
1923, p*b, footnote 1*
(3) "Indian Currency" by h*M* Macleod,p*13 Quoted by
lather and beri in their 'Indian Economics', Yol*II, 
dombay, 1943, p.251.
(4) "The problem of the Rupee" by b.R. Ambedkar, London,
1923, p.3^ .
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a ted that it is not possible to maintain two or more differ­
ent ratios in a bimetallic system of currency. The ratio of 
the economically less important area was bound to be nulli­
fied. The,best course for India would hare been the Moghul 
method of free coinage of gold and silver leaving the ratio i 
between them to be determined by the European bimetallic sys­
tem which dominated the Indian system all the same - despite 
Indian attempts to the contrary.
The most determined effort by the Indian Government to 
break away from the bimetallic system and to establish an 
independent silver monometallism was made in 1835 by passing 
the Silver Act which demonetized gold and introduced a com­
mon silver rupee for the country as a whole. This involved 
a sudden withdrawal of about one half of the Indian currency
and was most inopportune under the circumstances of that
(1) The first phase of the 
time. /Industrial Revolution in Great Britain reached a
stage of completion by 1830 before which her trade with In­
dia was restricted to spices, indigo, superfine cotton and
silk goods and other rarities having great value in small
the
bulk. But when, after/mechanisation of the British produc­
tive system, commodities of common use such as clothing, 
utensils etc. were produced and exported to India, after 
1830, en masse, the economic life of common men in India be­
gan to be affected. Indian society was based on self-suff­
icient village communities consisting of agriculturists and 
artisans, the bulk of whose needs were mutually supplied by
(1) "The Problem of the Rupee", by B.R.Ambedkar, London,
1923. p.22.
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tnemselves. But when cheap machine proaucts began to reach first
the coastal and riversiue villages, ana after the opening up of
railways, the villages near the railways, village artisans lost
11)
their trade ana became landless agricultural labourers. Agricult
urists said their surplus agricultural products to foreign merch-
an
ants to enable them to buy foreign ^oods, and India became/import­
er of manufactured goods and exporter of agricultural proaucts and
(2)
raw materials • This commercialization of Indian agriculture j
the
bein^ on the lines of/geographical division of laoour was bound to 
increase the wealth of India but this required at the same time 
a correspondingly big volume of money-metals to effect exchanges. 
But at the early stages of this commercial revolution, the Indian 
government, by demonetizing gold ana reducing the money supply, 
created a great stringency in the money market.
The monetary stringency brought about a depression and the 
Government was forced to issue a proclamation in 1841 permitting 
the acceptance of gold, in payment of government taxes, by the
public treasuries at a ratio of 15:1, the market rate at tnat time
the
This gave-, a great fillip to the reintreduction of ^ola money and/ 
currency system became bimetallic again. After the discovery of th 
Californian ana Australian gold mines, gold oec&me more plentiful 
than silver in the fifties,at the official rate of one weight of
gold to fifteen weights of
(1) "The Economic Development of India", by V. Anstey, London, 
1946. pp, 330-531.
(2) Ibid. p. 331.
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silver. The members of the public now began to pay their 
taxes only in gold coins. This meant a loss to the Govern­
ment because it could not force these coins on its creditors 
at the official rate due to their non-legal tender character. 
In 1852, therefore, the Government suspended the acceptance 
of gold coins in payment of public dues altogether. This 
made the monetary situation once again stringent and the peo­
ple began to use raw gold for monetary purposes side by side
(1)
with the silver rupees, at the market ratio. This fact 
was bro\ight to the notice of the Government by the Bombay 
Chamber of Commerce in 1863 and the Government accepted the 
inevitable again. By a notification in 1864, it authorised 
the public treasuries to accept, in payment of public dues, 
sovereigns and half-sovereigns at a rate of ten rupees per 
pound. Treasuries were also authorised to make their pay­
ments in sovereigns and half-sovereigns whenever they had a 
supply of those coins and provided people were willing to 
accept them in payment. In 1866, the Government appointed 
the Mansfield Commission to report on the desirability of the 
reintroduction of gold coins. The Commission gave its ver­
dict in its favour. The Government issued a notification in 
1868 and made the sovereign legal tender in India and at the 
same time raised the rupee-value of sovereigns and half-sov­
ereigns from Rs.10 and Rs.5 to Rs.10-8-0 and Rs.5-4-0, to 
bring the ratio between rupees and sovereigns into conformity
(1) "The Problem of the Rupee", by B.R.Ambddkar, London, 
1923. p.42.
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with the market ratio* out as the golo-value of silver fell 
further, sovereigns tendea to disappear from circulation wnti 
tuts government passed an Act in 1670 which made the rupee the 
only ' legal tender in India* this, however, drought the sov­
ereign back into circulation at its metallic value* This was
H )
the situation up to 1673*
rhus we find that inoia had the continuous record of a 
bimetallic currency system from the 16th century to 1673*
This system waned tnrou^h the breakdown of the koghul 4&*ire 
and the unsuccessful ratio experiments of the hast India 
company* phe persistence of gold coins and bullion in 
circulation despite the silver Act of 1635 not only maintained 
the bimetallic character of the system but also provided the 
absolutely essential media of exchange which made possible the 
commercial revolution in the lnoian econo ay*
xMiiuh 3* £M, ikgs»c»ttpi>t .fcpattjaar.,j^ rAaftUaa..a£isr. tel2«
Ito_ are&j. i>fl^ r.66ton« 
the yranco^lrussian tar of 1676, from which Prussia came 
out victorious, was followed by the emergence of the German 
Sspire, with the Prussian king as the emperor of Germany* The 
newly formed Empire probably thought it unbecoming to have 
any other metal than gold in her currency* in 1673 she not 
only demonetised silver, but also melted down a huge quantity 
of silver coins ana sold them foi bullion* fhe movement for 
demonetising silver once set on foot was Immediately followed
(1) *Xhe problem of the hupee” by Ambedkar,
London, 1923* pp*45-46*
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by other North-European countiSes bordering on Germany. Am- 
erioa also closed her mints to the free coinage of silver im­
mediately after Germany. The countries of the Latin Union 
did the same in 1877. Bimetallism was universally suppressed 
but it left behind a gold standard in some countries, and a 
peculiar, limping standard in others, suoh as U.S.A. and Fr­
ance. In these limping-standard countries, silver coins, al­
ready minted, were allowed to remain in circulation at their
face value side by side with gold coins, but no new silver
(1)
coins were added to the circulation. Due to the fall in the 
price of raw silver which followed, there arose a difference 
between the price of silver coins and silver, the face value 
of the coins becoming higher than their bullion value. What­
ever was the value of gold coins, was also the value of silver 
coins. Owing to the retention of free coinage of gold, the. 
value of gold coins and gold bullion was the same - and the 
value of silver ooins, so to say, limped behind the value of 
gold. The Limping Standard was, in effect,a gold standard - 
overvalued silver coins simply economising the use of gold.
Silver displaced from bimetallic currencies accumulated 
in the bullion market and became cheaper in rdation to gold 
at the official bimetallic ratio (1:15.5). It then began to 
swarm in the currencies of Asiatic countries, such as India, 
China, Indo-China and the Pacific Islands where it was still 
freely minted, and drove gold out of circulation by the oper­
ation of Gresham1 s Law. These countriew were completely de­
(1) "The Purchasing Power of Money”, by I.Fisher, 1911.
Chapters 6 and 7.
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nuded of their gold coins and were reduced to silver mono­
metallism. The international currency system was thus bi­
furcated into two disjointed monetary blocs of gold and sll- 
(1)
ver. If the ratio of the total volumes of trade between 
countries reduced to silver monometallism, on the one hand, 
and the countries on gold monometallism, on the other, had 
been the same as the ratio between the total value of silver 
and the total value of gold at the then ration (1:15.5) there 
would not have been any change in the gold value of silver.
But as a matter of fact, the percentage of world trade car­
ried on by India, China and other Far-Eastern countries, on
the
silver, was by far smaller than the percentage of/total value
of monetary metal possessed by silver at that ratio. This
necessitated an internal revaluation of gold in the gold
bloc and silver in the silver bloc. As the supply of gold
suddenly fell short of what the price-structures of the gold
standard countries required at the existing level, it led to
a lowering of prices in the gold standard countries. For
contrary reasons, the price levels in the silver standard
(2)
countries began to rise. Very serious consequences follow­
ed from this disruption of the relation between gold and sil­
ver.
The downward tendency of prices in the gold standard 
conntries reduced the profitability of their productive enter­
(1) "The Purchasing Power of Money”, by I.Fisher, 1911. 
Chapters 6 and 7.
(2) "Gold and the Gold Standard”, by E.W.Kemmerer,
Hew York, 1944. p.89.
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prises. The entrepreneurs were, therefore, compelled to re­
duce wage rates as well as to reduce their scale of produc­
tion and this made millions of people unemployed. Unemploy­
ment and the reduced wages of the employed diminished nation­
al Income which, in turn, reduced demand for conamption goods. 
This reduced the profitability of productive enterprises all 
the more. A vicious circle of deflation, unemployment and 
diminishing income was set on foot. The deflation was par­
ticularly acute in industrial enterprises and Great Britain, 
as the industrial forge of the world, was particularly hard 
hit and suffered the worst depression of the 19th century.
The downward trend of commodity prices, employment, wages and 
income in Great Britain was paralleled by similar trends in 
other gold standard countries including U.S.A., Germany and 
France. But the diminution of income and purchasing power 
of Great Britain had a particular significance due to the 
fact that she was by far the biggest Import market of the 
world. Other gold standard countries depended on Great Bri­
tain for the sale of the bulk of their products. With the 
the
shrinkage of/British market, these countries were encumbe.red 
with undisposed products that went on accumulating. Hence, 
the other gold standard countries suffered two-fold diffi­
culties - firstly due to the fall in the gold prices of their 
goods and secondly, and this was much more serious, due to 
the shrinkage of the British market.
It is generally supposed that the Great Depression in 
Great Britain in the last quarter of the 19th century was 
caused by serious German and American competition supported
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by high tariff walls in both these countries. The severity 
of competition of German industry was certainly exaggerated. 
Germany began late in the industrial race and her growth, 
which was greater than that of Great Britain, was only to be 
expected. But the range of competition of German industry 
with British industry was quite restricted. With the ex­
ception of iron and steel, they hardly clashed with each 
other and even here Great Britain more than held her own, her 
exports increasing from £28.3 million in 1870 to £37.6 million
in 1900. Hence, German expansion can hardly be said to have
(1)
been achieved at the cost of Great Britain. So far as the
the
responsiULlty of/tariff in creating the depression is con­
cerned, there is no doubt that Germany adopted a protection­
ist policy after 1880 and so did U.S.A. after the victory of 
the Northern States in the American Civil War. But the Ger­
man tariff of 1880 reduced the volume of British exports to 
Germany only from £10 million to £7.7 million at which level 
it remained up to 1890 when it began to rise again. Exports 
to Holland, Belgium and France remained stationary during the 
period while exports to U.S.A. showed a constant Increase up 
to 1894. But the period of really high protection began with 
the MacJcinley Tariff of 1891 in the U.S.A., succeeded in the 
following year by increased tariffs by France, Spain and Port­
ugal. Thus, protection became a serious obstacle to trade at 
the closing stages of the Great Depression, which occurred in
(1) "Industrialization and Foreign Trade", League of Nations,
1945. p.78.
the middle nineties* The diminishing market was naturally 
scrambled for by the countries encumbered with excess production 
and the tariff walls raised by Germany, U.S.A* and France were 
attempts to conserve as much of that attenuated market as 
possible by each country. Tariffs were thus not a cause of 
depression, but its effect.
The seriously diminished purchasing power of the custmmere 
of Great Britain and other gold standard countries, which compris­
ed virtually the whole of the international market (with the 
minor exception of the silver area) now clashed with their increas* 
ed,and,probably even then, increasing productive power, while 
before 1873, the world market could be termed a sellers' market, 
because the monetary purchasing power of the people increased at a 
faster rate than production,and therefore sellers could dictate 
their terms, after 1673 the world market became a buyers' market 
because production was in excess of effective demand,and buyers,
due to their paucity,could dictate their terms. To put it in
(2)
another form, the volume of effective demand fell below the 
level of the productive capacity of that period. Thus diminution
* "*•. •v.'V** o?.* ’ ’ VI v
of the purchasing power of the people in general, in the gold 
standard countries, reflected itself in a diminished purchase of 
foreign goods, and therefore, in a shrinkage of foreign trade.
The trade of the gold standard countries with the silver 
area was also seriously dislocated by the constantly falling
silver exchange. The suspension of silver from currency
(1) "The Industrial and commercial Revolutions in Great nritain
in the 19th Century", by L.C.A. Knowles, pp. 144-147.
(2) Vide infra p. 4.
synchronised with a high output of silver from hewly dis­
covered mines and the introduction of improved processes in 
all the mines. But the increased supply of raw silver in 
the last quarter of the 19th century was not disproportion­
ately greater than the increase of gold in the third quarter
(1 )
of that century. And yet their relative value during the 
first period was wellnigh constant at the ratio of l:15j 
while in the third quarter, the value of gold fluctuated be­
tween 16.10 and 26.75 weights of silver per one weight of 
(2)
gold. The cause of this difference lay in the operation of 
the compensatory action of bimetallism in the earlier period 
and its suspension in the later period. The increased sup­
ply of silver simply made the already bad situation worse and 
brought about a catastrophic fall in its price which stood at
the close of the century at a level about 75ft lower than the 
(3)
1873 level. It meant a continuous appreciation of the ex­
change rate of the gold standard countries In relation to the 
silver area. This restricted the trade of the former count­
ries in various ways.
The export trade of Great Britain and all the other gold 
standard countries began to suffer a competitive disadvantage 
in comparison with the producers of similar goods in the sil-
(1) "Gold and the Gold Standard", by E.W.Kemmerer, New York,
1944. p.90.




yer area. The Indian cotton industry, for example, was said 
to be at a considerable competitive advantage over the Lanca­
shire Industry during the prevalence of the silver standard in
(2)
India. Though It may be argued that the Indian cotton indus­
try did not produce the same kind of goods as Lancashire ex­
ports, yet it cannot be denied that due to the wide scope of 
substitutability of one kind by the other, Lancashire exports 
suffered grievously in the Indian market. Secondly, due to 
the continuous fall in the silver exchange, the prices of im­
ports from gold standard to silver standard countries were 
constantly rising and, in consequence, there was an overall 
shrinkage in the amount of imports from gold standard countries 
demanded by customers of the silver area. Last, but not 
least, constantly changing exchange rates brought about an ele­
ment of risk in foreign trade with the silver area generally 
and tended to restrict the volume of international trade.
Taking an overall picture of British trade with the rest 
of the world, while during the previous period, it expanded 
continuously, during this period, not only was that expansion 
suspended but there were actual recessions at times, that is 
from 1872 to 1879 and from 1883 to 1887. These trade recess­
ions and trade stagnation simply reflected the decline and 
slowing down of British internal economic activity. While the 
index of manufacturing production (taking 1913 • 100) in 1872
(1) "Report of the Herschell Committee, 1893". para.27.
(2) "Indian Fiscal Commission Report, 1921-1922". para.154.
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was 48, it sank down to 45.6 in 1879 and from 59.9 in 1883,
(1)
it fell to 57.5 in 1887.
Thus, the observance of the gold standard rules brought 
about the Great Depression in Great Britain and as this led to 
the collapse of the British import market, the British depres­
sion was magnified into world depression. Although Great 
Britain was maintaining gold monometallism from 1821, yet she 
was enjoying the protection of bimetallism up to 1873 after 
which she, and through her, the world, had to pay the price 
of the gold standard in the form of persistent depression for 
about a quarter of a century. The gold standard, of course, 
enabled Great Britain to maintain her balance of payments equi­
librium and stable exchange rates within the gold area and 
thereby to martinise her international trade but this maximum 
trade represented a comparatively low (depression) level of 
economic activity. In fact, the International gold standard 
began its career by depressing internal economic activity and 
stagnating international trade.
Section 4: Monetary Management in India from 1873 to 1893.
After the breakdown of bimetallism in 1873, silver, on a 
large scale, began to flow into the silver standard countries, 
and India, particularly became a sink for silver which was 
largely coined into rupees. India was having an increasing 
supply of money and a rising tendency of prices even before 
1873 due to the increased supply of gold from Californian and
(1) "Industrialization and Foreign Trade", League of Nations,
1945. p.132.
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Australian mines and its absorption in the International bi­
metallic currency of which Indian currency formed a part. But 
the increase in money supply after 1873, due to the excessive
concentration of silver in India, was immensely greater than
(1)
that before 1873. This heavy coinage of silver set up a 
decided tendency towards a muoh greater rise of prices in 
India than before 1873. The rising tendency of prices made 
Indian investments and productive enterprises still more pro­
fitable. The Monetary situation in India and other silver
standard countries was, therefore, exactly the reverse of
that in the gold standard countries as in the former effective 
demand was running much ahead of production and exerting a 
strong pressure towards an increase of employment, income and 
production.
The rise of internal prices benefitted the Indian indus­
trialists to a very great extent. The Industrial wages and 
other elements of cost of production did not keep pace with 
the rise of prices and, therefore, the cost of production of
the industrialists did not rise as muoh as the sale proceeds
of their products. Due to their everlncreasing profits, in­
dustrialists were constantly increasing their soale of pro­
duction during this period. for example, the cotton indus­
try of India more than trebled its size during these twenty
(2)
years while the jute industry was nearly doubled. Agri­
cultural production, however, could not be increased under
(1) "The Economic Development of India", by V.Anstey, London,
1946. p.410.
(2) "India1s Foreign Trade since 1870", by Dr.P.Hoy, London, 
1934. pp.151-165.
the stimulus of high prices. Agricultural production was 
determined more by natural factors than economic stimulus and 
it maintained nearly a constant volume Irrespective of price 
fluctuations.
The external effects of the silver standard in India were 
more striking • than its internal effects. With the constant 
fall in the gold price of silver, the exchange rate continu­
ously fell lower and lower. From 58 pence per ounce in 1875, 
the price of silver fell to 52j pence in 1879; 43 pence in
1888 to 37^ pence in 1892. With the fall in its silver value, 
the exchange value of the rupee in terms of the sovereign be­
gan to move down and fell from about 2s.Od. in 1871 to about
(1)
14 pence in 1892. Not only did the exchange rate suffer a 
steady fall during this period, but it had a seesaw movement 
as well. The widest variations of the previous decade occur­
red in 1865-66 and 1866-67 during the American Civil War when 
the range of fluctuations was only 7.6# in the first year and
8.8# in the second year. But the ups and downs in the silver
(2)
period was much wider and their range went as far as 19.25#. 
The fluctuating exchanges Introduced an element of risk into 
the trade of India with the gold standard countries and added 
to the cost of such trade. But this disadvantage was more 
than obviated by the exchange advantage which the constantly 
falling rupee exchange conferred on Indian exports. The In­
ti) "Report of the Hersohell Committee, 1893". paras.3,4 and 5.
(2) "India’s Foreign Trade since 1870", by Dr.P.Roy, London, 
1934. p.148.
dlan exports to gold standard countries progressed much faster 
than exports to silver standard countries having stable ex­
change rates with India, proving thereby the export stimulat­
ing effect of falling exchanges. This special increase of 
India’s trade with the gold standard countries was particular­
ly important because the bulk of her trade was with the gold 
area. Indian trade with other silver standard countries con­
stituted only 26# of the total foreign trade while the trade
with the gold standard countries constituted the remaining
(1)
74#.
But the expansion of Indian foreign trade was seriously 
hampered by two obstacles. Firstly, imports of India consis­
ted mainly of manufacturing goods while her exports consisted 
of agricultural produots and raw materials. Constantly fall­
ing Indian exchanges, by making foreign imports of industrial 
goods costlier to the Indian consumers, gave virtual protec­
tion to the Indian Industries. The expansion of Indian in­
dustries during the silver period, as we have noted above, can 
at least partly be traced to this exchange depreciation. On 
the other hand, falling rupee exchange made the prices of In­
dian exports constantly cheaper to the foreign buyers who would 
naturally be willing to buy more Indian goods. In comparison 
with a competitor from the gold standard area, the Indian ex­
porter was at a definite advantage to Increase his exports.
But Indian exports consisting mainly of agricultural produots, 
supplies of which were Inelastic, were not in a position to 
benefit from this competitive advantage.
(1) "Report of the Hersohell Committee, 1893". para. 24.-27
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In the second plaoe, due to the prevalence of the Great 
Depression in the gold standard countries, which constituted 
three-fourths of the market for Indian exports, there was a 
substantial shrinkage of foreign demand for Indian goods. No­
thing short of the restoration of the purchasing power or re­
turn of prosperity of the gold standard countries could have 
led to any substantial increase of purchases from India. Under 
these circumstances, the falling rupee exchange simply lowered ' 
the price of Indian goods to foreigners and made the foreign 
exchange earnings of India constantly diminish. Indian foreign 
trade had not apparently attained any real Increase during this 
period. From an annual average of Rs.99.14 crores during the 
quinquennium ending in 1873-74, the aggregate value of the 
total trade of India rose up to Rs.197.36 crores in the quin­
quennium ending in 1893-94. In other words, in the course of 
twenty years the value of aggregate trade nearly doubled. But
the value of silver having been halved it may be seriously doub-
t h q
ted whether/increase of Indian foreign trade In terms of rupees
(1)
represents any increase at all.
The only definite thing that the depreciation of the silver 
exchange did was the constant deterioration of the terms of In­
dian trade. As the prices of foreign imports (and,therefore, 
of all manufacturing goods) were on a constant increase and the 
prices of agricultural exports were constantly falling, the In­
dian farmer found his Income and purchasing power decreasing.
at
In view of this fact, it Is not at all to be wondered/that this
(1) "Report of the Herschell Committee, 1893". paras. 6-16 
and 24-27.
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period was blackened by some of the worst famines in the re-
oords of India, during 1877-78 and 1878-79. Strangely enough
the famine year of 1877-78 recorded a phenomenal Increase of
trade and surpassed all previous records including that of the
(1)
inflated trade of 1865-66. In the second year of the fam­
ine, however, trade was considerably restricted, but even then
I . '
recorded an increase of 12.58$ and was well above the level of
any other year than 1865-66; the year of the American cotton
(2)
famine. The causes of these severe Indian famines may pro­
bably be traced to crop failures in the preceding years, but 
it cannot be denied that the record inorease of exports, main­
ly agricultural goods including food crops, during the famine 
years hao something to do aggravating the intensity of 
famines particularly as there was a relatively less increase in 
the Income of consumers and wage earners in comparison with the 
rise of prices.
The falling exchanges and rising prices created serious 
difficulties in long term capital Investments in India. As 
the value of rupee securities was constantly falling in terms 
of gold, which was the standard of Great Britain, the premier 
lending country of the world, the entry of foreign capital in­
to India considerably slowed down. The uncertainty as re­
gards the sterling value of the Interest on the Investment and 
the prospect of the diminution which the Investment capital 
might suffer, if it were desired to retransfer it to England,




discouraged the British investors all the more. Foreign
firms were also finding a difficulty, owing to the falling
c
exchange, in procuring the services of European servants re­
quired for conducting their undertakings in India. Moreover, 
the Indian Government adopted a policy of developing what was 
called extra-ordinary public works, i.e. a system of trans­
port, mainly railways and a net-work of irrigation, financed 
by capital borrowed from England. The government was very 
muoh handicapped in borrowing money from England beoause every 
sterling loan became a constantly increasing burden in terma
of rupees and the government dared not shoulder such a huge
(1 )
burden. Hence, the development of these extra-ordinary 
public works was seriously handicapped and the economic pro­
gress of the country retarded.
The fall of exohange created a further end extremely 
serious difficulty for the Indian Government because of its 
obligation to make big sterling payments to England. Being 
based on silver, India had to offer an increasing price for 
procuring sterling or gold. Prior to 1873, this difficulty 
was absent because the ratio between the rupee and sterling 
was stable. But after 1873, the same amount of silver cur­
rency could only purchase less and less amounts of the cur­
rencies of the gold standard countries, such as Great Britain. 
With an obligation to pay Home Charges in terms of sterling, 
the Indian Government was required to levy higher and higher 
taxes to make up the deficit in the sterling value of the
(1) "Report of the Herschell Committee, 1893". para.28.
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rupee. The budget estimates of the Government were repeatedly
d )
upset by the fall of the silver value. What was Calculated by
the Finance Member today was upset by the change in the price of
silver tomorrow. The total excess of rupees needed to provide
for the net annual sterling payments over thftee required to meet
the sterling obligations increased from about Ks. 87 lakhs in
(2)
1875-76 to over Rs. 10 crores in 1891-92.
During these twenty years of the silver stand&ro, Indian
agriculturists were suffering from the greater rise of prices
of foreign goods they bought in comparison with prices of things
they sold* long term investments were being seriously retarded
(3)
and Indian finance became chaotic. In comparison with these 
disadvantages, the developing industries formed an insignificant 
benefit to the Indian economy. The origin of all these difficult­
ies could be traced to the depreciating silver currency which 
proved by implication that a stable exchange relation with Great 
Britain was immensely more important to India than tb have a 
bigger volume of money-supply and rising prices. The more potent 
cause, than the depreciating silver currency, that caused the 
Indian difficulties was, however, the ureat Depression in the 
gold standard countries which diminished the demand for Indian 
exports.But the dreat depression itself was of monetary origin.
(1) "Report of the Herschell Committee, 1895". para.5.
(2) Ibid. para 5-5.
(5) " The Economic development of India", by V.Anstey, London
1946. pp 395 and 410.
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The blind mechanism of the gold standard, according to which 
monetary management was carried bn in the gold area, restricted 
the supply of money ana brought about tnat situation. fthile the 
overabundance of money was the cause of trouble in the silver 
area, tne scarcity of money was tne centre of trouole in the gol< 
area. The removal of overaounoance in the former and scarcity in 
the latter, tnat is, the adjustment of the volume of money to th< 
productive capacity in both the areas, was the way to restore 
currency equilibrium and maintain tne economic progress of! lnaia< 
In spite of all attempts to increase revenues and decrease 
expenditures, the government budget was always in deficit during 
the whole of this poriod. Mainly cue to this reason, as well as 
the constant agitation of the Lancashire Cotton Industry against
H)
tne depreciating Inuian exchanges , the free coinage of silver 
in India was suspenaea in 1693 ana further increase of monetary 
supply was stopped from that yeajr.
Section:5: The end of the Great Depression and the changed 
international Monetary Situation 1693-1699.
The monetary stringency that caused the Great Depression in 
great Britain, at that time the financial and industrial centre 
of the world, helped to bring about its own remedy. The phenome­
nal development of cheque-bankin^ in Great Britain 
during the last quarter of the 19th century economised the
(1) ” Indian Fiscal Commission Report, 1921-22". Chapter 10,
paras. 152-171.
use of gold and thereby increased the volume of money to such
an extent that it constituted a very substantial part of the
(1 )
monetary circulation of the country. The cheque-money 
helped to maintain British prices and effective demand at a 
higher level than they would have otherwise attained by the 
effect of depression, if the monetary supply were comprised 
only of gold coins. If the depression could have run its 
course without its effect being counteracted by cheque-money, 
the fall of British demand would have been so great and the 
pressure for downward balancing by other gold-standard count­
ries would have been so unbearable that it would have broken 
the gold standard fabric itself. It was the pegging of 
British demand at a comparatively higher level by cheque-money, 
despite the depression, that maintained to some extent the 
market of other countries and kept the gold standard in ex­
istence during these difficult years. Thus it was the cheque 
money that saw the gold standard through the Great Depression.
By the middle nineties the volume of oheque-money con­
stituted such a large proportion of the monetary supply of the 
country that it began to affect the value of money to a much
greater extent than gold itself. The monetary system became
(2)
increasingly a sterling standard rather than a gold standard. 
Mainly due to the augmentation of money supply by cheques, the 
fall of prices was arrested during the closing years of the 
century and an upward trend of prices made itself felt. At the
(1) "The Meaning of Money", by H.Withers. Chapter 5.
(2) "The Economist", May 1, 1948. Article ’Sterling Area’, 
p.699, para.2.
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close of the century a climax was brought about when the 
South African gold mines began to pour in a huge quantity 
of newly mined gold and expanded the basis of the jbritish 
credit structure* Cheque-money was multiplied manifold on 
the expanded gold base* This not only dispelled the monetary 
stringency, but made the money market easy and thereby 
stimulated drltish effective demand* from the beginning of 
the 2oth century, the volume of expenditure began to run ahead 
of production and there was a fairly rapid rise of effective 
demand in all the countries subscribing to the currency system 
represented by gold and sterling*
SECTION 6* The Appreciating Indian Rupee ana the 
Reintegration of the Indian Currency System with 
the International Cold standard*
The suspension of silver minting in India in 1893 not 
only brought about a revolutionary change in her currency 
system, but also achieved a not altogether insignificant effect 
in the working of the gold standard itself due to the apprec­
iation of the rupee in relation to gold* In spite of the 
budget difficulties caused by the falling exchanges and 
the representations of the Lancashire industry to remove the 
artificial exchange advantage of the nombay industry, the 
Indian government did not, at first, try to bring about any 
radical change in the silver standard* Instead, it endeavour­
ed to introduce some kind of bimetallism by international 
agreements* The Indian Government sent delegates to
the International Conferences of 1881 at Paris and of 
1892 at nrussels, with the aim of supporting all proposals
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(1)to reconnect silver with gold. But none of these con­
ferences could arrive at any conclusion on that point. In 
1892 the Government of India approached the Secretary of 
State for India with a proposal for closing its Mints to the
free coinage of*silver and making arrangements for the intro-
(*)
duction of the gold standard. The Secretary of state sub­
mitted the proposals of the Indian Government to a depart­
mental committee, with Lord Hersohell as the chairman, for 
examination. The committee upheld the proposals of the 
Indian Government and recommended the suspension of free 
minting of silver but the retention of the coinage of rupees 
on Government account in exchange for gold at a ratio of 
ls.4d. per ounce. It also recommended the acceptance of 
gold at the Government treasuries in payment of public dues 
by the people at the same ratio.
The Government accepted the proposals of the committee 
and the Act of 1893 was passed, closing the Indian Mint to 
the free coinage of silver for the public. The Government 
undertook the further obligation of supplying rupees in ex­
change for gold coin and bullion at the rate of ls.4d. to 
the rupee and empowered the people to pay their public dues, 
if they so desired, in sovereigns and half-sovereigns at the 
same rate. In other words, the maximum gold value of the 
rupee was fixed at this level but there was no provision to 
guarantee a minimum gold value for the rupee. It was ex­
pected that the suspension of further coinage of rupees,
(1) "The Problem of the Rupee", by B.R.Ambedkar, London,
1923. p.135.
(2) "Report of the Herschell Committee, 1893". para.3.
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while demand for rupees was increasing, ane to the increase of 
Indian industry and trade, would gradually push up its value to 
16 pence. As a matter of fact, the closing of the Mints made the 
rupee supply fall much short of the demand and was accompanied 
by an acute monetary stringency in India. The stringency commenc­
ed with the outbreak of famine in 1896 when the nank of Bengal ■.] 
raised its rate from 4* in September 1896 to 8^ in November of wh<
same year. The stringency continued to oe intensified until the
O )  expenditure®
discount rate went up to 1 »  in 1696 . fhile the volume of/Kfluupc
ran much ahead of production before 1693, it fell much short of
production from 1896 onwards. It led to a sharp appreciation of
the value of the rupee and the prices began to decline steeply.
Partly due to the appreciation in the internal value of the
(2)
rupee ana a decline in the world value of silver the rupee 
exchnage oe0an to rise and the face-value of the rupee became 
higher than its bullion value. The gap between the exchange and 
bullion value of the rupee began to widen with the lapse of every
13)
year as will be clear from the following table.
Year Metallic value of the rupee Exchange value of the rupee
1894 11yd. m d .
1895 11|d. 13£d.
1896 11?d. 14 id.
1897 10£d. 15*d.
1898 10^d. 15Jd.
(1) "Letter from the Bombay Native Shares, Stocks and Bxchaa^e 
Brokers' Association to the Chairman of the lnolan Currency 
Committee, May 28,1698." "The fowler Committee Report,
1696", Appendix 5, p*20.
(2) The fall in the value of gold during these years also helped 
this development.
(3) "The fowler Committee Report, 1898". p. 87, para. 63*
and fowler Committee Evidence. Question 238. i- IT
The rising exchnage value of the rupee conferred an exchange 
bounty on the imports from foreign countries and tended to stimu­
late it. While before 1892, Indian industries v*ere enjjying a 
protection due to the falling exchange, after 1892, they were con 
fronted with serious foreign competition- the exchange working in 
favour of the foreign producers. Indian industries were doubly 
hit by the general fall of prices and keen foreign competition 
which started from 1892.
The rising rupee exchange put the Indian export trade at a 
great disadvantage because it made the Indian goods costlier to 
foreign buyers and diminished their purchases. As the rise in the 
exchange rate in relation to the silver standard countries was 
more pronounced- than the rise xixm in relation to gold standard 
countries,Indian exports suffered more in the markets of the form­
er than the latter. On the other hand, demand for Indian exports 
in the gold standard countries which constituted the bulk of 
India's market was rapidly increasing during these years due to the
declining virulence of the Great Depression. These two factors
e
probably neutralised each other so far as their efftct on the 
Indian export trade was concerned.
There were other factors that were working towards a diminu­
tion of the Indian export trade. In the beginning (1892) Indian 
foreign trade was hampered by the existence of general trade depre-
d)
ssion in Europe and the banking collapse in U.S.A. and Australia • 
Moreover, in the Ear East there was the war between China and
(1) "India's Foreign Trade since 1870", by Dr. P. Roy. pp.57-66.
Japan which disturbed India's trade with the silver area. By 1695- 
96, there was a revival of business in creat Britain, the depre­
ssion in U.S.A. anu Australia was over and the war between China
ana Japan terminated. But in 1696-97, the abrupt end of the monseo
d )
ns brou^t the country to the verge of famine • It was followed 
by the failure of the winter rains and a devastating earthquake 
along the eastern side of the country. Famine broke out in vast 
areas necessitating suspension of exports of food grains. But, 
allowing for the trade restricting effects of all these factore, i 
must be admitted that exchange appreciation was probably the most 
potent factor in restricting Indian foreign trade during this ± >
period. Though quantum figures of trade of these years are not ava
the
liable,yet due to/absence of any serious price fluctuations!gene­
ral index of Indian wholesale prices with 1672 as 100, stood at
(2)
104 in 1860, 100 in 1690, 104 in 1895 and 116 in 190© there was
no wide divergence between volume and available value figures of
trade given below. Trade in this period was stagnant and there
(3)
were even years of retrogression.
( In millions of rupees)
tears Merchandise import Merchandise export Totals
1892-4 770.21 1,065.02 1,825.24
1894-5 725.29 1,069.14 1,824*45
1895-6 729.27 1,142.25 1,672.72
1696-7 761.17 1,029.84 1,801.01
1897-8 726.47 976.22 1,712.80
1898-9 721.01 1,128.00 1,849.01
1899-0 752.04 1,090.82 1,842.87
The currency position from 1892 onwards was avowedly
transitional and provisional and some definite action still
(1) •India's Foreign Trade since 1870",by Dr.P.Roy, pp 57-66.
(2) "Index Numbers of Indian prices" by F.J. Atkinson.
(2) Compiled from "Statistical Abs/ract", relating to British India*
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remained to be taken. This was hastened by the representa­
tion of the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce, which was inconven­
ienced by the starving of the money market through the clos­
ing of the Mints and the temporary suspension of the sale of 
Council Bills, resulting in a very high rate of discount.
This led to the appointment of the Fowler Committee in 1898.
There were two alternative schemes for establishing the 
gold standard considered by the Fowler Committee. Mr.Lindsay, 
Deputy Secretary and Treasurer of the Bank of Bengal, sub­
mitted a scheme for a gold standard without a gold currency,
while the Government of India submitted another scheme of cl
(1)
gold standard with a gold currency before the Committee.
The latter upheld the proposal of the Government of India and 
made the following recommendations: (a) Like the Australian 
branches of the Royal Mint there was to be free minting of 
sovereigns and half-sovereigns in India; (b) The rupee was 
to circulate with unlimited legal tender character side by 
side with gold currency. (c) The existing obligation of 
the Government to sell Council Bills to an unlimited extent 
and their encashment in rupees was to continue. To fulfill 
this obligation the Government was to retain the exclusive 
right of coining rupees. The profit on the coinage of rup­
ees was to be formed into a separate reserve called the gold 
standard Reserve. (d) The Government was to undertake the 
obligation of supplying gold, specially for export purposes 
when the balance of trade went against India.
(1) "The Fowler Committee Report, 1898". paras. 42-47.
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The Government of Inaia accepted the report of the Fowler Comm, 
ittee almost in its entirely and passed the Act of 1699 making 
sovereign* and half-sovereignd unlimited legal tenaer in Inuia at 
the rate of 1s*4d* to the rupee or fifteen rupees to the pound* 
This measure merged the Indian currency in the International 
Gold Standard system from 1699*
Section 7; The Expanding Monetary Supply under the 
International Gold Standard Regime. 1699-1914*
The Increasing monetary supply of Great Britain, partly brou­
ght about by the development of cheque-banking ana partly by the 
Increased gold supplies from the South African mines, persisted 
continupusly for the first fourteen years of the present century* 
It maintained a slowly rising price-level and a profitability 
of productive enterprises throughout this period* The labour and 
resources that suffered unemployment during the last quarter of Jkfc 
the 19th century began to be rapidly re-employed and production
went on expanding, increasing pari passu the income of the country,
the
Despite this increase in economic activity/volume of money during 
this period ran ahead of expanding production* In consequence, 
demand for goods was always in excess of their supply or, in 
other words, effective demand was greater than the level of 
economic activity* The monetary situation during this period was, 
therefore, exactly the reverse of what it was during the previous 
twenty-five years* After 1900, a sellers* market developed again 
and due to the excessive pressure of demand the sellers could 
dispose of their goods at terms more profitable to themselves*
The expanded British demand for goods (i.e. the big 
and growing effective demand) was not and could not be re­
stricted within the Internal market. A good part of it 
overflowed the national boundaries and was utilized to pur­
chase foreign goods. This British demand stimulated inter­
national trade and foreign productivity. Moreover, the 
overflowing part of the British demand (or market) consti­
tuted a very substantial part of the world demand (or mar­
ket) and was the deeldlng factor in determining the for­
tunes of the world eoonomie activity and world trade, and 
thereby the functioning of the gold standard system itself. 
The strength of this British demand and its position in the 
world economy was forcefully demonstrated by the American 
crisis of 1907-8 when U.S.A. ceased to purchase anything 
from the outside world, but continued her exports unabated 
and made the rest of the world her debtors. Great Britain 
met the unfavourable balanoe of herself and the rest of the 
world by sacrificing part of her gold reserves, as well as 
by recalling partly from U.S.A. pert of her short-term loans 
by a high bank rate policy. In the process, Great Britain 
had to extend loans to many countries to meet their defioit 
balance. This was, however, a stop-gap arrangement and 
simply proved the financial strength of Great Britain in 
the short loan money market of the world. More significant 
was the strength of the British import market, which could 
more than make good the complete collapse of the American 
market. It enabled all other oountries to earn sufficient 
foreign exchange to maintain their balanoe of payments equi­
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librium and stable exchange rate with sterling and thereby 
with gold. The British import markets were thus the main­
stay of the gold standard, world trade and world economic 
activity. The gold standard itself became In essence the 
sterling standard. Any other country of the world could 
attain a high level of international trade and domestic 
economic activity simply by maintaining a stable exchange 
rate with sterling.
Section 8: The Gold Exchange Standard in India, 1399-1914.
From 18999 the Indian Government began its attempt to 
put sovereigns and half-sovereigns into active circulation. 
They instructed their Post Offices to pay money orders In 
sovereigns and Paper Currency Offices to meet the demand for 
encashment of notes in gold coins, unless these were refused 
by the public. The district treasuries and railways also 
were Instructed to make payment In gold coins if people were 
willing to accept them. These attempts to put gold into 
circulation continued during 1900 and 1901 and a substantial 
amount of gold coins amounting to £6,750,000 passed into 
public hands. But one half of the gold thfcs put into cir­
culation returned to the Government, being paid by the pub­
lic in discharge of their dues to the Government. A con­
siderable part of the remaining half was exported and a sub-
CD
stantial amount was believed to be with bullion dealers.
In the meantime, negotiations were being carried on to start 
a Mint to coin sovereigns and half-sovereigns, but due to the
"Indian Currency and Finance", by I.M.Keynes, Chapter 2.
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hostility of the British Treasury, these proved abortive.
For both these reasons the Government was forced to give up
(1)
any further attempts to put gold coins into circulation.
The gold that accumulated in the reserves of India was ship­
ped to England to be kept, with other gold reserves, ear-
(2)
marked in the Bank of England.
After these failures, the Indian Government took advant­
age of that part of the recommendations of the Fowler Commit­
tee which permitted the Government to coin rupees to satisfy 
public demand^ to relieve the stringency of the money market. 
The sale of Council Bills was begun and to meet these, rupee 
coinage was resumed and was maintained at a steady rate up 
to the end of 1904. The silver bullion reserve urns suffic­
ient to meet this demand, but in 1905 there was an abnormal
demand for Council Bills and to meet the latter, the rupee 
reserve was nearly exhausted. The stock of silver bullion 
also ran short and the Government had to buy silver with part 
of the gold reserves in London and ship it to India. In the 
meantime, the rupee reserve in India sank to danger level and 
the price of the Council Bills had to be allowed to rise to 
ls.4gd. per rupee. But the silver bullion arrived and the 
Mint worked overtime and the supply of rupees increased very 
rapidly and was not only sufficient to meet the demand, but,
by the end of 1906, became much greater than what was required
(3)
for a very long time to come.
(1) "Chamberlain Commission Report, 1914". paras. 53-76.
(2) Ibid. paras. 77-101.
(3) Ibid. paras. 12-43.
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had
But the fact that the Government had/to allow the exche • 
nge to rise above the maximum level, injured its vanity. The 
Government went on coining rupees to such an ®xtent tbat under 
no imaginable circumstances would there be a shortage of ru­
pees again. For the whole of the financial year 1906-7, they 
continued their minting* By the end of October, came the 
American financial crisis. Amerioa, during and immediately 
after the crisis, sold to the outside world immensely more 
than what she bought from outside and made the rest of the # 
world suffer a steep unfavourable balance in relation to her. 
The balance of trade turned strongly against India and the 
usual demand for Council Bills completely disappeared. To 
meet the Home Charges, the Secretary of State could sell 
Council Bills of three millions of rupees only, by allowing 
the lowest exchange rate ls.3i!d. per rupee. Thereafter buy­
ers could not be found even at that rate. He had to with­
draw from the exchange market and meet the Home Charges from 
the gold reserves. But his complete withdrawal also did not
succeed in maintaining the exohange which continued to fall
(1)
and reaohed ls.Slsd. per rupee by November 25th, 1907. This 
rate was lower than the lowest specie point and it could not 
have happened if the rupee had been a gold coin.
To save the exohange rate, more drastic steps were urgent­
ly required. In December of 1907, the Government offered to 
sell Reverse Councils or Sterling Drafts, to an unlimited ex­
tent at the minimum rate of ls.3ltd. per rupee on the Secretary 
of State,who was to meet these from the gold reserves. There
ID"Chamberlain Commission Report, 1914". paras. 12 to 43
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was an urgent demand for these Sterling Drafts and their total 
amounted to £2o million within a year. The Gold Reserves of the 
Government fell from £31 million to £11 million within one year 
while the corresponding amount of rupees was withdrawn from cir­
culation. There was another Invisible agent which worked to 
help the exchange. Railway and general loans to the aggregate 
amount of £14^ million were contracted in London by the Indian 
Government. Nearly £10 million was spent in England on purchas­
ing materials and this did not help the exchanges. But to the 
extent of nearly £5 million, these loans were spent to purchase 
materials in India and these helped the exchanges. Henoe the 
total assistance from reserves and loans amounted to £25 million, 
which was also the amount of rupees withdrawn from circulation.
This ultimately turned the tide and by the middle of 1908, the
(1)
demand for Council Bills revived. Towards the end of the year 
1909, the exchange fell again and Reverse Councils were offered 
promptly. From that time until 1914, the currency system worked 
smoothly without any further strain.
India built up a very sound gold reserve consisting of two 
sections. Out of the profits of the rupee coinage, a separate 
gold reserve, called the Gold Standard Reserve was created and
kept in London and this, together with the Paper Currency Reserve,
(2)
kept up the external va].ue of the rupees and notes.
(1) "Indian Currency and Finance", by J.M.Keynes. Chapter 2, 
p.134.
"Chamberlain Commission Report, 1914". paras. 12-43.
(2) "Chamberlain Commission Report, 1914". paras. 77-118.
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/soyerbi-g;3db'' ;to)rJndia:;V;a:Xid the  / fc n ir t l i  ip ro v ls Io p v, prevented^, 
b i t ;!:frosii f a l l i n g  bblow;> > tlm qqbt f■ o f . e^cportlhg
: g q ld Tb,v-.; ' i lh - 'p ra p t in e b 't lp ^  ■ o f
'"■varia tion ' ;of: ■ thb ;-;s te 'rlihgvvyh iub ;:o f; the.:vrupee^were •' l 's *4 d ; land  o>:
ste rlihg--;w as: d u y in g ^ th ls * p e r io d  c o n y e r t ib le  In toI.' ’<'■'"/■ ■ - -i : •'.--1, -O’.' • "i'1 ‘ 'I'.' '■'■ -■■-■■'’>' !' . ,n,,, ,• .^y<; ’’ .. -J/*4 ,^:'-
. g o ld  In  u n iiu a ite iM m o u n ts , vti th q u t  ;n^ios t i a p ,;. and: gold- h o u ld  be
(1 ) " In d ia n  Currency and f in a n c e ’!T, by l.M ^Keyues, :t.oudonvbi91S.
jbA;:.p>v:6;*v.;;'rb;.;^ iv'b--
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exported freely from England, the Indian system became in ef­
fect a gold standard.
With the perfection of the Indian monetary system its pro­
vision became widely known and freely copied by many other 
countries of Asia, Africa and Latin-America. The Philippines, 
Siam, Indo-China, Straits Settlements, Dutch East Indies estab­
lished varieties of the Exchange Standard and secured stable 
exchange with gold. The Japanese currency system also was, in 
effect, an exchange standard. Thus during the first decade of 
the 2oth century, the gold exchange standard became the prevail­
ing monetary system of Asia - the silver standard being restric­
ted to China only. Supplemented by the exchange standard, the 
monetary system of the world became unified into the Internat­
ional Gold standard in the real sense of the term.
By linking her currency to gold, India made the rupee an 
instrument that could be interpreted in terms of almost all 
the currencies of the world - a unit in the world system.
Stable rupee exchange rates brought India within the orbit of 
world wide multilateral trade that was developing during the 
last quarter of the 19th century in the gold standard countries 
of the world and was by-pas3ing India to a degree. The world 
trade that was perfected by the close of the 19th century into 
a circle with all its multilateral ramifications began as bi­
lateral trade from the beginning of the century and was connec-
(1 )
ted with the British overseas investments. When, with the in­
crease of these investments, their incomes exceeded fresh ex-




ports of capital9 Great Britain developed/favourable balanoe of 
trade In relation to her tropical debtor countries. The lat­
ter supplied primary products to Britain and serviced their 
loans by sending an excess of exports to Britain over their Im­
ports from her. At this stage, it was a bilateral trade be-
U )
tween Great Britain and the tropics.
The expanding demand of Great Britain for all types of
solely
goods could not be met/by the tropical countries for a n y  leng­
th of time. The economic development of Western Europe and 
U.S.A. in the seventies enabled Great Britain to procure from 
them more and more of her import requirements. Great Britain
became the mo3t important market for the products of U.S.A.,
the
France, Sweden, Denmark and Holland. As long as/economic de­
velopment of these countries was restricted to primary goods, 
they continued to purchase traditional British manufacturing 
goods, such as textiles, apparel etc. From the eighties, how­
ever, they themselves built up these industries and restricted
the
the corresponding British products by import duties. In time,/ 
British balanoe of trade become unfavourable in relation to 
these countries .aut daring this perio£;British imports from 
tropical countries began to decline and her unfavourable bal­
ance of trade with them was transformed into a favourable bai­
ts)
ance. It is interesting to note that this ohange took place 
despite the fact that the servicing charge for foreign loans 
of tropical countries went on increasing. The servicing oh-




arge for foreign loans of U.S.A. did not Increase during this
period but, nevertheless, she Increased her favourable balanoe
(1)
of trade with Great Britain. In Western European countries 
British investments were negligible and these oountrles did 
not require any favourable balanoe to service their foreign 
loans. But, nevertheless, they developed a favourable bal­
ance In relation to Great Britain and fitted themselves into 
the trade system in between the jjropios and Great Britain.
Thus, we find that though the world trade began from the neces­
sity of creating a favourable balance to service the foreign 
loans of the tropical countries, yet it soon surpassed that 
limit and developed into International trade par excellence
based on/geographical division of labour - each country pro-
a (2)
duoing goods in which it had/ comparative cost advantage.
Up to this point, the world trade was of triangular type 
in which U.S.A. and continental Europe financed their increas­
ing purchases of primary ^oods from tropical countries by a 
net export to Great Britain, who met this deficit balance from 
her dividend and interest receipts from investments in the 
tropical countries. The latter, with the surplus of their ex­
ports to U.S.A. and continental Europe, not only servicedtbelr
foreign loans but paid for the balance of Imports from Great 
(3)
Britain. In the 1890*8 , this triangular trade became quad­
rangular 'when the Regions of Reoent Settlement in the Temperate 
Beltf - i.e. the British Dominions and South Amerloan countries
; r .ti . Y .';v  ; /  . . . >  '•




came on the scene. These areas first developed agriculture 
and then mining and industries on the most scientific lines 
and in agricultural exports competed with U.S.A. so success­
fully that the latter was ousted from the British and conti­
nental European markets. But these countries were in need of 
transportation equipment and other capital goods from U.S.A. 
which, however, needed very little of their products. They 
had, therefore, a net unfavourable balance of trade with Am­
erica as well as with the tropical countries - the last mention­
ed supplying them with primary products. The Regions of Re­
cent Settlement paid for the net imports from the tropics and 
U.S.A. by a net export of raw materials and foodstuffs to Ger­
many and other industrial countries of Europe. Germany, again 
required raw materials and foodstuffs from these Regions as 
well as from the tropical countries. She paid for this net 
import by making a net export to the rest of Europe. The 
European countries (minus Germany) paid for their net imports 
from Germany partly from their interests and dividends on over­
seas investments and partly by their favourable balance with
(1 )
Great Britain.
Thus, by the close of the 19th century, world trade be­
came fully multilateral. The course of this trade formed a 
complete circle in which the different groups of countries,
starting from the tropics, were contiguously placed, each area
a
having/favourable balance in respect of all others preceding it.










In the above figure, if we trace the circumference of the
circle in the arrow direction from the tropical countries, we
a
shall find that every group indloated thereon has/favourable 
balance with all other groups in front of it. Great Britain 
was the terminal point as she met her net unfavourable balanoe 
with her proceeds from foreign investments. That the volume 
of this trade was much greater than the net proceeds from the 
British foreign investments was indicated by the fact that the 
total volume of favourable balance of the tropioal countries 
far exceeded the amount needed for servicing their foreign 
loans. Now, this Increase was possible, by activating, 
through multilateral trade, the demand for tropical products 
of all the countries in front of the tropioal areas indloated 
on the clrole. If there were no multilateral trade, the vol­
ume of exchange would be restricted to a much smaller amount J
(1) k simplified form of the figure on p,78 in "The Network of 
World Trade", League of Nations, Geneva, 1942.
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capable of being bilaterally adjusted,and the world would have 
been much poorer by being deprived of the advantages of the in­
ternational division of labour.
Now, this multilateral trade was possible, only if there 
were multilateral means of international payments, i.e. if each 
currency could be freely turned into any other currency at re­
asonably stable exchange rates. If there were no stable ex­
changes, multilateral settlements of international payments 
would become so risky that they would be given up altogether 
and trade would be reduced to bilateral transactions and shrink 
in consequence. The International Gold Standard, by maintain­
ing the stability of exchange rates, provided the means of 
multilateral settlements and thereby facilitated multilateral 
trade. This was the reason why the multilateral trade system 
in the last quarter of the 19th century comprised only the gold 
standard countries. During these decades, India could not 
participate fully in the development of world multilateral 
trade because of the absence of a stable international means of 
settlement caused by her fluctuating exchanges. When, however, 
stable exchanges were attained from 1900 onwards, India got the 
means of settlement on a multilateral basis and the entire pot­
ential world demand for Indian exports was released and made ef­
fective. This naturally stimulated Indian exports and she par­
ticipated in the world multilateral trade to the fullest extent.
While her membership of the International Gold standard 
system provided India with the means of participating in the 
multilateral world trade, the prosperity boom in Great Britain 
from 1900 to 1914 supplied the contents or materials of that
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trade. Prom 1900 onwards effective demand began to run ahead 
of .British productive activity and this very fact increased 
the profitability of British productive enterprises, which went 
on expanding continuously. Though effective demand was in 
excess of the volume of production, yet the level of British 
production did not attain the maximum productive capacity even 
at the end of this period. This peculiarity imparted a partic­
ular efficacy to monetary stimulus in increasing British 
productivity. Increasing effective demand backed by increas­
ing productivity stimulated world trade and thereby increased 
the economic activity of the whole world. Taking manufactur­
ing production as an index of economic activity, we can form 
a rough idea of the intensity of this British stimulus from
in
the following table :-
Indices of i.anufacturin^, Activity. 
(Base: 1913 - 100)
Period. U.K. World. India.
1871-75 49.0 22.4 .... (2)
1876-80 50.0 24.5 s e e s
1881-85 57.3 30.4 • s e a
1886-90 61.3 36.8 • s e e
1891-95 64.6 42.6 • e s s
1896-00 74.3 53.6 53.5
1901-05 77.3 67.0 68.9
1906-10 83.1 79.9 85.0
1911-13 93.1 94.3 97.1
The expansion of the British market meant, in effect, the 
expansion of the world market, so much so that the total coll­
apse of the American import market in 1907-8 could not ser-
(1) compiled from the tables on p.130 of "industrialization 
and foreign Trade*, League nations, 1945.
(2) not available.
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iously or permanently damage or dislocate the world trade or 
industry. The expanded British demand in combination with 
India’s membership of the International Gold Standard bene- 
fitted Indian foreign trade in two respects. The terms of 
Indian trade with the rest of the world improved considerably 
and her volume of trade increased immensely.
It is noteworthy that the rise in prices during this per­
iod was greatest in India as is shown by the fact that the 
level during the quinquennium 1907-11 as compared with the 
Quinquennium 1894-8 showed an increase of 40$, while corres­
ponding percentage rises being 21$ for U.K., 38$ for U.S.A.
(1)
and 20$ for Australia. In Indian index numbers there is a 
preponderance of agricultural goods while manufacturing goods 
preponderate in those of advanced countries. The special 
rise of Indian prices was due to the special rise of agri­
cultural, as compared with manufacturing, prices in the world 
market. This was mainly due to the economies of large scale 
production in manufactures with the expanding scale of pro­
duction. The Indian imports consisting mainly of manufactur­
ing goods and exports being mainly agricultural products -
(2 )
this meant a strongly favourable term of trade 1b? India.
The second effeot of the gold standard and expanded Bri­
tish demand was the phenomenal development of India’s foreign 
trade from 1900 to 1914. The following trade tables will
(1) "Report on the Enquiry into the Rise of Prices in India 
(1914)", by K.L.Datta. p.29.
(2) "Index Numbers of Indian Prices 1861-1931", *y ?.J. 
Atkinson.
(1)
give an iaea about the Immense increase of Inaian trade.
Manufactured Articles from 1871- 1913.
World
( quantum 1913 - 100) 
Great Britain India
Total Ira Ex­ 1m
Period Trade Port port port
1871-75 .... 26.7 44.8
....1876-80 32.1 38.1 43.5
1881-85 40 44.3 54.9 ....
1886-90 45.1 49.9 60 ....
1891-95 45.9 57.5 57.3 ....
1896-00 48 64 55.4 ....
1901-05 63.2 68.7 67.9 56.1
1906-10 77.9 80.9 82.2 69.9
1911-13 95.6 95.9 96 87.7
1913 100 100 100 100
gx
port
As Indian quantum export figures of this period as well as 
import figures before 1901 are not available we cannot compare the 
increase of Indian trade of this period with the previous period* 
But taking the import figures as Representative, the conclusion 
may be hazarded that from 1901 to 1913, Indian trade nearly doubl­
ed itself in magnitude and the rate of increase was greater than 
that of Great Britain as well as of the world* The extraordinary 
nature of the increase of Indian trade during this period is corr< 
borated by the general quinquennial value figures of Indian trade 
given on p* 107* The available price datum indicates that from 
1865 to 1913, price-changes were not of considerable amplitude*
The general index number of Inaian wholesale prices ( base:1873 -
13)
100^ - stood at 107 in 1865, 116 in 1900 and 122 in 1910. Due to
(1) Industrialization and foreign Trade : League of nations 
1945, page 157, 162 and 163.
(2) quantum figures not available.
(3) Index. Numbers of Inaian prices by f.J. Atkinson.
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this reason price changes aiu nor prevent a rough correspondence 
between value and volume of trade during this period.
I D
The Growth of Indian foreign Trade 
frora 1664-69 to 1909-14
( In lakhs of rupees )
quinquennial
Average Imports Exports Total
1864-5 to 1666-9 31,70 55,66 87,56
1669-70 to 1873-4 33.04 56,25 89,29
1874-5 to 1676-9 38.36 60,32 96,66
1679-60 to 1663-4 50,16 79,06 129,24
1884-5 to 1686-9 61,51 66,64 150,15
1889-90 to 1893-4 70,76 104,99 175,77
1694-5 to 1696-9 73,67 107,53 161,20
1899-0 to 1903-4 64,66 124,92 209,60
1904-5 to 1908-9 119,65 165,44 265,29
1909-10 to 1913-4 151,67 224,23 375,90
Two facts go a long way to explain the stagnation of Indian 
trade before 1900 and its phenomenal development after that year. 
Indian currency management consisted of a fluctuating rupee 
exchange with gold before 1900 ana stable exchange after 1900.
This fact, together with British depression in the previous period 
and the prosperity boom during the later period are sufficient to 
explain the uifference. The phenomenal development &f Indian trade 
and industry from 1900 to 1914 was thus mainly incidental to the
British prosperity boom of this period. India attained her aone-
the
tary objective partly through her attachment to gold standard but 
mainly through the monetary policy of the major economy^that time.
(1) Compiled from Statistical Abstract relating to British India,




Inaian Currency Policy and problems: 
The Suspension, Restoration and 
Liquidation of the Gold Standard.
1914-1931.
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C H A P T E R  I I I .
INDIAN CURRENCY POLICY AND PROBLEMS
The Suspension, Restoration and Liquidation 
of the Gold Standard . 1914-1931.
Section 1: Monetary Repercussions of ttorld war 1.
The first World War created such a situation that it was no 
longer possible to continue monetary management according to the 
gold standard rules and thereby maintain exchange stability and 
balance of payments equilibrium. The International Gold Standard 
which prevailed for such a long period before the outbreak of the 
war, was a means of multilateral settlement of international trade 
transactions - using the word trade in the widest economic sense, 
comprising exchange of goods and services and capital movements. 
The gold standard could, therefore, exist only as lonfe as inter­
national trade existed and was free enough to attain equilibrium. 
But the great Var destroyed all these foundations, trade between 
the belligerent countries was out of the question, for four years 
and more, the production and distribution of &oods was governed in 
the belligerent countries primarily by the exigencies of the war. 
The belligerent countries had to divert labour and capital from 
export industries to either battlefields or munition factories. On 
the other hand, their need for foreign imports remained the same, 
if not increased. Moreover, whatever little trade could be 
carried on, was made wellnigh impossible by blockade and shipping
109.
shortage. International trade was, thus, not only drastically 
reduced but there was no means of attaining a balance of payments 
equilibrium. To meet their unfavourable balances, the belligerent 
countries had to sacrifice their gold reserves in the very early
d )
stages of the war and go off the gold standard.
The neutral countries also could not remain on gold for long.
As the belligerent countries had to send their gold to them in
payment for their essential purchases, the neutral countries
raised a huge superstructure of currency notes ana bank money
on the expanded gold base. Their money supply increased to such
an extent that they could not maintain their gold ratios even
with their augmented supply of gold. The importunate demand of >
the belligerents for more loans persuaded them to expand their
credit structure beyond all normal proportion to their reserves
and this in time compelled them to suspend gold payments end to
(2)
resort to inconvertible paper money.
Despite many stupendous obstacles, an attenuated internation* 
al trade had to be carried on during the war. It was essential,
for example for Great Britain to maintain the import of war 
supplies from America. Due to her inability to maintain exports 
ana her rapidly disappearing gold reserves that provided
(1)" Uoney,” by D.H.Robertson, London,1946. C h a p t e r p p  109 and 
110.
(2) Ibid. p. 110.
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the only means of payment, the dollar-sterling exohange rate
fell briskly from £1 : 54.86 to £1 : 54.76 within a few
(1 )
months. This increased the cost of war materials to Bri­
tain and raised the problem of meeting the price of the excess 
imports from America. Exchange was pegged at 4.76 to the 
pound, but this involved an unlimited offer of dollars by the 
British Government at that rate to the importers and others
(ft
who needed dollars. British capitalists owned a huge amount 
of investments in America before the war. The British Gov­
ernment bought the titles to these investments in exchange for 
sterling and began to sell them in America. With the dollar 
proceeds of the sale of these American investments the Govern­
ment continued to meet its deficit balance. When all the in­
vestments were thus sold off, the British Government took a
(3)
big loan from America to continue its foreign payments. Thus, 
by the end of the war, America instead of being indebted to 
England, became her creditor for a colossal amount. This en­
tire Anglo-American trade transaction was an international bar­
ter deal and the dollar-sterling exchange rate was an arbitrary
loan-rate. When pegging was withdrawn in March 1920, the dol-
(4)
lar value of sterling quickly fell to 53.4. Bilateral barter 
deals of this type constituted the general pattern of inter­
national trade transactions during the war. In other words, 
money ceased to be managed to serve the needs of free inter­
national trade because there was no such trade.
(1)"Babington Smith Committee Report, 1919". para. 19.
* • * j
V  7  - i - ♦,
(2)"Prosperity Decade: A Chapter from American Economic History, 
1917-1929", by G.Soule, New York, 1947. p.253.
(4) "babington Smith Committee Report, 1919", para.19.
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While the Great War created a situation in which inter-
of
national trade could no longer serve as a criterion/ monetary
management, the same situation demonstrated the possibility
of managing money according to a new criterion.The belligerent
governments, in their attempts to commandeer economic resources
to prosecute war, soon came to the limit of taxation and
straight borrowing and were obliged to have recourse to the
(1)
manufacture of paper money. In all cases, paper money was 
able to mobilise real resources for the prosecution of war to 
a very great extent. Thus, paper money was found capable of 
directing economic activities in a desired direction and at­
taining a set purpose.
Much more significant than the diversion of productive 
activities from one line to another was the power that paper 
money demonstrated in stimulating production itself. The war 
caused a terrific destruction of productive equipment and 
complete chaos in the productive organization in Europe.
Mainly due to this reason, the volume of overall production of 
the world suffered a diminution. But, in countries where pro­
ductive equipment did not suffer physical destruction or dis­
location, the volume of production, under the stimulus of ris­
ing prices brought about by increasing paper money, increased
(2)
considerably. This was an unmistakable sign that paper money
had the power of stimulating production. The indices, on 
page 112 of this thesis, of manufacturing production of the
(1) "Money", by D.H.Robertson, London, 1948. p.108.
(2) "Industrialization and Foreign Trade", League of Nations,
1945. pp.134 and 135.
world?at the beginning and end of the war, of some selected 
European countries suffering from war destruction and dis­
location, as well as of countries that were comparatively im­
mune from war devastation, will bear out this general infer­
ence*
(1)

















It was, thus, at least vaguely,apparent that If paper 
money could mobilise real resources for the purposes of the 
war, there was no reason why it should not be able to mobilise 
resources for other purposes; and if war demand, made effect­
ive by paper money, could stimulate productive activity, there
was no reason why consumption demaifl, made effective in a simi-
the
lar manner in peaoe-time, should not be able to stimulate/pro­
duction of consumption goods*
(1) "Industrialization and Foreign Ttade", League of Nations, 
1945* pp.134 and 135.
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Section 2: Indian Currency during ?forld War I.
Although India was an active participant in the war, her 
currency experience during these years was more similar to that 
of neutral countries than belligerents. After an initial loss 
of confidence by the Impact of the war and a quiok recovery from 
it# there ensued a strong demand for the Indian currency orig- 
inatlng from the Allies' demand for Indian goods. Large quan­
tities of various Indian materials, such as sand-bags, hides 
etc. needed for the Eastern Theatres of War, were bought by 
the Indian Government on behalf of His Majesty's Government.
In addition to this, arrangements had also to be made for the 
financing of purchases in India on behalf of some of the Do­
minions and Colonies. The combined effect of these factors
was to create a heavy demand for Indian goods and, therefore,
(1)
for Indian currenoy.
While the export trade of India was thus expanding rapidly, 
import trade lagged far behind and it declined continuously 
throughout the war years. Imports from Central European 
countries were naturally suspended and the Allies' productive 
organization was concentrated more and more on war needs.
Hence, though raw materials and foodstuffs were bought in great­
er and greater quantities by the Allies, yet they could not ex­
port any goods to India. This excess of exports over imports
(2)
created an ever-increasing favourable balance for India, 
and a great demand for Council Bills.
(1) "Babington Smith Committee Report 1919". paras.9-11.
(2) Ibid. paras.10 and 11.
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Iffir tg , .A ft...to fp idudutf. a u iin g
ie faar Years in Lakhs of Rupees. (1)
le&r jLjg^ o£t Lxport Bailee
1915-14 165,25 244,20 60,95
1914-15 157,95 177,46 59*55
1915-16 151,99 192,56 60,57
1916-17 149,65 257,10 67,47
1917-16 150,42 255,44 65,02
1916-19 169,05 259,52 70,29
Under pre-war conditions Council Bills were sold in 
London for sterling which was then ueposited in lnaiafs account 
with the Bank of England* A part of it was kept in London as a 
l»o lu reserve to meet Reverse Councils when Balance of payments 
became adverse to India. Another part was utilised to buy ana trax 
sport gold bullion to India. But, with the commencement of the wax 
Great Britain suspended the gold standard and stopped the export 
of gold. Against this restriction only a small part of tne sterlln 
which resulted from the sale of Council Bills could be used to buy 
and ship gold. The difficulties in purchasing silver from outside 
were greater still as will appear from discussions in tne follow­
ing pages. The following taole on the next page gives India1s 
imports of treasure during the pre-war qulnquenium ana during the 
war period and shows a sudden diminution of gold ana silver after 
the outbreak of the war. In value, the average ^old and silver imp 
orts of Inula during the war was not much below one-fourth of 
the pre-war years. __________ __________ _______




Net Imports of Treasurei on Private
(1)
Account
Gold & silver coin 
apd bullion in p
silver cola 
ana bullion in £
1909-10 20,660,000 1914-15 12,31.5,000
1910-11 21,700,000 1915-16 6,984,000
1911-12 26,706,000 1916-17 1,357,000
1912-12 29,455,000 1917-16 15,277,000
1915-14 19,713,000 1916-19 53,000
Total ; 120,242,000 Total ; 35,964,000
As gold and silver in exchange for sterling could not be pro*
to
cured In the requisite quantity, India's balance of sterling began/
accumulate ana stood at 4*240 million at the end of the war. This
deal did not, therefore, represent a bilateral trade transaction
nor was the amount of £240 million a traae balance, but it was
unilateral loan transaction ana the amount involved was simply a
loan from Inaia to Great Britain. The suspension of gold payments
oy Great Britain and the stoppage of exports of gold, therefore,
12)
imperceptibly put India off the gold standard ana the monetary 
management of India ceased to be regulated for the neeas of 
international trade.
The sterling balance of £240 million was adjusted by the encash 
ment of Council Bills of the same amount in India in terms of 
rupees and rupee*notes. This involved an increase of money supply 
in India and there was a measure of inflation. The rise in prices 
did not apparently lead to any appreciable increase in 
agricultural production but there was a noticeable Increase
in manufactured production. The exports of manufactures
(1)"Babington Smith Committee Heport 1919* para 14
(2) Ibid.
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ures which constituted 22.4# of the total export trade in
(1)
1913-14, rose up to 36.6# in 1918-19. There were signifi­
cant developments in the cotton, jute, leather, iron and steel 
industries.The rise of prices, however, had less real effect 4n 
net increase of production than in diversion of production from 
Indian consumption goods to war exports. Indian monetary man­
agement during the war was, therefore, designed to finance the 
war-loan of £240 million and to mobilise the equivalent Indian 
resources for war purposes - a situation not dissimilar to the 
financing of war with paper money in the other belligerent 
countries during these years.
The sterling exchange mechanism continued to function
an
smoothly until the end of 1916 when a difficulty of/exceptional 
nature arose. A heavy demand for Council Bills, and in con­
sequence, for Indian currency necessitated a big expansion of 
the supply of both silver rupees and rupee-notes. Rupee-notes, 
however, were convertible into silver rupees but these paper 
notes increased relatively to such an extent that they came to 
the verge of inconvertibility. To increase the supply of sil­
ver rupees, the Indian Government had to make heavy purchases of
silver for coinage to the extent of 538 million ounces up to the
(2)
beginning of the year 1916. From that year, however, the 
value of silver began to rise rapidly and the Government began 
to find increasing difficulty in procuring more silver. There 
were several reasons for this scarcity and the rise in the
(1) "Indian Economics", by G.B.lather and S.G.Beri, Bombay,
1945. p.202.
(2) "Babington Smith Committee Report 1919". p.17.
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price of silver. In the first place, on account of political 
disturbances the silver production in Mexico, the most im­
portant silver producing country in the world, was completely 
disorganized, and chiefly because of this, the world production 
of silver fell from the pre-war average by an amount of 43.6
million ounces out of the average total of 50.5 million ounces
(1)
of the world*s total annual output. Secondly, the world de­
mand for silver, especially for coinage, became more and more 
acute. Coinage of silver in the British Empire required 108 
million fine ounces per year during the war, while the pre-war 
quinquennial average was only 30.5 million fine ounces. Other 
conntries, especially belligerents, absorbed similarly big con­
signments of silver for coinage. The conserving of gold by
the belligerents for war purchases led them to increase their
(2)
demand for silver coinage.
The following list of silver prices shows a continuous 
rise in the price of the white metal from 1915 to 1920:-
(3)





1919 (May) 58 "
1919 (December) 78
1920 (February) 89
per ounce is the silver par of
this value of silver,the metallic value of the rupee becomes
(1) "Babington Smith Committee Report 1919". para.15.
(2) Ibid. para.16.
(3) Ibid. para.18.
equal to its exchange value at ls.4d. and this par was attain­
ed in August 1917. The rise in the price of silver bullion 
in the rupee above Its face-value made the sale of Council 
Bills at ls.4d. per rupee an impossibility because of the dan­
ger of rupees being melted down and sold for bullion. Hence, 
the rate of exchange had to be allowed to rise to correspond 
with the rise in the value of silver. The following table
The rises in exchange rate were effected by the control 
of the supply of Council Bills by the Indian Government. By 
allowing these rises in the exchange rate, rupees were saved 
from the melting pot, but at the same time the prices of Ind­
ian exports to British purchasers were made very much higher. 
These rises in exchange rate hastened the accumulation of Ind­
ia* s sterling balance and probably made the amount double 
what it would have been if the exchange rate had remained at 
the previous level. In the Indian economy, the rise of 
prices was much less serious because of the encashment of a 
smaller volume of Council Bills than would have been necessary
(1)
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if the rupee-sterling exchange rate had not risen. Indian 
currency was thus managed during the war primarily to finance 
the war exports or the sterling loan which accumulated mainly
change rate against Great Britain. The Indian exchange rate 
did, therefore, materialize as an arbitrary sterling loan rate 
and had no connection with the potential trade situation of 
the oountry.
Though the exchange rate of the rupee was raised pari 
passu with the rise in the value of silver, yet this did not 
appreciably arrest the immense increase of currency supply in 
India. To meet its own war expenditure, the Government of 
India had to float huge war loans and had to help itself by 
manufacturing currency notes. While before the war notes 
constituted only a minor fraction of the currency circulation 
of India, they became nearly equal to silver coins at the end 
of the war and the absolute increase of note circulation was 
greater than that of silver rupees, as will appear from the 
table below:-
The above figures indicate only the annual absorption of 
rupees and notes in the Indian eoonomy. The gross circula-
at the cost of Indian inflation and partly by turning the ex-
(1)
Currency Circulation in India.
(In lakhs of rupees•)
I7o7-T5"TF T gte:iT  —  ~ ™S7&T '"11,78
1914-15 to 1918-19 22,08 16,72 38,80
for 5 years. Ru ~ . Notes. Total.
1919-20
(1) "Indian Economics %  by G.B.lather and S.G.Beri, Bombay, 
1945. Vol.II. p.295.
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latlon of notes increased from 65,5 crores in 1913-14 to 171.fi 
crores in 1919-20 while active circulation increased from 45.6 
crores to 151.1 crores between the two years. This precipi­
tate increase of money supply led to a corresponding increase of 
Indian prices;
Index number of Wholesale Prices in India and 
£reat Britain. (TTJ
Calcutta TJ.K.Board of Trade 









The comparatively smaller rise in the Indian prices is ex­
plained by the rise of the rupee exchange in terms of sterling. 
The rising prices undoubtedly created distributive injustice 
within the Indian society,but by increasing the profitability 
of business enterprises, they stimulated Indian production very 
significantly. India was one of the few countries that re­
corded a very pronounced increase of manufacturing production
and thereby demonstrated the power of paper money in stimulating
(3)
productive activity.




(3) The index of/ifltfl rose to 118.4 in 1920 from 100 in 1913. 
"Industrialization and Foreign Trade", League of 
Nations, 1945. p.135.
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Section 3: The Post-War Monetary Situation and 
the Restoration of the Gold standard, 1919-257
The miracle that paper money performed during the war was
not terminated even after the end of the war. Many indigent
governments of war-torn Europe found in paper money the easiest
and, in some cases, the only practicable method of taxing their
people and they continued to run their tottering administra-
(1)
tions by manufacturing more and more paper money. The war 
had already led to a huge increase of money supply all over the 
world with its consequent inflation. In some belligerent co­
untries, such as Germany, Russia and Poland, there was an in­
ordinate increase in the supply of money and prices rose to 
astronomical heights. In others, the inflation, though severe,
was not astronomical; price advances reached magnitudes of the 
order of 300# to 600#. In some other countries inflation, al­
though real, was of still lower magnitude. In England, for 
example, between 1914 and 1920, the wholesale price level rose
195#; in Norway from January 1915 to December 1920, 128# and
(2)
in U.S.A. from September 1917 to June 1919, 10#. After the
war, inflation continued in those countries where it had alrea^r
been most rampant. War inflation and its further accentuation
in many countries during the Immediate post-war years led to
various pathological economic developments of a highly unsatls-
(3)
factory nature.
Before the war, prices were rising all over the world, but 
not nearly so quickly as during and after the war. The rising
(1) "Money", by D.H.Robertson, London, 1948. p.109.
(2) "Gold and the Gold Standard", by E.W.Kemmerer, New York, 
1944. pp.108 and 10$.
"Money" by D.H. Robertson,London , 1948,p.UY- 11%
prices ran ahead of increasing productive activity,yet there 
was always an excess of productive potentialities. The ris­
ing prices by increasing the profitability of productive en­
terprises stimulated the dormant resources of production and 
enlisted their application in the expansion of further pro­
duction. Similarly, It might be suggested that rising prices 
after the war shouM have also Increased the profitability of 
enterprises and continued the expansion of production. But tbs 
post-war production situation was fundamentally different. The 
devastations of the war had thoroughly disorganized the world’s
system of production and distribution. In Europe, there was
the
extensive destruction of/physical equipment of production and 
the agricultural industry was completely out of gear. More­
over, the supply of money was already so great, the effective 
demand for goods so intense and profitability of productive en­
terprises so considerable that all the extant resources of pro­
duction that were capable of producing anything were already 
fully engaged in production. There was no excess (short-run) 
potential productive capacity to be tapped by further monetary 
stimulus similar to that before the war. Hence, the continu­
ance of the practice of manufacturing paper money by many co­
untries after the war could not increase production any further
(1)
but simply manifested itself in the form of rising prices.
The continuous inflation in many European countries after 
the war, made the holders of money constant losers and there 
was a natural inclination of every person to spend his money as 
quickly as possible and hold his saving in the form of real
fl) "Money", by D.H.Robertson, London, 1948. pp.110-119.
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goods. This meant an increase of the velocity of money, ac­
celeration in the rise of prices and a flight from money in
(1)
general. With the persistence of inflation, holding of money 
became such a losing affair that people were compelled more and 
more to give up monetary transactions and had to resort to bar­
ter, and the overall demand for money began to shrink. Diffi­
culties in monetary transactions and inconveniences of barter
restricted the volume of exchanges and thereby caused serious
the
difficulties in the way of/expansion of production. By under­
mining the basis of contract, it tended to disorganize the pro­
ductive system altogether. At the climax of inflationary de­
velopments, production was found to have shrunk considerably in
the
the countries concerned. In 1920,/ Russian index of manufactur­
ing production, for example, sank to 12.8 from a base of 100 in
(2)
1913. In 1923, the year of super-inflation in Germany, the
index of German manufacturing production sank to 55.4 from 81.8
(3)
in 1922 and 100 in 1913. The similar Hungarian index in 1923 
fell to 56.6 from 80 in 1922, and the Polish index in 1924 was 




It was thus obvious that/increase of money could not stim­
ulate further production when all the available factors of pro-
duction were already fully engaged. Beyond this limit of full
an
engagement,/increased supply of money was found to have a tend-
(1) "Money", by D.H.Robertson, London, 1948. pp.117 and 118.
(2) "Industrialization and Foreign Trade", League of Nations,
1945. p.134.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid. pp.136 and 137.
ency to disorganize and reduce production rather then to stimulate
it* Increasing money supply in the post-war years became an obsta-
a
cle to production, instead of/help* To increase production under 
the post-war circumstances, it was necessary to recreate and rehab 
litate the physical equipment of production* No extent of increase 
of monetary supply could have enabled Europe to rehabilitate her 
productive system without importing equipment from abroad, which 
at that time meant U*S*A* But foreign goods could not be bought 
with manufactured paper money* Foreign loans could meet the situa­
tion, but foreign capitalists could not he expected to lend money 
to a country suffering under an inflationary pressure* Moreover, 
with the progress of inflation, foreigners set a much lower value 
on an inflating currency then the value to which it fell within
(D
the country and consequently tended to raise the prices of
foreign goods much higher than those of domestic goods9and thereby
made the purchase of foreign equipment by an inflating country
extremely costly* German inflation of 1923 put the whole of
Germany up to auction, hut even that could not help her to attain
either balance of payments equilibrium or to rehabilitate her pro-
(2)
ductive system* Both goods and loans could be more easily obtai 
ned from U*S*A* by the European countries if they stopped infla­
tion and rehabilitated their currencies back to the gold standard
13)
to which America returnee! immediately after the war. The ever­
growing inflation that was rapidly deteriorating the economic
(1) "Money,by D.H.Robertson,London,1948.pp.119 and 120.
(2) Ibid. p.122.
(3) Ibid. pp. 126-128.
125.
systems in Germany, Austria ana other central European countries 
to a state of complete collapse, set afoot a strong movement to 
restore the gold standard in the post-war years. The International 
Financial Conference hela in Brussels in 1920, at which 39 countr­
ies including the most important nations of the world were represe­
nted, urged on all countries that had lapsed from the gold
d)
standard to return to it with all promptitude.
Side by side with the movement to restore the gold standard, 
there developed another school of thought which upheld the crea­
tion of paper money as the most outstanding event in the whole evo­
lution of the monetary system of the world, because it relieved
(2)
humanity from the tyrannies of the yellow metal. The exponents 
of this thought were not oblivious of the serious implications of 
potential inflation under paper money. As a remedy for this poten­
tial danger they advocated that all the governments of the world 
should be summarily deprived of money-making power altogether so 
that they might not create inflation. Misuse of this excellent 
instrument by the short-sighted governments of many countries did 
not warrant, in their opinion, a summary supression of it, but 
simply a more cautious and efficient handling of this facile mecha­
nism. It is mainly for evolving sound principles for management 
of paper money that the theory of central banking received the 
closest attention of the economists of this school of thought.
At their hands the theory of central banking attained its highest
(1) "Gold and the Gold Standard", By E.W.Kemmerer, aew York,
1944. pp.21 and 22.




development in the twenties. The Central Bank of a country was 
conceived as a parallel organization to the Government for contro­
lling the economic affairs of the society, it was to be the mone­
tary government of the country. The political government wat* not 
only to be deprived of money-making power but tne uentral Bank
was also to be the keeper of the government's tax-money and the
12)
supervisor of its expenditure. The government was not to own any
shares in the Central Bank which was to be privately owned, but
a national institution, not to be run with an eye to profit but
(3)
to maintain the monetary stability of the com.try.
Monetary stability was meant to include the stability of
14)
prices, profit and production. In other woros, tne Central Bank
of a country was expected to maintain economic activity at the
(3)
maximum level. This, it was to do, by providing re-discount
facilities to other oanks of the country when they needed more
lb)
funds t* finance the trade and industry of the country. Thus, 
the paper money facilities of which the government was to be 
deprived, ware to be maae available to facilitate the productive 







"Central Banks",by Kisch arid Elkin, Lonaon,192b.
"Report of tne Royal Commission of Indian Currency Finance 
1926". paras. 83-90.
Ibid.
"A Tract on Monetary Reform", by J.M. Keynes, Lonuon 1923* 
Chapter 4.
Report of the Hilton Young Commission 1926". paras 114-116 
Ibid.
level of activity. The economic opinion of that time was so much 
influenced by this school of thought that the existing Central 
Banks adopted the rules propounded by it, if they did not already 
conform to them. Appeals were sent from one international confer­
ence after another to countries that did not possess any Central 
Bank to organize one and to put their monetary system in order. 
Many new Central Banks did come into existence and took up the 
reins of their monetary government and undertook the function of 
maintaining the productive activity of their respective economies« 
J.M. Keynes may be regarded as the leader of this new school 
of thought, tie was logical enough to realize that if paper money 
was to maintain the stability of internal economic activity it 
could not, at the same time, maintain the convertibility of money 
into gold, tie was,therefore, consistent in being a violent 
opponent to the restoration of the gold standard, which he dubbed 
a barbarous relic. But, strangely enough, the general boay of 
economic opinion did not find any fundamental inconsistency in 
observing gold standard rules as well as maintaining internal 
economic activity by the monetary authority of a country. Far fron 
appearing to be contradictory, the gold standard rules were taken 
as a healthy check to any monetary system in which paper money jcju 
constituted the bulk of the circulating media. They grafted the
A
gold standard rules on to the perfected theory of central banking; 
and over and above maintaining internal economic stability,Centra] 
Banks were charged with the responsibility of maintaining th^con-
138. '
\ ; y e r t i - l v i i i ^  . m ^an ta lh  thb.,'balance o f
V ^ a y iu o n t^ ' o f  t h e i r  . reapedbiye 1 c o u n tr ie s . ...
? •v ht?.: d ;^ ie :vr e s t b ^ t io n  o f  the  go ld  standard- -thus became the  gen- 
ora lly-.recognised? o b je c t iv e  I;. ' ID B * i.> ^ a s |b f f^ ^ h e \g o ld i s tandard  
;L;v0n iy J ^  s l io r t i t i i i ie  d u r in g  the la tte r? ? p a rt wary and
*.yhery-reserye'. p o s it i.p n i;--wasi a lw ays?.very1 s tro n ^  . ;: . She. re s to re d  . 
\ 't i% .g o i'd  s tanda rd :-in - ^ w e ’b i '9 ^  \$xi 1933‘'when’; tb ‘e. A u s tr ia n  
currency" waisf ^bout^v-be/bblia^'se 'by I n f l a t io n ^ . she re ce ive d  a 
; .,v;- lo a n  from  th e ^ ll^ d ^ O b u n 'ijy ie a ? th ro u g h "  - t ite ; ||0 p 4 ip ff ic e s  :o f  the  
-• Le'agiie-; o f  H a h io n s^ fb r /Currency; .s ta b iliz a tio n ;. '; !  ;.. • The e x te rn a l
of .th e - A us tria ix . c u rre n c y :’at" t k a t  t im e t /a s . much?;lower than-
g e n e ra lly  th e  case v / ith  in f la t in g  
v-v; ' d u tre n c ie a '* . ; 'rShe;; p eg gd d x thp .e x te rn a l va lue  o f  he r money in  
1 te rin a  o f - - t i le - d o l la r  in  the: f  i r s t  in s ta n ce  .and./offered?' to;x;c6nr--v':v 
;; fv P r t  . t te r fc u rre h ’cy. in / d o l la r s  to; any e x te n t a t  th a t  Biinijim it;^vf;u/\ 
f  -'. fa te v  _ ._■ ■;.ofhus^?;by? s ta b »1 L s ih g /b p fc u r re n c y  P la i t s !  low er • ex- ■ 
f  ;tb p n a l ■:va liie-,;:.Aus'fria  : could; help; h e r s e l f■ v)tt!xia; t i t t l e  - m ore lfe f i? 
,? . . ^latidu-.ahd:?finaiioe- j i e r s e i f f $ i  th -p a p e r inoney fo r ,  some tim e 
'••mbre;;uht^ ' dom ofaliseci- ih tp rn a l;:ya l.u e ;:;f;.e ll- to  the! . .
;d io w e 'r i ••'$! Hi t i e  h e lp ;o if,a f  ioa in ::fromfthe-;/; - I f ‘?i:;■; ■
.• IS U n i^  he r cu rrency  by follow-
:x "i;!lng.. A u s tr ia  r ; ; fh a t::;i s  ^'.:by;x;pffering to  •
. ?'vxcbnyert ;i t  in ^ d a l la r s  in  u n lim ite d  aBiiouirfcs a t  .the: low e rV e ± te rn - 
;?i'n i'■ vain© ;of' its'?-curiren;b'y. / ;d .M tto  frOm the League
:M ■ (1 ) fM epof t  o f  the?. M i  ton-: Young •;•- Ccmimis s io n  1936.st .v para .114.
■ I d  £ ) ' i ^G o ld -a n ti ; tlie.;-,Gold ■ • S iandard?^/; byvHL;^  , la w  -York-,?■;?; -;i
f i t  i f f  rpp l^ 'l'van d  ■33*. - ■■- ■■■• ’, ' ■ ' ' d;-: I f '- '; "  . . ■ '.'/-I ; •
/viVMoaaL^ y;^ '','^ IbSrJ.i> *j£l*Hbfee.xr/tisoia f Lqhdbn ',fi9 '48.. ; ip p l l3 § i;and?120l- ,
129.
of Nations, Belgium raised a foreign loan xx xxxxxxf and sta­
bilised her currency. Franoe also made some private arrange­
ments with a few big American financial houses for a currency 
stabilization fund. Russia was the only country which did 
not get any foreign loan for this purpose. But, by carefully 
regulating her foreign trade, which was a government monopoly, 
she managed to stabilize the external value of a new money 
called Chervonetz which was meant for external use only. The 
rouble was the Russian currency which circulated within the 
oountry to effect internal exchanges only. During the year 
1923, the inflating internal currency (rouble) and the external
money (Chervonetz) circulated in Russia concurrently with a
(1)
constantly changing ratio between them.
the
All/other countries of Europe, one after the other, sta­
bilized their currencies in terms of the dollar. As the dol­
lar was convertible into gold, the European currencies were 
linked to gold and with the stabilization of sterling in terms 
of gold, the International Gold Standard may be said to have 
been restored in 1925. In most cases, the currencies
were stabilized at lower external values, and after stabiliz­
ation they enjoyed some competitive export advantage due to
internal undervaluation of their currencies and a little lati-
(2)
tude for further inflation. But in England, Denmark and Nor­
way, where inflation did not go very far, the situation was ex­
actly the reverse. As regards these currencies, exchange 
speculators were of opinion that they xntrAu had the ability
(1) "Money",by D.H.Robertson, London, 1948. p.127.
(2) Ibid. pp.129 and 130.
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and intention of restoring their old parities ana they anticipated 
this oy putting external values to these currencies higher than 
their internal values* when these currencies were stabllsed at 
these speeulatlvely high external values, they became internally
( D
overvalued and suffered from a competitive export disadvantage* 
This led to deflation and depression in these countries and there 
was a net diminution in their effective demand* Though the restor­
ation of the gold standard did not lead to any global shrinkage of 
overall effective demand (because further Increase of effective 
demand in countries which had stabilised their currencies with 
internal under-valuation more than offset the shrinkage of effect­
ive demand in countries with internally over-valued currencies),
England, Denmark and Norway suffered a relative shrinkage in their
(2)
money supplies and effective demand*
Thus the restoration of the gold standard did not, in general, 
involve any immediate global shrinkage of prices or deflationary 
tendencies* Even after the restoration, rising prices continued
(3)
for some years more and the world market continued to be a 
sellers* market, in which of course the few countries with over­
valued currencies could not participate fully* considered trmm a 
global point of view, effective demand continued to be greater 
than the overall productive activity, and the observance of 
the gold standard rules did not clash




with the new objective of maintaining internal economic stabil­
ity for the time being (except again in the cases of the few 
countries with over-valued currencies). The monetary policies 
of the countries under the gold standard could thus maintain, 
for the time being, both internal and external stability but 
were always subject to the potential danger of a clash between 
the two objectives if the basic monetary condition did change, 
that is, if the global effec/feiye demand tended to fall below the 
level of global productivity.
SECTION 4* Currency Management in India from 1919 to
1925 and the Restoration of the Gold Standard.
India emerged out of World War 1 with a record of
continuous favourable balances and a sterling accumulation of
£240 million to her credit (though she still had a sterling debt).
Although she was a belligerent country, her productive equipment
did not suffer any physical damage as did that of her European Allies
rather, her industrial productive power increased quite appreciably.
Probably due to these reasons, India felt herself financially
strong enough to make a bid for the restoration of the gold
standard immediately after the war. India was second to
America in making this effort. On the 30th May, 1919, the
Babington smith Committee was appointed to commend the best
means to restore the gold standard in India. After recording
its opinion that the stability of exchange rate in terms of
gold was particularly important in a currency system like that
of India, the Babington smith committee recommended that the
gold standard bt& introduced forthwith in Inoia, at the rate of
2t.0d. gold to the rupee. The rupee was to remain unlimited
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legal tender and it was to hare a fixed exchange value in
terms of gold at the rate of one rupee for 11.30016 grains
of fine gold, that is, one-tenth of the gold contents of the
(1 )
sovereign. This high rate for the rupee was recommended be­
cause the Indian currency system was in potential danger from
a further rise in the price of silver and a high rate kept the
(2)
danger at a distance. The India Government accepted the re­
commendations of the committee and stabilised the rupee at 
2s.0d. gold.
This was an unwarranted decision for India to take for 
more reasons than one. U.S.A. was at that time the only im­
portant country on the gold standard. The restoration of the 
gold standard by India, therefore, necessarily involved fluct­
uating Indian exchanges with all other countries except U.S.A. 
It is not to be denied that U.S.A. transformed herself into a 
major economy in the course of the war. Her import market 
was second only to that of Great Britain and she emerged out
(3)
of the war as the premier creditor country of the world.
Great Britain was no longer the only major eoohomy us she had 
been before the war; at the close of the war, she had to 
share this honour with U.S.A. But despite this transformation, 
stable exchange rate with U.S.A. was not more important to 
India than with Great Britain for the simple reason that India 
even then had the major part of her trade and financial trans­
actions with Great Britain. The stability of sterling rate
(1) "Babington Smith Committee Report 1919” . para.59.
(2) Ibid. paras. 43 and 57-60.
(3) "Prosperity Decade: A Chapter from American Economic
History 1917-1929", by G. Soule, New York, 1947. 
p.254.
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was, therefore, more important to her than that of the dollar
(1)
rate. Moreover, India emerged from the war with a big ster­
ling reserve while she had no dollar reserve at all and her
•old reserve was a small fraotion of her sterling holding. It
the
was, therefore, much easier to maintain/sterling rate rather 
than the gold or dollar rate and there was no raison df§tre 
for India to subscribe to the gold standard before Great Brit­
ain did so.
But the more important argument against the adoption of 
the gold standard was the imminently difficult balance of pay­
ments situation which should have been foreseen. The sterling 
rate of the rupee then prevailing was an arbitrary loan rate of 
the war period which was moved up to that high level by an ab­
normal rise in the value of silver. It had no connection with 
the trade situation between India and Great Britain. From 1914
to 1920, price-level In India nearly doubled while in the U.K.,
(2)
it nearly trebled. These relative price movements might have 
justified an improvement in the sterling rate of the rupee by 
50$, but the actual improvement was by 150$. It should, there­
fore, have become obvious that once normal trade was resumed, 
the artificially high exchange rate was sure to suffer an appre­
ciable diminution.
After the announcement of the Government decision to stab­
ilize the rupee at 2s.Od. gold, there was a further initial 
speculative rise in the rupee exchange which stood at the un-
(1) "Indian Economics", by G.B.lather and S.G.Beri", Bombay,
1945. Vol.II. pp.219 and 220.
(2) Indian price level: Calcutta Index, Base: 1914 * 100. 
British price level: Board of Trade Index, Base: 1913*100.
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preoedented figure of 2s.lo£d. on the 11th February, 1920; 
then, however, a reaction set in for various reasons. The ter­
mination of the war automatically brought to an end the abnorm­
al war demand for Indian exports. Despite their high and ris­
ing prices, the devastated countries of Europe were unable to 
bid for Indian exports beoause of their extreme dearth of for­
eign exchange as well as of gold. Moreover, the failure of 
the rains in India in 1920 and prohibitively high prices of 
foodstuffs, forced the government to put an embargo on export 
of food crops. Japan had a serious crisis in the same year 
and could not take her normal quota of cotton from India. All 
these causes led to a sharp shrinkage of Indian exports. On 
the other hand, strong forces were in operation to increase im­
ports in India. During the war, Indian manufacturing industr-
V ;  • v-> . j  ■ r  . ' ; ,
ies could not be technically improved and reorganized beoause 
of the shortage of machines and plants, which were all of for­
eign make and could not be imported. Moreover, there was an 
accumulated delayed demand for consumption goods and just aftei 
the war, huge quantities of machinery and manufactured oonsumex 
goods were imported. The high exchange also helped these pur­
chases very considerably as their rupee prices fell very low.
Due to the operation of thesccombined forces, the balance of
(1)
trade turned strongly against India, as will be clear from 
the table on the following page.Bf ifcftMriara
(1) "India's Foreign Trade since 1870", by P.Roy, London,
1934. pp.111-115.
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( 1).Balance of Foreign Trade of India in Merchandise.
(In crores of rupees)
Tear Import Export Balance
1919-20 221.70 333.02 f 114.32
1920-21 347.56 267.76 - 79.80
1921-22 282.59 248.65 - 33.94
1922-23 246.19 316.07 t 69.88
1923-24 237.18 363.37 t 126.19
The unfavourable trade balance brought about a severe
pressure on the exchange rate and this was further aggravated
by the upward trend of the value of gold. Iftere was a sharp
decline in the production of gold in 1920 when it was 333
million (U.S.) gold dollars in place of 35S million (U.S.)
gold dollars in 1919. This decline in gold production con-
(*)
tinued up to 1922. on the other hand, a rush to seize gold 
by the different oountries for monetary reserves followed ab­
out the same time and added to the increased demand for gold. 
Due to these causes, there was a sharp rise in the value of 
gold.
The unfavourable trade balance and the rising price of 
gold not only led to the disappearance of the demand for 
Council Bills but to a strong demand for Reverse Councils. 
These put a double strain on the Secretary of State*s gold 
resources - to meet Home Charges as well as to support the ex­
change rate. The Government at first started to sell Reverse 
Councils at rates baaed on 2s.8d. sterling on February 5th, 
1920. The rate was raised to Ss.loSd. on February 12th, but
(1) "Review of the Trade of India 1929-30." p.8.
(2) "International Currency Experience", League of Nations,
1944. p.233.
(1)
thereafter it decreased as sterling appreciated. The Re­
verse Councils were paid in London out of the proceeds from 
the sale of sterling securities and Treasury Bills belonging 
to the Paper Currency Reserve. Intense demand for, and sale 
of, Reverse Councils reduced the Secretary of State’s gold re­
serve to a dangerously low figure. By the end of June, the 
balance of trade began to turn strongly against India, with the 
result that despite the heavy sale of Reverse Councils, the mar­
ket rate of exchange not only departed from the parity of gold, 
but also fell below the parity of 2s.Od. sterling. It was ap­
parent that even if the sale of Reverse Councils was increased 
so that the entire gold reserves of India were exhausted, it 
was not possible to stop the downward trend of the exchange
rate. The Government admitted the inevitable and tried to
(2)
maintain the rate at 2s.Od. sterling from June 24th, 1920.
But this decision to stabilise the rupee at 2s.Od. sterling
was taken very late and was too inopportune under the circum-
(3)
stances. Great Britain was following a policy of severe de­
flation at this time to restore sterling to the pre-war gold 
parity. Stabilization of the rupee at any sterling rate would 
have involved a severe deflation of Indian currency over and 
above the basic deflation required to correct the wartime rise 
of the Indian exchange rate. Moreover, adhering to sterling 
necessitated a greater degree of deflation of the Indian cur­
rency because sterling was rising in value in terms of gold due
(1) "Hilton Young Commission Report 1926". para.8.
(2) Ilrid. para.8.
(3). Ibid. para.8.
to the deflationary policy of Great Britain. The Government 
was, therefore, required to possess a much bigger sterling re­
serve to maintain a sterling rate. India had indeed possess­
ed a big sterling reserve of £240 million during the war which
in
could have served he^good stead in this connection, but she 
had already made a free gift of this amount to His Majesty the 
King. India was thus no more v able to maintain the sterling 
rate than the gold rate. Despite the government’s efforts to 
the contrary, the market rate of exchange continued to fall.
The Indian Government was compelled to reduce its own rupee-
/C
rate following the market rate and the only principle that was 
adopted was to keep the official rate at a somewhat higher 
level than the market rate*j[£) But this also could not continue 
indefinitely and by the end of September, the Government with­
drew from the exohange market altogether, after selling from 
the beginning of the year, Reverse Councils to the extent of 
£55,382,000.
After the withdrawal of the Government from the exchange 
market, the exchange rate continued to fall as rapidly as be­
fore and early in 1921 fell below the low level of Is.3d. ster- 
* ling and ls.Od. gold. In 1922-23, the export trade of India 
showed a revival due to an improvement in the purchasing capac­
ity of the European countries. The Joint result of the con­
traction of currency and the revival of export was a rise in
(2)
the exchange value of the rupee at a slow but steady rate.
In September 1923, the rupee was equivalent to about ls.3|d.




gold. From December 1922 to June, 1924, that is, for eighteen
months, the gold-exchange-value of the rupee remained fairly
stable at about Is.3d. gold. During the same period the rupee
price-level remained fairly stable at approximately 176 (the
(1 )
limits being 170 and 181). The genuine exchange rate was
apparently attained at that level.
Extraneous factors again began to disturb the exchange
rate thereafter. In June 1924, the pound sterlingsioaiat
88.8$ of the pre-war gold parity. Having decided to raise
the dollar sterling rate to the pre-war gold parity, Great
Britain resorted to a serious deflation. In consequence, the
sterling-price-index fell from 163 in June 1924, to 149 in Feb-
(2 )
ruary 1926, that is, a fall of about 9$. The Indian Govern­
ment effected a greater degree of deflation, not only to main­
tain the sterling rate, but to raise it further. The sale of 
Council Bills was kept suspended and the Secretary of State 
met the Home Charges from the gold reserves. The Indian price 
index number fell from 176 to 157 (Calcutta index) that is, by 
11$ and the rate of exchange rose from ls.4d. to ls.6d. gold,
i (3)that is, by 12$$. Although for the maintenance of the sterling 
rate, a measure of deflation in India was necessary, there was 
no definite reason why this deflation should have been carried 
to excess and another dislocation in trade ^ith Great Britain 
caused.
(1) "Hilton Young Commission Report 1926". para. 182.
Calcutta index: Base, 1913 • 100.
(2) "Economic Problems of Modern India", by R.R.MukherJee and
H.L.Dey, London, 1941. VdLII. p.277.
(3) Ibid.
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The exchange value of the rupee reached ls.6d. gold in 
April 1925 and from that time the Indian currency system was 
linked to the International Gold Standard, with a part of her 
money supply and effective demand guillotined by a measure df 
deflation. But this deflationary measure did not seem to 
inconvenienced, her export trade, at least for the time being, 
as there was a tendency for the Indian exchange rate to rise 
above Is.6d.gold. The Governments action after April 1925 
^was directed towards preventing the rise of the rupee much be-
„ U )
yond this point.
Thus, from 1920 to 1925, the role of Indian monetary man­
agement either in maintaining bala.nce of payments equilibrium 
and a high level of international trade, or in stimulating in­
ternal productive activity may be regarded as enttely passive 
or even negative. Indiafs attempts in 1920 to establish a 
gold ratio and then a stable sterling ratio, failed ignomin- 
ously and she left the balance of payments equilibrium to take 
care of itself. Although after 1920, she allowed the exchange 
rate to fluctuate freely, that policy was not motivated by con­
sideration for internal stability. All these years, she fol-
(2)
lowed a policy of deflation, and in 1920 and 1924 to suoh ex­
tents that prices suffered sharp declines as will appear from 
the table on page 140 of this thesis.
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Although the internal monetary policy of India was thus 
mainly negative in character, external factors were highly 
favourable to her attaining a high level 6f international 
trade as well as te* stimulating international productive act­
ivity. U.S.A. was having a prosperity boom from the end of 
1921 and was purchasing more raw materials from the rest of 
the world. There was, moreover, a pronounced global increase 
of manufacturing production from 1921 increasing the demand 
for raw materials of which India was one of the suppliers t<3 
the world market. Last, but not least, Great Britain, the 
major economy which constituted the bulk of India’s market, 
was participating fully in the general increase of manufactur­
ing activity. Due to this combined demand for Indian exports, 
the quantum of India’s foreign trade increased continuously dur­
ing these years and brought prosperity to the Indian farmers. 
The latter constituted the main market of the Indian manufact­
uring products and their prosperity stimulated the manufactur­
ing production of India very definitely. All these develop­
ments of these years have been put in tabular form on the next 
page .at£xxxxxxxxxxxx.
(1) "Review of the Trade of India 1927-28" and "The Report 
of the Controller of Currency 1927-28", Statement I.
1921 1922 1923 1924 1925
Indices of Manufacturing 
froduction, base lilS.(l)
vvorra;... . ! : . . . : 99.5 104.5 111 120.7
125.8 141.4 133.2 148
81.8 55.4 81.8 94.9
Quantum of India’s Trade, 
base 1S13-IG14. (2)
Sxport..................... 140 145 154 152
Import..................... 169 190 180 158
Index of India’s Manu­
facturing troduoilon..... 116.5 116.5 133.0 132
Thus the international sellers’ market helped India to 
have a rising quantum of international trade as well as an
Jl
increasing productive activity, particularly in manufactures.
Section 5; International Monetary Management from 1925 
to 1029: Conflict between the two alms of faonetary Policy.
. intended
Monetary policy,/both to stimulate internal productive 
activity and to attain a high level of international trade by 
observing the gold standard rules,at first worked fairly well 
&fterl925. The basis of this policy had been founded in TJ.SA . 
three years before the International Gold Standard was restored. 
After a short post-war slump, a reoovery boom, without any out- j 
side help, began in U.S.A. from the end of 1921 and from the 
very beginning she began to extend loans to European countries 
to enable them to purchase her goods. With the international 
monetary equilibrium restored under the gold standard In 1924- 
25, confidence in the international capital market revived and
(1) "Industrialization and Foreign Trade", League of Nations,
1945. pp.134 and 135.
(2) "Review of the Trade of India,1929-30". p.9.
Indian figures relate to 1921-22, 1922-23, 1923-24, 
1924-25 and 1925-26.
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American capitalists began to extend huge amounts of both long 
and short-term loans to Germany and other European countries. The 
latter had, of course, to pay interest and amortisation of these 
loans as well as of previous inter-govemmental debts in addition 
to reparations to U.S.A. nut U.8.A. re-lent to Europe much more 
than she received on these accounts,resulting in a net export from 
America to Europe. This net export supplied an additional stimulus 
to the American expansionary programme which was already material!*
U )
lng. Thus, internal expansion and the expansion of international
trade supplemented oach other. The industrial production!in which
the most significant item was the automobile industry) recorded a
phenomenal increase. The index of production rose from 98 in 1921
(2)
to 146 in 1929. The national income recorded an equally phenomenal 
increase; rising from *59.4 billion in 1921 to $67*2 billion in
15)
1929. If allowance is made for price changes, per capita income
14)
is found to have risen from #522 in 1921 to $716 in 1929.
Increase in the productive activity and national income increi
' ' . ' y
\
ed the demand of America for foreign goods,the imports of which we; 
very much facilitated after the general restoration of the gold 
standard.in 1927 and 1928 America consumed 39> of the total consum 
ion of nine of the most important foodstuffs and raw materials 
consumed by the fifteen most Important industrial countries 
of the world.I5) In 1929 she purchased
(1) "Prosperity hec&ae: A Chapter in American Economic
history 1917-1929", Hew fork, 1947. p.264.
(2) "Industrialisation and yoreign Trade", League of Nations,
1945,p.l34, ease: 1913 « 100.
(3) "Prosperity uecade: A Chapter in American Economic
history 1917-1929", New fork,1947, p. Iu8.
(4) Ibid. p. 108. At 1929 Prices.
15) Ibid. p. 266.
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12.2% of the total imports of the world and was only second
(1)
to Great Britain as an import market.
The continuous increase of American imports and a net
flow of American loans supplied an expansionary urge on the
economies of other countries. American loans made up the
capital shortage from which Germany was suffering after the
devastations of the war and helped to rebuild her productive
organization for four years from 1924. During these four
years of borrowing both production and foreign trade inoreased
continuously. In 1920 German production rose 30j£ Hgher than
(!)
the level of 1925. Foreign borrowing helped the payment of
reparations not by meeting these directly but by increasing
the volume of production and national income of the country
which increased the revenues of the government and provided
(3)
sufficient foreign exchange for the purpose. Foreign trade 
also recorded a remarkable increase. While in 1925, imports 
amounted to 77.4 of thdr 1913 value, in 1928 they amounted to 
90% of their 1913 value. Exports increased from 58.3 in
(4)
1925 to 77.2 in 1928 on the basis of their value in 1913.
The other war devastated European countries also rehabilitated 
their productive organization with the help of American loans.
Much more important than the American loans was the Am­
erican import market. The countries that immediately bene-
the
fitted from the expansion of/American market - the Dutch East
(1) "Prosperity Decade: A Chapter in American Economic
History 1917-1929", New York, 1947. p.266.
(2) "The Ecohomic Lessons of the Nineteen-Thirties", by
H.W.Arndt, London, 1944. p.27.
(3) Ibid. p.28.
(4) Ibid. p.27 and 28.
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Indies, Malaya, India, Japan, Canada and Latin-America etc. -
were those supplied industrial raw materials and food-
(1)
stuffs. The increased incomes of these countries,derived 
from their increased sales to America^ enabled them to purchase 
more finished products from Great Britain, France, Germany etc.; 
and the latter in turn, purchased more raw materials and food­
stuffs from the agricultural countries. Through all these 
cross-connections, all the other countries of the world ex­
perienced the expansionary effect.
The American and world boom particularly benefitted 
France as she specialised in luxury goods and fashion products 
as well as in invisible exports in the form of a tourist traf­
fic and the world demand for all these increased immensely by 
general prosperity. The foreign trade of France hit the re­
cord target in 1928 and 1929. In four years, her export
(2)
trade increased by 14%. Her export trade was particularly
helped by a considerable undervaluation of the franc and this
gave her a competitive exchange advantage over the dollar, the
(3)
pound and the mark.
Great Britain was suffering during all these years a ser­
ious competitive disadvantage with her overvalued pound. More­
over, the technological developments of the 20th century af­
fected very unfavourably some of her principal export industr-
(4)
ies. The coal industry faced increasing competition from hy-
(1)"Prosperity Decade: A Chapter from American Economic 
History 1917-192J", by G.Soule, New York, 1947. p.266.





dro-electricity and oil, while the steel industry met in­
creasing rivalry from lighter metals. The extremely oheap
labour of Japan gave her a decided advantage over Great Brlt-
(1)
ain - particularly in textiles. High tariffs against some
British products in many of her former markets crippled her
(2)
corresponding industries. During these four years, the per­
centage of her manufacturing exports (among the principal in-
(3)
dustrial countries of the world) shrank from 26# to 22$,
and she was enoumbered with an unemployment problem averaging
one-tenth of her labour population and numbering between.1 and
(4)
\.2 millions. Nevertheless, Great Britain did not remain un­
affected by the prosperity boom. From 1924 to 1929 her pro-
(5)
duction increased by 12#.
Taking a global view, the expansionary boom started by 
U.S.A. benefitted the world as a whole as well as most countr­
ies individually. The following table showing the indices of 
manufacturing production can be taken as representative of the 
expansion of economic activity of the periods-
(6)









(1) "Economic Lessons of the 1930*s", by H.W.Arndt, London,





(6) "Industrialization and Foreign Trade", League of Nations,
1945. pp.ldo.
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The expansion in productive activity was reflected In the 
expansion of international trade as well. The following table 
showing the quantum of international trade oan be taken as re­
presentative of the general trade expansion
(1)
Indioes of World Trade in Manufactured Articles.
(Base: 1913 = 100)
1921-25 1926-29






Thus, during these four years, both productive activity 
and the international trade of the world as well as of most 
Individual countries experienced a considerable expansion.
The monetary policy of maintaining both internal and external 
economic stability seemed to have succeeded fairly well.
But during all these years a contradiction was developing 
between the two aspects of monetary policy, that is, between 
the maintenance of productive activity and observance of the 
gold standard rules for a high level of international trade. 
The maintenance of American productive activity depended main­
ly on the continuance of American effective demand and partly 
on the net export of America to the rest of the world. But
1 * v. - *
both the factors were harbouring germs of impending decline. 
Consumers* income, the basis of effective demand, began to
(1) "Industrialization and Foreign Trade", League of Nations,
1945. pp 1^162 and 163.
(2) Ibid. p.163. Refers to imports only.
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(1)
suffer a sharp decline in U.S.A. from 1927. The annual grow­
th of total wages and salaries which in no previous year (ex­
cept 1924) fell below $1.5 billion, and the average of which
(2)
was much higher, sank to less than $400 million in 1927. 
Payment of wages and salaries showed little gain in manufact­
uring, a fact which is striking because manufacturing output 
continued to increase. Wages and salaries declined actually 
in construction, trade and mining Industries. Decline in 
consumers* income led to a shrinkage of consumer spending and 
tended to decline American investment and, therefore, American
(3)
productive activity. U.S.A., therefore, needed a much 
greater balanoe of net exports to make up the loss of decline 
in the domestic demand. But further increase of net exports 
also became increasingly difficult.
The continuance of American net exports depended on a 
greater volume of American loan to European countries than the 
latter were required to pay to America in the form of amort­
ization and interest charges on the previous loans. Further 
expansion of American loans depended on further expansion of 
investment facilities in Europe. But the sources of profit­
able investment in Germany and other European countries were
being rapidly exhausted and the soope of further American
(4).
loans was being diminished rather than expanded. The equi­
librium in the balance of payments had, therefore, to be main­
ti) "Prosperity Deoade: A Chapter from American Economic





tained by an ever increasing export of gold from Europe to Am-
(1)
erica. According to the rules of the gold standard game, a 
continuous import of gold from Europe to America should have 
been expected to raise the American price level at a multiple 
rate. The rise of American prices by discouraging imports 
and encouraging exports would have restored the external equi­
librium again. But that would have meant not only the increase 
of American prices but also the diminution of employment in 
American export industries and would have disturbed her inter­
nal economic stability. The external stability could have 
been maintained only at the cost of Internal stability but 
this, America was not willing to countenance.
For the time being U.S.A. avoided the choice between the 
internal and external stability of money by adopting a very 
novel policy. She neutralised the exoess supply of gold 
without sacrificing the convertibility of her currency into 
gold. This she did by simply replacing the notes that re­
quired 40$ reserves, with the other type of her common money 
which required 100$ reserves. It was tantamount to neutral­
ising the prioe-raising effect of 60$ of the gold reserves.(2) 
To avoid the divergence between the value of gold and the dol­
lar, America did not adopt the English method of controlling 
her currency and adjusting the value of her currency to the 
value of gold, but she adjusted the value of gold to the value 
of her currency by substituting one common money for another
(1) "Prosperity Decade: A Chapter from American Economic
History 1917-1929", by C.Soule, New York, 1947. pp.270 
and 271.
f2) "Money", by D.H.Robertson, London, 1948. pp.79-81.
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or by altering the reserve proportion. By thus locking more
and more gold in her gold certificates requiring 100$ reserves,
U.S.A. simultaneously maintained the stability of the value of
the dollar and the stable relation between the dollar and
(1)
gold. Thus "It is arguable that a truer Impression of the 
state of the world’s monetary affairs would be given by saying
that America (during this period) was on an arbitrary standard
to
while the rest of the world climbed back painfully on /a dollar
(2)
standard".
But U.S.A. could not possibly have expected to maintain 
the currency equilibrium indefinitely by a gold-neutralisation 
policy for the simple reason that the amount of gold which 
Europe oould export was not inexhaustible. Time was drawing 
near when the scarcity of exportable gold would have dis-rupt- 
ed the currency equilibrium and throttled trade between Europe 
and America. By this policy, U.S.A. simply postponed the de­
cision between internal and external stability but could not 
solve it.
France also played a game of gold neutralisation during 
these years. The considerable undervaluation of the franc 
helped her to have a surplus balance of payments and she re­
ceived continuous imports of gold. She accumulated a very 
big gold reserve which was second only to that of U.S.A. The 
bulk of this gold was sterilised and was not allowed to exert 
its full influence on the price-level and thereby disturb the 
internal economic stability of the country. For this reason
(1) "Money", by D.H.Robertson, London, 1948, pp.79-81.
(2) Ibid. p.81.
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the advantage of competitive exohange depreciation persisted 
and was draining away the gold reserves of other countries.
The reserves of Great Britain were particularly hard hit.
While U.S.A. and France were neutralising their gold im­
ports for maintaining their internal economic stability de­
liberately, Great Britain was faced with the opposite diffi­
culty of an unfavourable balance of payments, and her inability 
to lower prices and costs to increase exports and restore the 
external equilibrium of the country. The substantial over­
valuation of the pound was mainly responsible for the unfavour­
able balance which could be oorrednd by lowering the cost of 
production of British exports involving lowering of British
wage rates. But wage-rates proved absolutely intractable to
(1)
any downward move. Any attempt in that direction only led
to political strife. Thus, high costs and restricted export
trade, were causing an accumulation of unfavourable balance
(2)
and draining away of British gold reserves. Again, British 
depressed industries suoh as coal, cotton, woollen, worsted, 
iron and steel and ship-building had their world demand ser­
iously restricted and a considerable proportion of labour and 
capital locked in these industries had to be transferred to 
the growing industries of the south to restore her competitive 
position in the world market. But labour and capital were
(3)
found to be greatly immobile. The capitalists would suffer 
losses and labourers unemployment and reduction of wages rather
fl) "The Economic Lessons of the 1950#s", by H.W.Arndt,
London, 1944. pp.20 and El.
(2) Ibid.
(5) Ibid. pp.276 and 277.
than shift to other employments. To what extent the immobil­
ity of labour and capital and the inflexibility of wages were
motivated by the new ideal of internal economic stability can­
not be ascertained, but at the same time the influence of the 
latter on the former cannot be altogether denied. These 
frictional maladjustments constantly deteriorated the external 
equilibrium and were destined to disrupt the gold standard and 
throttle international trade sooner or later.
Thus, in U.S.A., Germany, France and U.K., that is, in 
all the major economies of the world, a clash between the two 
monetary objectives was in progress and rapidly coming to a 
head. For their internal economic stability* each of these 
major economies was maintaining a precarious balance by manip­
ulating their gold reserves, that is, by sterilising or losing 
gold. But as this gold Jugglery was approaching its end, each 
of these coutries was destined to be confronted with the prob­
lem of choosing either external or internal stability as the 
guiding principle of their monetary management.
Section 6 ; Indian Monetary Management from 1926 to 1929.
Monetary management in India from 1925 consisted of the 
observance of the gold standard rules. The Government of 
India in response to repeated requests from various quarters 
promised an enquiry into the currency situation early that 
year and on August 25th, 1925, a Royal Commission on Indian 
Currency and Exchange was appointed with Lt.-Commander Hilton 
Young as president. The report of the Commission waw publish­
ed on August 4th, 1926 and it recommended a gold bullion stand­
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ard for India. The rupee was to be stabilized in relation to
gold at a rate of ls.6d. and having the value of 8.47 grains
of gold. The Currency Act of 1927, legalised this gold ratio
(1)
of the rupee on which it remained up to 1931. During these 
years, India maintained her balance of payments equilibrium 
strictly according to gold standard rules.
India, however, did not remain completely unaffected by 
the new trend of thought that advooated monetary management to 
be so conducted as to stimulate domestic economic activity.
She was influenced by this idea to such an extent that in 1927 
a bill was brought before the Indian Legislature to establish 
a Central Bank for India, - an instrument accepted by the eco­
nomic opinion of the time to be capable of adopting monetary 
policies to simulate and stabilize the economic activity of 
the country concerned. But the Central Bank Bill of India 
gave rise to a very bitter controversy because the nationalist 
leaders feared that the proposed Central Bank would be con­
trolled by the European business community to the d&riment of 
Indian interests and to forestall this, they wanted it to be a 
state-owned bank. This militated so much against the prevail­
ing idea of a private Central Bank that the Government was con- 
. .
strained to withdraw the Bill in 1928. Due to the absence of 
a Central Bank, Indian monetary management could not be conduct­
ed to maintain internal economic stability but had to be re­
stricted to the maintenance of the external stability of the 
rupee only.
(1) "The Economic Development of India", by V.Anstey, London,
1946. p.428.
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Although India was observing gold standard rules to attain 
a high level of international trade yet the external factors 
were anything but favourable to attain this end. In the first 
place, Great Britain which constituted the principal market for 
Indian exports, was semi-depressed (at least far from being 
prosperous) during these years and naturally could not take the 
normal quota of Indian exports. Secondly, it Is no doubt 
true that a sellers’ market continued during these years but 
that was only as regards manufacturing goods. Demand for ag­
ricultural goods which constituted the bulk of Indian exports
(1)
was definitely on a down grade from 1926.
The basic cause of this lay in a much greater global pro­
duction of agricultural goods in relation to their demand,due 
to an overdevelopment of agricultural industry. During the 
war, European agriculture was completely disorganized, but this 
loss in agricultural production was very substantially mitigat­
ed by inoreased production in U.S.A., the British Dominions 
and some South Amerioan Republics who adopted the most scien­
tific methods of agrioulture. From 1922, European agriculture 
was rapidly rehabilitated, partly with the help of American 
loans, and the total world production soon outstripped its de­
mand. To make things worse, the overdevelopment of the agri­
cultural industry of U.S.A., instead of being curtailed, re­
ceived further financial assistance from banks and government
(2)
and agricultural investment and output steadily increased.
(1) "Prosperity Decade: A Chapter from American Economic
History 1917-1929", by G.Soule, New York, 1947. pp.229-
249.
(2) Ibid. p.125.
The agricultural countries with a surplus productive capacity 
as well as a surplus produce began to maintain a precarious 
balance by a continued accumulation of stocks. But this could 
not arrest the fall of agricultural prices which set in from 
1926, and very adversely affected Indian exports. The American 
bumper crop of 1928 brought things to a head and set afoot an 
agricultural depression. Partly due to the half•depressed 
British economy, but mainly because of depression in world 
agriculture, the quantum of Indian foreign trade continuously 
declined during these years.
(1 )
Quantum of Indian Foreign Trade.







Decline in foreign trade and particularly of exports di­
minished the Income of the Indian farmers and made them poor 
purchasers of manufactured goods. This in turn reaoted un* 
favourably on the manufacturing activity In India which made 
very little headway during these years; there were also years 
of recession.
(2)
Annual Indices of Kanufaoturlng Production in India.
(Base 1913: • 100)
Year Index





(1) "Review of the Trade of India, 1929-30". p.9.
(2) "Industrialization and Yoreign Trade", League of Nations,
1945. p.135.
During 1921-25, the part that India herself played in 
her currenoy management was completely passive, if not nega­
tive, but due to the favourable external circumstances she 
enjoyed both a rising grade of international trade as well as
international productive activity. But during 1926-29, India 
herself maintained a stable international currenoy relation, 
but external factors were definitely unfavourable to her.
Both her international trade and productive activity was de­
finitely on a downward grade during the later years. This 
difference between the two periods, definitely indicated the 
greater Importance of external faotors in attaining India’s 
monetary objectives than her own part in attaining the same 
end.
Section 7: The American Crisis of 1929. the Great 
Depression and the Liquidation of the Gold standard in 1931.
The internal economic stability, for which the gold stand­
ard rules were so seriously strained in many countries, could 
not, however, be adequately assured anywhere, and particularly 
in U.S.A. The American prosperity boom, which started from 
1922 under the favourable circumstances of the sellers’ market 
of the world, was all the time developing a dlsproportionality 
consisting of overdevelopment of capital goods industries out 
of all proportion to consumption goods industries. Investment 
in capital goods between 1919 and 1928 Increased at the rate
of 6.4J6 while that of consumption goods only at the rate of
(1)
2 .8%. Moreover, a decline in consumption expenditure set in
(1) "Eoonomic Lessons of the 195&0’s," by H.W.Arndt, London,
1944. p.16.
( 1 )
from 1927* Consumption expenditure was the basis cf demands 
for capital goods and the motive force for capital investments.
Difproportionate ca ital investment in face of declining con­
sumption expenditure was an absurd development and was bound 
to disorganize internal productive activity. The American
monetary authority could not regulate investment, least of all,
(2)
could it regulate capital investment. What it could do was 
to adopt a dear money or cheap money policy. But entrepreneurs 
were found to undertake investment with very little regard to 
interest rates and particularly the proportion of capital- 
industry to eonsumption-industry investment was found to be un-
(3)
connected with interest rates.
When the preposterous stock-speculation began in U.S.A. 
in 1928, it was proved that the power of the monetary author­
ity to influence internal prices (and particularly stock
prices) was practically nil. Dear money could not curb the
(4)
activities of the speculators in the least. In the face of
a declining consumer-spending and decreasing employment in
(5)
many lines, the increase of stock prices by the activities 
of the speculators was really an absurd development and could 
not last long. From the 24th October, 1929 the bubble of 
speculation was pricked and Wall Street began to suffer one 
crash after another. The collapse of the stock speculation
(1) "Prosperity Decade; A Chapter from American Economic







caused the most precipitous fall in security prices end immense 
losses in individual capitsl. It had the most depressing re­
percussions on the investors who not only stopped further in­
vestments but also tried dis-investments.Themonetary authority
could not persuade them to undertake investment under any con-
(i)
ditions of cheap money. Unemployment began to mount by mil­
lions and there was a most disastrous decline in Income and
(2)
consequent shrinkage of consumption spending. Even those who 
were left with sufficient income became scared and reduced their 
expenditure. There developed a veritable liquidity mania. 
Every American became a seller and tried to sell anything he 
could get hold of. American capitalists summarily recalled 
their short-term foreign loans and suspended their long-term 
lending. The American market became overstocked with saleable 
goods but no American was inclined to buy arching and the im­
port market completely collapsed.
In the post-war years, the effective demand for goods of 
all kinds on a global basis was much ahead of the supply of 
goods and production. This situation was mainly a legacy of 
the war which created an inflation, on the one hand, and dis­
organized the world production, on the other. The post-war 
world market could be termed a sellers1 market because sellers 
with their limited stocks could dictate their terms to the buy­
ers who needed a much bigger supply. After the restoration of 
the gold standard in 1924-25* though considerable parts of this
(1) "Prosperity Decade: A Chapter from American Economic
History 1917-1929, by G.Soule, Hew York, 1947. p.510.
(2) "The Economic Lessons of the 1950»sw, by H.W.Arndt,
London, 1944. pp.5I-3J.
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excessive effective demand in many countries were curtailed, yet 
the overall effective demand of the world aid not diminish in the 
least. The sellers' market continued under the gold standard as 
well and maintained the profitability of investment and proauction 
for a few more years. Under the stimulus of this excess demand,
H)
world production proceeded apace and nearly caught up with the 
global effective cUrKanlby 1928. by 1929, world production was pro­
bably slightly aneaa of effective demand and in many sectors of pro­
duction declining tendency of prices made its appearance. When at 
this juncture the American demand, which formed a considerable part 
Xhm of the world demand, completely collapsed, the global effective 
demand suffered a severe shrinkage. Supply of goods and their pro­
ductive equipment thereafter became immensely greater than this
12)
attenuated world demand. The world market became a buyers' market 
where buyers in view of their scarcity could dictate their terms.
The consequence of this collapse of world demand (or world 
market) was disastrous to employment, income ana production in all 
countries. The crisis of 1929 and the Great Depression that followec 
ad was purely an internal affair of U.S.A. tier foreign trade aid 
not exceed 6> of her total trade and her internal economy was not
13)
dependent on the foreign market, but the rest of the world was
very vulnerable to American depression because her imports consti­
tuted a suostantial
(1) "Induatrialization ana jjorei^ Trade", League of nations,
1945. pp 154 and 135.
(2) " The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen Thirties", by H.W.
Arndt, London, 1944. pp.31 and 32.
(3) ” Prosperity Decade : A Chapter from American Economic Histery, 
1917-1929, by G. Soule, New Xork, 1947. p. 265.
joy •
part of their exports. Decline of American consumption de­
mand affected their export trade and through that, their inter-
(1)nal economy very adversely. From 1928-1932, production in
^  (2)
Germany, for example, fell by 46>. While between 1925 and 
1929, unemployment in Germany ranged from one to two millions,
(3)
it reached six millions in 1932. State unemployment insuren- 
ce did not allow the decline of consumers1 demand in Great Bri­
tain below a certain level and for this reason decline in Bri­
tish economic activity was less severe than in U.S.A. or Germ­
any. But even then It was sufficiently bad to record the low­
est employment level for any time. About three millions of
(4)
her workers were without employment. Between 1929 and 1932, 
national income in U.S.A., Germany c.nd Great Britain declined
by 53#*42#and V]% respectively while wholesale prices fell by
„ (5)
38$,35#and ^0% respectively.
The decline in manufacturing production in comparison with
the previous boom period reveals eloquently the devastation
wrought by the Great D e p r e s s i o n . ^ )
(1) "The Ecohomic Lessons of the 1930*s", by H.W.Arndt,





(6) See tables on the following pages of this thesis.
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(1)
Annual Indices of Manufacturing Production.
(Bases 1925-29 * 100)
Year World Germany O.K. France O.S.A.
1929 113.3 107.9 109.9 112.0 112.7
1930 101.6 95.5 100.0 109.8 92.
1931 90.5 78!3 90.5 96.2 75.8
1932 80.1 64.6 90.4 82.7 58.4
fall in the
The /quantum of global international trade followed the 
decline in the internal economic activity as will be clear
from the following tables- , v
(2)
Quantum of World Trade in Manufactured Articles.
(Base: 1915 * 100)
Year World Germany U.K. France U.S.A.
1926-29 104.3 86.1 Q7.4 79 157.8
1950 99.7 89.7 95.4 92.7 155.9
1951-55 75«5 66.2 61.3 63.4 86.6
Up to 1931,at least, all these countries were on the 
gold standard but that could not save their international 
trade from suffering a grievous shrinkage. Thus, it disprov­
ed the idea that the gold standard could £ways maintain a
high level of international trade, rather, international trade
-ated
was found to be conrel/with internal economic activity, both 
rising and falling together and both dependent on the American 
import market. From this fact it could further be inferred 
that if the collapse of the American market could paralyse the 
world trade aftd productive activity, a similar crisis in Great 
Britain, with a more important world market, would more easily 
break down the system. Parallelism need not have stopped with
(l) "Industrialisation and Foreign Trade", League of Nations, 
1945. pp.140 and 141.
(2 )  Ib id .  p .162 . o-tvcL \S7
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Great Britain. From 1924, Germany reconstructed her economy 
and developed her productive organization to such an extent
that by 1929 her import market was not far behind that of U.S.A. 
Similarly, the French import market also was not far behind 
that of Germany. Of course, it was also plain that if the im­
port markets of these four major countries continued undisturb­
ed, industrial crisis in any other country, forming very in­
significant parts of the world market, would not appreciably
harm world trade and productive activity. Now, the part
played by the gold standard in those years of depression, was 
the
to maintain/balance of payments equilibrium and to facilitate
a
that law volume of international trade which was possible during/
low
period of/level of productive activity. Without the gold 
standard the volume of international trade in the first de­
pression years would have probably been lower still. But 
the gold standard could not claim to maintain a high level of 
international trade; what it could claim was to maintain a 
level of international trade commensurate with a given level 
of economic activity.
But within a few years of the depression consequent on 
the American crisis of 1929> the gold standard was unable to 
maintain any balance of payments equilibrium at all and failed 
to maintain even that low level of international trade which
was commensurate with the existing low level of productive
(2)
activity. Germany was peculiarly dependent on the American 
market - particularly on the American capital market. She re­
built her industrial organization with American capital - about
(l) "The Economic Lessons of the 1930*sn, by H.W.Arndt, 
London, 1944. pp.283-295*
(2 )  Ib id .
162.
■ v.-' . ' '
one-half of which was short- term advances. The stock-specu-
lation and then the depression in America made the capitalists
(1)
recall their short-term loans from Germany. The flow of 
long-term capital also began to decline, and in 1950 1951*
withdrawal of short-term funds continued at a rapid pace. Am­
erican loans provided Germany with foreign exchange to pay re­
parations and with their stoppage, reparation payments created
a serious exchange problem. Genuine doubts were now enter­
tained about the exchange value of the mark. Foreigners, as 
well as Germans, now began to transfer their funds from Germ­
any to foreign countries. Similar difficulty in Austria 
caused the failure of the Vienna Credit Anstalt in May 1951
(2)
and thereby started the European financial crisis of that year, 
The Brunning Government attempted tc adjust the German economy 
by a policy of deflation,but it failed completely due to the 
continuance of flight capital. In the circumstances, the 
government was compelled to adopt exchange control to main­
tain external equilibrium. But exchange control necessarily 
involved the abandonment of a free gold standard.
Great Britain was affected by world depression through 
the decline of her exports by and a simultaneous increase 
of imports. The surplus of merchandise imports increased 
from £386 million in 1930 to £408 million in 1931. Adverse 
British balance of payments and the blocking of British short­




(4 )  I b i d .  p p .2 2 -2 3 .
term loans in the banks of Austria end Germany led to a panic 
withdrawal of foreign deposits from London end this completely 
exhausted th© gold reserves of the Bank of England, On Sept­
ember 21st, 1931# Great Britain was thus forced to suspend gold 
payments and with this suspension, the International Geld Stan­
dard ceased to exist. The gold standard was thus discredited 
not only for its inability to maintain a high level of inter­
national trade consistently, but to maintain any level of in­
ternational trade in depression time. It was unable to main­
tain its own existence during the depr ilon and was thus
found to be only a fair-weather craft,
garr^ acy.........great;
D,vre»alon from 1929-1931.
The outstanding characteristic of the Great Depression 
was an excessive fall in agricultural prices out of all pro­
portion to the fall in manufacturing prices. Because of this, 
the worst hit countries during the depression were the primary 
producing areas which were brought to the verge of bankruptcy. 
Despite the existence of some manufacturing countries on modern 
lines, India was primarily an agricultural country *>nd the ex­
ports of India consisted mainly of agricultural goods and raw
materials. With the onset of the depression, she/confronted 
with a shrinking,export market and a disastrous fall of agri­
elastic nature of agricultural production in India, In India* 
the cultivator did not produce any smaller quantity o^ crops so
(1) monetary Theory11, by G.N.Hala. P h ila d e lp h ia , . 1946,
p.197.
(2) "Economic Problems of Modern India", by R.FUMukerJee,
London, 1939* Tol.l. p.328.
was
cultural prices The situation was aggravated by the in
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long as the price obtained was above his nominal cost of pro­
duction in which his wage and profit were not included. Re­
striction of production would, in most cases, have meant mone­
tary loss to the farmer because he would then have gone with­
out any work. In India, therefore, production was virtually 
independent of the price obtained and practically the same area 
was cultivated bearing the same crops. The following table 
gives the area unde^^rops in British India during the years 
1928-29 to 1951-32.
Area mtev . C m s  in Br.m gh In41»f
•. V  a ■ 1
(000 acres)
Food Non-Food
Year Crops Crops Total
1928-29 200,269 51,189 251,458
1929-30 200,218 4g,839 250,057
1930-31 202,706 48,067 250,775
1931-32 205,014 46,547 251,471
In the case of non-food crops there was an appreciable 
fall in production which was more than compensated by an In­
crease under food crops. As the acreage remained practically 
constant, so also did the yield per acre apart from seasonal 
factors, and export prices were falling lower and lower. In
the case of jute at least, the fall in prices was such that it
(?)
probably fell even below the nominal cost of production.
The extent of the fall in the quantum of international 
trade and of the disastrous decline of the Indian export prices 
caused by the complete collapse of the international market for
(3)
agricultural goods, can be estimated from the table overleaf.
(1) "Department of Statistics: Government of India".
"Economic Problems of Modern India", by R.R.MukerJee,
London, 1939* Vol.I. p«330»
(2) "Bengal Jute Enquiry Committee Report".
(3) "Review of the Trade of India 1938-37•* p«28.
Quantum of Price level of
Year Export Import Exports Imports
1927-28 100 100 100 100
1928-29 106.1 105.2 97.5 96.4
1929-50 108 105.4 90.2 95.2
1950-51 96.6 82.5 7I .5 o0
1951-32 82.5 70.6 59-2 71.7
1932-53 74.9 81.4 55.3 ' 65.2
Moreover, like all other agricultural countries, India 
suffered from a deterioration of the terms of trade because 
the prices of her exports fell more heavily than the prices of
imports as is clear from the table above.
Though agricultural productivity of India, did not de­
cline in quantity, it shrank in value quite considerably. The 
disastrous fall in the prices of agricultural goods made Indian 
farmers, who were the principal purchasers of Indian manufactur­
ing goods, very poor buyers. This made the depression spread 
to Indian industrial production as well. The indices of manu­
facturing production of these years recorded not only a stag­
nation in place of the rapid development that was taking place, 
but also positive recession.
(1)
Annual Indices of Manufacturing Production in Indifc.






India was on the gold standard up to September 21st, 1931 
but that did not help her in any way to maintain the level of 
her international trade. Moreover, due to the disastrous fall
Jb> os j b i 'v e
in the prices of exports the^balance of trade of India continu-
(l) "Industrialization snd Foreign Trade*, League of Nations, 
1945. p.141.
ously fell from 1929, as will appear from the table below, ana pay« 
monte equilibrium had to be maintained by a constant loss of 
gold reserves•
The favourable balance of trade was a normal ana essential 
feature of Indian trade because she had to service her forei^ 
loans and pay for invisible imports therewith* By 1931, the balan­
ce of payments situation deteriorated to such an extent that Indian 
gold reserves were nearly exhausted and suspension of gold payments 
were impending* Great .Britain gave up the gold standard in Septem­
ber 1931 and allowed sterling to depreciate to the extent of 30%*
To maintain the Innumerable financial banking and trade relations 
with Great Britain undisturbed, Inaia went off the ^old standard 
simultaneously with her, but kept the existing exchange rate with 
sterling and thereby haa 3C$ depreciation in terms of ^old. Even 11 
she had not ae-llnked her currency from gold in 19319 Inaia would 
have been forced off the gold standard in the following year when 
her positive trade balance disappeared altogether!involving a 
heavy deficit balance of payments for servicing her foreign loans)* 
In fact,the sterling connection held out the prospect of a better 
level of international trade for India than the gold link* But this 
meant only a minor difference* The fundamental course of
balance V 
Korchtuiaise Trade ,/of Inaia 
1 In crores of rupees )

















(1) Indian jiCQnomics. vol n  by jatfyer & jjer.l. Bombay 1945.p.203
: 167.
In d ia n  f  o r  e i  vtr.ad-e^'^ya& 01erMnfed by the  in te n s i t y  o f
dep ress ion  In  th e ''w o rld  m arket. E'er a ttachm ent to  the  go ld  
s tandard  d id  p r a c t ic a l ly  n o th in g  to  a rre & t 1 t i ia  d e te r io r ­
a t io n  o f  he r fo re ig n  tra d e  s i tu a t io n  caused uy the  c o lla p s e  
o f the ' forelgnfRem and w h ic h , ’ I n  e f f e c t ,  meant the  demand'of 
the  m ajor economies. W hile  the  experience  o f  In d ia n  cu r­
rency management "d u r in g '’£925: ' i o ^ ^  e x te rn a l
fa c to rs  x /^ere more im p o rta n t in  a t ta in in g  In d ia Is  m onetary ob­
je c t iv e  th a n -h e r own m onetary p o l i :eyi§u:t ^  o f 1929
■to ;:19 5I'.-.demonstrated th a t  the  e x te rn a l f  a c to rs ' w r  e.;. a l l  im - 
p o r te n t i n  having f o r  Xndiar.a h ig h 'le v e l  o f  in te r n a t io n a l  
t r a d e , " In d ia  e ith e r  a tta in e d  o r f a i le d  to  a t ta in  the  ob­
je c t iv e s  o f  m onetary p o l ic y  accord ing  to  the  r is e  o r f a l l  in  
the  fo r tu n e s  o f  th e  major-.-economiesw-  •




Indian Currency Policy and Problems: 
The Autonomous Currencies of the 
Thirties. 1931-1939.
CHAPTJSR IV *
INDIAN CURRENCY POLICY AND PROBLEMS 
The Autonomous Currencies of the Thirties.
mi-ss-mi*
Section 1. The Aims of Monetary tofum.ten.fcnt from 1931.
Internal Economic Stability alone.
When the Great Depression was shattering the international 
gold standard system in one country after another, strenuous 
efforts were being made by international institutions and confer­
ences to rehabilitate the international monetary and trading sys­
tem. But all those attempts failed without exception. The funaamen' 
tal reason for these failures lay in the fact that after the 
onset of the depression, many countries did not accept the basic 
premise that the ideal was the restoration of the gold standard -
the medium through which depression and unemployment originating
(1)
in one country afflicted another. With U.S.A. in the throes of 
a great depression, other countries were having serious deficit 
balance of payments and the observance of the gold standard rules 
by the latter necessarily involved the adoption of a policy of 
deflation with consequent depression in their internal economy. 
Moreover attempts to decrease imports to restore balance of pay­
ments equilibrium, automatically led to the curtailment of inter­
national trade. The ^old standard stood for a nigh level of inter 
national trade but it was found that during the depression the
(1)* The Economic lessons of the Nineteen-Thirties*, by
H.W. Arnot, London, 1944. pp. 234-242.
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very observance of the gold standard rules lea to the restriction 
of foreign trade. For the continuance of international trade in 
those years gold standard was an obstacle rather than a help.
Again , it became almost obvious that even with their best 
efforts to observe gold standard rules, it was not possible for 
countries other than U.S.A. to maintain the international Oola 
standard in operation for any length of time, fclth the collapse 
of America! effective demand (or market) vhich constituted a 
significant part of the world*s effective demand (or market), the 
latter fell short of the global productive, activity and it was 
not possible to maintain currency equilibrium9and therefore gold 
standardywithout compensating the deficient effective demand of 
U.S.A. As the rest of the world could not possibly increase its 
effective demand, to make up the loss in American demand, the con­
tinuance of the gold standard was found to be dependent on the 
American effective demand at a high level. The same reasoning 
also indicated that the international gold standard depended for 
its pperation on the maintenance, at a high level, of the effec­
tive demand of Great Britain constituting a greatorimport market
than U.S.A. It was not unlikely that the collapse of even German
the
ana Erench effective demand could have aisrupted/gola standard. 
The maintenance of their normal quota of effective demand by each 
of the four major economies being the condition precedent for the 
existence of the gold standard anu none of them beln* sure that 
others would be able to maintain their demand consistently, most 
of them were no longer inclined to subscribe to the international
monetary system and make their internal economies dependent on 
the uncertain markets of others. Instead^most of the major econo­
mies aaopted monetary policies to stimulate their effective 
demand and provide their own markets on autarchic lines.
The Great Depression also revolutionised prevailing ideas 
about the most efficacious methods of maintaining effective dema­
nd and thereby internal economic activity. In the twenties it was 
generally presumed that the monetary authorities by simply adopt­
ing a dear or cheap money policy could regulate the volume of 
money and effective demand in their respective economies. But tne 
monetary authority of U.S.A. was found to be completely unable to
d )
check the boom of 1929 with a dear money policy. After the
onset of the depression when the global effective demand fell
below the prevailing economic activity of the world, a cheap
money policy could not stimulate effective demand in U.S.A. in 
12)
the least. Entrepreneurs were not willing to take loans, under­
take investment and thereby to stimulate effective demand at any 
low rate of interest. It was thus apparent that for stimulating 
effective demand what was needed was not only the regulation of 
the supply of money with an easy money policy but also the regu­
lation of demand for money by adopting a compensatory investment
policy either undertaken by the government or the monetary autho-
13)
rity itself. Durin^ the first half of the thirties, most of
(1) "Prosperity Decade : A chapter from American Economic History 
1917 -1929", by G. Soule; New York, 1947. p. 304.
(2) ■ Ibid p. 310.
(3) " Monetary Theory", by G.N. Halm, Philadelphia, 1946. 
pp.417-433.
the major economies adopted an anticyclic&l policy for stimulat­
ing their effective demand ( and thereby to maintain their econo­
mic activity) by re^ulatin^ both the supply of and aemand for 
money.
On the supply side, the cheap money policy was the main device 
adopted by all these countries irrespective of their reserve posi­
tion, to stimulate entrepreneurs to undertake investments and there 
by to increase the effective demand of the employees. On the dema­
nd side, attempts were made to increase the purchasing power of 
consumers, either by direct distribution of relief among the dis­
tressed or by direct undertaking of investment by the Government
which increased the income of the employees and thereby increased
(1)
their effective demand. All these measures were adopted by each
of the major economies that followed a recovery policy,but each
country laid emphasis on a different measure. In Great Britain 
was
emphasis/on cheap money policy, in U.S.A. on relief measures and 
in Germany on public investments alone.
Section 2. The Recovery Measures of the Major EconomiesT 1931- 37. 
Great Britain.
Although private investment in Great Britain was stimulated 
chiefly by a cheap money policy yet it received two other stimu­
lants, one increasing directly the profitability of investment, 
the other increasing the private consumption expenditure. As Great
Britain aid not fully share the prosperity boom of the 1920's,
many profitable
(1) " The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen Thirties" by H.W.
Arndt, London, 1944. pp.62, 122, and 156.
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sources of investment were 3eft unused and these were
(1)
undertaken after 1932. The motor-car, electrical,rayon
and other industries came Into this class, but the most
outstanding of this class was residential building which
continued throughout the 1930fa and accounted for about
(2)
one-third of the increased employment of this period.
The second support to private investment in Great 
Britain during this period came from the exceptional fall 
in the world prices of foodstuffs and raw materials. Great 
Britain, being an exporter of manufactures and Importer of 
foodstuffs and raw materials, had her terms of trade improv­
ed to such an extent that a representative unit of her
exports purchased 20# more imports than it did before the
(3)
depression. This low price of Imports saved about £250
million of consumers9 Income which could, therefore, be
spent on houses, motor-cars etc., and thereby stimulate
(4)
the corresponding industries.
Under the stimulus of these joint forces, private
Investment in Great Britain Increased considerably and
attained a remarkable degree of recovery from depression.
The various Indices of her economic activity in 1937 were
higher than those In 1929. Excluding agricultural workers,
the number of the employed rose from 10.2 millions in 1929
(5)
to 11.5 millions In 1937. The Index of manufacturing
(1) "The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen Thirties" by
H. W. Arndt, London, 1944 pp. 122,. 32$, n:'
(2) Ibid
(3) Ibid p. 131
(4) Ibid p. :..;I
(5) Ibid p. 127
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production rose from 109.9 in 1929 (1925-1929 * 100) to 140 in
H )
1937. Money wages in 1937 rose 1% higher than in 1929 ana the
rise in wages was further augmented by a fall of 5# in the cost of
(2)
living. The national income in 1937 shot up to £5,200 million
(3)
from £ 3,650 million to which it had sunk during the depression.
In spite of all these phenomenal developments achieved by Great 
Britain, there were serious short-comin^s in the British recovery 
of the thirties. The unemployment figure in 1937 was higher than
U )
in 1929, 10.6$ of the insured workers being without employment.
When the depression in U.S.A. absolutely touched the rock- 
bottom, the first Roosevelt Administration, on coming into office
in March 1933, adopted an expansionist programme under the title
the
of/'New Deal.1 The primary object of this programme at the 
beginning was not to expana production or to create employment but 
to grant relief to the destitute and the unemployad, to lighten 
the urban and rural indebtedness and to raise agricultural incomes 
But out of these disjointed relief measures, a conscious policy 
of compensatory government expenditure gradually emerged. While 
at the beginning } relief expenditure constituted the 
main part , at the end public works assumea significant 
importance • The bulk of this expenditure was
(1) "Industrialisation and Eorei^ Trade”, League of Nations,
1945. p. 140.
(2) * The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen Thirties", by H.W. 
Arndt, London 1944. p. 126.
(3) ” The Economist,” 15 April , 1939.
(4) "Eull Employment ia a Eree Society”, by M.H. Beveridge, 
London, 1945. p. 47
174.
financed by budget deficits which amount to 13.5 billions in
11)







Though public Investment formed a good part of this
huge expenditure yet several deterrent factors minimised
its significance to a very serlouB extent. During these
years, when the Federal Government was expanding public
works expenditure, the local and state governments were
reducing their public works expenditure which declined from
(2)
3 millions in 1929 to 1.1 millions in 1935, The
investments of the Federal Government could not make good
this decline. During the prosperity boom of 1923-29, tbs
average total investment expenditure amounted to # 18,500
million a year out of # 77,000 millions of average nation- 
13)
al income. In 1933, total investment expenditure stood
between 5,000 and 6,000 million and by 1937, it rose
(4)
between # 12,000 to $ 13,000 million. Thus, the increase 
of public investment fell far short of the decline in 
private investment and the effect of a deficit budget was 
restricted to the stimulation of consumption expenditure 
only.
(1) "The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen Thirties1*,
by H. W. Arndt, London, 1944 p. 6D.
(2 ) Ibid p. 62 footnote
(3) Ibid p. 61
(4) Ibid p. 61
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During the four years from 1933 to 1937* when the
government stimulated private consumption expenditure by
an enormous sum* there took place a substantial increase in
the economic activity of U.S*A* The index of production
(Federal Reserve Board* 1923-25 —  100) rose from 64 in 1932
to an average of 116 for the first nine months of 1937 while
(1)
It stood at 121 in 1929* Thus even In 1937 Industrial 
production stood at a level b% lower than in 1929* Ihe 
national income rose from ft 40*000 million in 1932 to
ft 69*800 million in 1937 while in 1929 it stood at >481*100
(2)
million* Even if allowance was made for the low price-
level of 1937* the national income in the later date stood 
the (3)
below/1929 level* The recovery attained by America was*
therefore* anything but satisfactory* %hlle in 1929 the
unemployment figure stood at three millions* there
over eight millions of people without work in 1937*
GERMANY
With Hitler in power in January 1933* the Nazi Govern­
ment adopted an expansionist policy based at first cn public 
works and later mainly on the rearmament programme* More than 
two and a half milliard RM was spent in 1933-35 on public 
works comprising the construction of strategic motor roads*
(1) "Ihe Economic Lessons of the Nineteen (Thirties"* by
H*W• Arndt* London* 1944 p* 60
(2) Ibid p. 60
(3) Ibid
(4) Ibid p* 61
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ordinary roads* public buldings* waterways* state railways* land 
improvements ate* By the end of 1934* in addition to the normal
d )
budget expenditure* government spent- more than five milliard RM.
The whole of this expenditure stimulated consumption demand and
increased private investment( from 440 million RM in 1932 ) to
12)
1070 million RM in 1934 and the index of industrial production
increased from 70.2 in 1932 ( base :1913 = 100 ) to 101.8 in
(3)
1934. The unemployment figure was reduced by more than three
(4)
millions. The indirect demand-stimulating effect of this huge
expenditure would probably have urged the private entrepreneurs
to undertake investment to the level of full employment in oue
course* but entrepreneurs were not given this chance* because
from that time economic policy was changed from recovery to rearma
ment and government expenditure for the latter purpose increased
by leaps and bounds. From 12.2 milliard RM in 1934-33 government
expenditure increased to 22 milliard RM in 1937-38 * while
gross public investment increased from 4.1 milliard RM to
(5)
8 - 9  milliard Rli. Private investments also increased from
16)
1.07 milliard RM in 1934 to 2.1 milliard in 1936 .
These huge public and private expenditure not only created
(1) "The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen Thirties" by h.W. 
Arndt* London* 1944. p. 133.
(2) Ibid . p. 156.
(3) "Industrialization and Foreign Trade"* League of Nations*
1945. p. 134.
(4) " The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen Thirties ", by h.W. 
Arndt* London 1944. p. 155*
(3) Ibid. p. 156.
(6) Ibid.
full employment in Germany, but over full employment. Prom 
1935* the problem of the government was how to divert re­
sources of production which were running short from consump­
tion goods industries to armament factories# By 1937* there 
was absolutely no unemployment but an acute shortage of
skilled labour# The industrial production rose from 70#2 in
(1)
1932 (base* 1913 100) to 138#1 in 1937# It was thus
much higher than the level of productivity in 1929 with an
(2)
index of 117#3# The total national Income increased from
%  , ' (3)
45#2 milliard R M in 1932 to 68#5 milliard in 1937#
(4)
Germany thus attained full recovery from depression#
FRANCK.
In 1928 France stabilised her currency at l/5th of its 
pre-war value and this gave her export Industries such a great
competitive exchange advantage that she was practically un-
(5)
affected by depression up to 1930# But the exchange de­
preciations of 1931 and 1933* as well as other trade restrict­
ing measures in her export markets more than eliminated her 
exchange advantage and plunged her into the depths of de­
pression from which she could not completely extricate her­
self during the thirties# France did not adopt monetary
(1) "Industrialisation and Foreign Trade"* League of Nations
1945 p# 134#
(2) Ibid.
(3) "The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen Thirties"* by
H# W. Arndt* London* 1944. p# 171#
(4) "The Economics of Full Employment", Oxford Institute of
Statistics* Oxford* 1945 p# 201-203#
(5) "The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen Thirties"* by
H. W. Arndt* London 1944 p# 135#
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measures as did Great Britain* U.S.A. and Germany to increase
her effective demand and stimulate internal economic activity.
the „
From 1931 to 1935* the French Government maintained/go ld-
that
standard by a policy of deflation which aggravated/economic
(1)
depression continuously. The index of her manufacturing
production declined from 122.6 in 1931 (Base* 1913 .. 100) to
(2)
109.1 in 1935. In 1936* the Front Populalre came to power 
and adopted an expansionist programme on the American New Deal 
model. But political difficulties and flight capital com-
i. ■ •' •
blned to frustrate this policy within nine months and this
brief revival of economic activity was followed by another
spell of depression which continued during the remaining years
(3)
of the thirties.
Thus* the expansionist policies of the four major econo­
mies attained widely different results. At one end was 
Germany* which expanded effective demand to the level of full 
employment and even beyond* while at the other end stood 
France with a declining effective demand.The increases in 
effective demand of the two other major economies stood in 
between those of Germany and France. Great Britain* with a 
considerable Increase of effective demand was closer to 
Germany than Franc** while U.S.A., with a modest Increase stood 
between Great Britain* on the one hand* and France on theothen
(1) "The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen Thirties"* by
H.W. Arndt* London* 1944 p. 138-140.
(2) "Industrialisation and Foreign Trade", League of
Nations* 1945. p. 134.
(3) "The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen Thirties"* by
H. W. Arndt, London, 1944. p. 141 - 150.
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The excess effective demand over the full employment level In 
Germany was not effective beyond her boundaries because Gera-any aid 
not possess any foreign exchange to liquidate her consequent unfav­
ourable balance* nor were the foreign countries willing to allow 
much credit to Germany. In view of these facts^fixcess effective 
demand of Germany could not in any way make good the deficiency in 
the increase ef effective demand in other major economies, how* the 
total effective demand of the four major economies constituted the 
bulk of the world's effective demand, nut complete depression in 
one of the major economies (France) and semi-depression in two 
others (U.S.A. and Great brltain) kept the global effective demand 
much below the global productive capacity. Xhe buyers' market 
which developed after the collapse of the world demand in 1929 
continued even after the application of recovery measures* involv­
ing the regulation of both the demand for and supply of money by 
most of the major economies. Xhe rest of the world* comprising 
the minor economies was thus still afflicted with a net deficiency 
of world demand* whlck kept their economies depressed end their 
production and employment below normal.
SaetlOK. 3. J.k. Keynes aiad the gull Employment jroi.i.cifis 
in the note Thirties.
before 1936. the demand stimulating measures adopted by the 
different major economies were not directed to the attainment of 
full employment ae such. They were either recovery or anti- 
cyclical policies ana their aim vas at best to carry their
respective economies back to the pre-depression level of economic 
activity. Full employment attained in Germany was incidental to 
the rearmament programme. In 1936* J.M. Keynes published his famo­
us work "The General Theory of Employment* Interest ana Money" in 
which he convincingly argued that full employment as such should 
be the continuous objective of monetary policy and that public 
investment by making deficit demand effective* was capable of 
attaining and maintaining full employment* provided investment was 
sufficient in volume and suitable for the purpose. The full employ­
ment theory as further embellished by Keynes himself ana his follo-
the
wers was gradually epitomised in the theory of/full employment 
budget of compensatory public investment to make up the deficit in 
private investment so that full employment be continuously mainta­
ined. Keynesian analysis proviaea the explanation why full employ­
ment was attained in Germany while the same could not be attained 
in U.K. or U.S.A. It was realised that adequate public investment 
was the cause of full employment in uermany while its absence or 
insufficiency was at the root of depression or semi-depression in 
France* U.S.A. and U.K.
The full employment theory eventually captured the imagination 
of the scientific world and received the adherence of a wide circle 
of supporters but none of the three half-aepressed major economies 
adopted it as a basis of their economic policy. On the other hand* 
as a basis of policy the theory suffered a setback in America in 
1937* In the spring of that year there developed a short but sharp 
boom in U.tt.A. originating mainly from the payment of veterans9
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bonus by the Government and a eanee^ent sudden increase in consu­
mers' aemand. The political opponents of the New Deal raised a hue 
and cry about the impending inflation ana compelled the aaministri 
ation to curtail its expenditure which fell from $ 4*100 million
d)
in 1936 to $ 985 million in 1937. The reduction of government
expenditure not only checked inflation but set on foot from
September 1937 & deflation and depression much more precipitate
than that of 1929. From October 1937 to March 1938* some four and
(2)
a half million workers lost their jobs. The index of production
of the Federal Reserve Bank fell from 116 in the first six months
(3)
of 1937 to 75 in July 1938. From $ 72*000 million to which 
it had risen in 1937* the national income fell to 9 50*000
14)
million by the beginning of 1938. By March 1938* it was reali­
zed by all that without the resumption of government expenditure
. V ■ . * , I
on a huge scale it was not possible to avoid another Great Depre-
j
ssion. In July 1938* a new programme of expenditure on relief
and public works was launched again and the recovery began as
sharply as the decline had developed in the previous year. By the
end of 1938* employment increased by 1.2 millions and proauction
(5)
regained the early 1937 level.
(1) "The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen Thirties", by H.W. 





The debacle of 1937-6, clearly demonstrated to what a great
extent the economic activity of U.S.A. depended on the government 
(1)expenditure. But even then, public investment was not developed 
in America before the end of 1939 to such an extent as to attain 
full employment. Moreover, the short hut sharp American depressioi 
of 1937-1938 caused a severe decline in the effective demand of 
the world and a correspohding world depression during this period* 
In France and Great Britain also, public expenditures increased 
during 1937-39, probably partly under the influence of this 
theory but mainly for rearmament. But despite these increases, 
full employment was not attained before the end of 1939. Thus, in 
all the three major economies, in U.S.A., U.K. and France, effect* 
ive demand remained persistently below their productive capacity 
throughout the thirties. Neither anti-cyclical recovery policies 
of the early thirties nor increasing public investments of the 
late thirties adopted by the major economies could entirely 
extricate them from depression and thereby increase the global 
effective demand to the level of productive capacity of the 
world. The global buyers1 market continued up to the end of1939 
when huge rearmament programmes rapidly forced up their 
economies to full employment.
In Germany full employment was attained before the full 
employment theory was enunciated in 1936. But the later
(1) * Monetary Policies and Full Employment*, by W.J. Fellner,
California, 1947. p.197.
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experience of the German full employment policy revealed the 
limitations within which such a policy was to he restricted 
and the conditions that were to he fulfilled for its complete 
success. The volume of German Investment expenditure was 
much greater than was necessary for German full employment and 
the conseq&ent Income and consumption demand of the German 
people were much greater than the volume of consumption goods 
produced in Germany. Germans were naturally eager to purctese 
more consumption goods from outside and this automatically 
turned the halance of payments against Germany. But German 
exports could not he Increased because a substantial part of 
her productive potential was engaged in the rearasment 
programme which did not provide any exportable ware. Moreover 
rearmament production Itself required more foreign raw 
materials which turned the balance of payments against Germany 
all the more. The excess purchase of Germany in the Buyers' 
market of the thirties was definitely of advantage to her. 
From many countries she succeeded in purchase a fair amount 
of materials against blocked paper marks which offered very 
little prospect of realisation. But this game of purchasing 
without payment did not proceed very far. Despite the 
existence of a buyers' market, most of the countries soon 
refused to sell anything to Germany without being paid back 
with real goods (or gold). But that was not possible for 
Germany without converting her armament factories into 
factories to produce useful exportable commodities. Hence*
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though It was possible to attain full employment by unpro­
ductive investment, it waa bound to reduce cons\xnption or the 
standard of living of the people and was not,therefore,worth 
having from an economio point of view.
Even If it could be assumed that all the German armament 
factories were converted into Industries for the production 
of useful exportable goods, still it would not be possible for 
Germany to liquidate her deficit balance entirely by Increasing 
her exports* Due to overfull employment in Germany, German 
consumers would have purchased much more from outside but, 
the rest of the world (due to its deficiency of demand) would 
have bought less from Germany .The G e m  an deficit balance could 
in those circumstances be liquidated either by decreasing 
German effective demand and thereby German purchases or by 
increasing foreign effective demand to Increase foreign pur­
chases of German goods* In the former case, the German level 
of economio activity would be reduced to the half depressed 
level of other major economies while in the latter alternative 
the economic activity and employment in the other major 
economies would be forced up to the level of full employment* 
Thus, full employment oould be attained only by co-ordinating 
the policies of the major economies — that is, only when all 
of them maintained full employment individually • Only then
would global effective demand have eqi ated world productive
. the
capacity* The rest of the world comprising /minor economies
had
would have/their productive activity automatically stimulated
by the expanded world demand and could have emerged out of the 
depression without any conscious effort on their part.
In fact, neither were German industries devoted to the 
sole production of useful goods nor had the other major 
economies full employment* Due to these reasons, global 
effective demand remained much lower than the productive 
capacity of the world throughout the thirties and depression 
in the economic activity of the world persisted* This made 
the German full employment activity to be attained and main­
tained only at the cost of German consumption and standard of 
living* The minor economies of the world continued to be 
afflicted by the depression during the thirties as a result of 
the deficiency in the global demand* In the face of this 
world deficiency in demand, if a minor economy adopted a full 
employment policy, its productivity would have been extremely 
low and its full employment could be attained only by a serious 
sacrifice of the consumption and standard of living of its 
people.
SgCTIOM 4 * Tbe Ipternal^Aspect of Indian monetary Policy 
from 1931 to 1938.
The depression with which India was afflicted after 1929
was, as we have already seen, nothing but a reflection of the
world depression caused by the collapse of the world demand,
particularly fdr agricultural products. India, with her
agricultural exports and her inelastic system of agricultural
production, was encumbered with an unsaleable stock in a
(1)
shrinking market*
(1) "Review of the Trade of India in 1936 - 37.w pp* 1 - 3 .
186
Partial recovery in tha world economio activities brought 
about by the expansionist measures of the major economies 
could# under normal circumstances# be expected to increase
the demand for Indian exports* but this was not the case#
incomplete and
firstly because the recovery attained was very/inadequate and
the world demand remained throughout the thirties much short cf
(1)
the productive capacity of the world* Secondly# the 
fundamental characteristic of the recovery measures of the 
thirties was to divert production from export goods to com­
modities of domestic consumption* Recovery being thus mainly
a
of/national charaoter did not bring about a commensurate 
1 (8) 
increase# in international trade* While global production
rose above the 1929 level by 1956# international trade was
the
still much belowyl929 level* The quantum of Indian exports
moved with the world trade and touched the lowest level in
1952-53 and was nearly the same as the quantum of world trade
in that year* From that time# It increased very slowly# but
13)
even in 1936# it was 12 points below the 1927-28 level*
The quantum of Indian export in the following year# (1936-37) 
rose to 107*4# consequent upon the expansion of world demand 
due to the rearmament programme of several countries* But the 
short but sharp American depression of 1937-38# lowered the
(1) "Industrialisation and Foreign Trade"* League of Nations
1945 p 141 and 161*
(2) "Review of the Trade of India in 1936-37" p* 1-3*
(3) Ibid p* 2 and p.28
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quantum of Inui&n export trade again which stooa at 103.1 in !
( D
1937-36 and 102*2 in 1936*39. Now# the exports of India consis­
ted mainly of agricultural products ana raw materials. The base 
year (1927-26) for these quantum figures was the year of agricul­
tural depression which seriously affected tne export trade of 
India* Hence tne international trace of the base year itself 
represented a depression level and it was only to this level 
that the quantum of Indian trace rose# eleven years afterwards* 
hut the rise in the quantum of Indian trade did not mean 
any mitigation of the Indian depression. Indian exports consisted 
mainly of agricultural goods# the production of which aid not 
appreciably diminish during the depression years# Undiminished 
supply in a contracting market necessitated a serious lowering 
of Indian export prices to effect sales* Other agricultural
countries encumbered with excessive exportable supplies mitigated
12)
the problem a little by accumulating and holding back stocks.
But# on account of the absence of any organisation to nold back
stocks# as well as the poverty of Inaian farmers# the fall of
prices of Indian exports was much greater than that of other 
countries* One of the manifestations of this fall of Indian
prices was a greater decline in the prices of Inaian exports
in comparison with that of her imports as will appear from
O )
the following table*
(1) IHeview of the Trade of India in 1936-39* p*72
(2) Ibid p. 4
(3) " Review of the Trade In of India in 1936-37" p. 28*
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fries indlooa or Indian Exports and Inporta 
(Basos 1987-86 .  100).
Tsar Quantum of Pries level Price level
__________exports_________ of exports_______ of Imports
1987-86 100 100 10U
1986-29 106.1 97.6 96.4
1989-30 106.0 90.8 93.8
1930-31 96.6 71.9 60.0
1931-38 88.5 S9.2 71.7
1932-33 74.9 59.3 65.2
1933-34 86.2 53.5 63.5
1934-35 87.6 54.1 63.0
1939-36 66.4 56.9 62,4
1936-37 107.4 57.8 68.8
The excessive fall In export prices reacted on the 
Indian price-level In general which recorded an almost
continuous decline during the thirties as will appear from
(1)
the index of wholesale prices given below.
1989 1930 1931 1938 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
100 82.3 68.1 64.5 61.7 63.1 64.5 64.5 78.3 67.6
Thus, the Great Depression in India took the form of a
collapse of prices rather than shrinkage in production and
the
this was mainly due to the inelastic eyetern of/Indian 
productive organisation*
The fall of agricultural prices reduced the income and 
standard of living of the Indian farmer very seriously*
Fran 1931* the farmer had to make both ends meet by die* 
hoarding his gold* The dishoarded gold in the first instance 
vas lodged with money-lenders and gold dealers who had to 
export a part of this gold due to an excessive increase in 
their stock in trade* From 1931 to 1936 the value of gold
(1) "Review of the  Trade of India in 1936-37"
p* 56 (Vide infra p.223.)
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(1)
exported from India amounted to 267 crores# More relevant 
in this connection was the fact that the fall in the income 
of the farmer made him a poor buyer of manufacturing goods 
but* on the other hand* Indian industries during the thirties 
enjoyed high and all round protection# With the home market 
at their entire disposal* Indian industrial production record­
ed a phenomenal Increase during the thirties as shown below :
Annual indices of manufacturing production (2)
(Base: 1925 —  100 }
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
109.5 100.7 108.1 108.1 116.7 132.4 143 150.7 163.5 166.8
But this rapid increase of industrial production soon 
saturated the home market which had already become serious­
ly truncated by the decline of the agriculturalist's income 
and his purchasing power of manufacturing |oods# By 1936-37 
signs of over-production became visible# Prices of indus­
trial products were on the decline# Jute* cotton* sugar*
steel* tea* cement etc#* recorded a persistent decline in
(4)
prices# Industrial profits were sinking again as shown
15)
below:
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937
100 7 8 47.1 27.8 34.6 44.2 62.6 69.2 63.1 61.1
It was now apparent that without expanding the domestic
market which meant the increase of the farmer's income* It wss
(1) "Review of the Trade of India* 1931-32 to 1935-36"
(2) "Industrialisation and Foreign Trade"* League of Nations
1945. p. 141.
(3) "Review of the Trade of India in 1936-37" p. 16#
(4) Ibid
(5) Ibid p. 31.
1939-40
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not possible to expand Indian industrial production any 
further* The main cause of the poor Income of the Indian 
farmer lay in the deficient world demand for Indian exports — 
a deficiency which India could not remedy# Only if the major
economies of the world stimulated their foreign demand to the
would
pre-depression level,/the prosperity of the Indian farmer
wwrfti have been restored# But this the major economies
this
did not do/throughout the thirties and in consequence, the 
purchasing power of the Indian farmers remained at a subnormal 
level and blocked the progress of Indian industries*
The minor economies, however, could stimulate their 
internal demand to some extent at least by their own efforts 
and without any external aid# Sweden, for example, adopted 
from 1935 a policy of compensatory public investment, regard­
less of whether it was productive (self-liquidating) or not, to 
provide work as well as Income to the unemployed# Unemployment
reached its peak in Sweden in March 1933 but after the adoption
(1)
of this policy, full employment was reached by 1957# The
>
national debt continued to grow but this increase was mainly 
accounted for by productive state Investments, income from
which was more than sufficient to cover debt services and most
of that part of increased state Investment, which was not 
profitable in the business sense, made useful additions to the 
nation's capital equipment# In addition, these Investments
  II I I I  I I— ■ — I — l m  I .  I I    — I .  Ill ■ ■  ■ ■  I I I I   II  . — — — I  M M   . i n . — — — — —
(1) "The Economic Lessons of the 1950 'a1 ,
H# W# Arndt, London 1944, p# 212#
maintained the purchasing power of the Swedish people during 
the depression* If a public investment policy of this type had 
been adopted in India during the thirties, the purchasing power 
of Indians could have been increased to some extent at least. 
the economic activity of the country could have been corresponding­
ly stimulated*
hut nothing of the kind was done in India during the thirties*
Some measures were of course taken to improve the lot of the
farmer by lightening x,his mounting debt burden, the incidence of
which became particularly heavy due to the fall of agricultural
prices* Agricultural debts were scaled down by various methods of
debt conciliation and compulsory reduction in many provinces,
partly by voluntary arrangements and partly by legislation, hut
this policy, in addition to the scaling down of rural debts, dried
up the very source of agricultural credit* The Government could not
(2)
provide an alternative source of supply* The Reserve hank of India
was brought into existence in 1933 and it had an agricultural
credit department* hut the work of the Agricultural Credit
Department of the Reserve hank consisted of research work in all
aspects of rural credit rather than making provision for
rural credit* The Government measures to scale down rural debts
also resulted in the restriction of agricultural credit and thereby
tended to check agricultural operations and the farmer's income
rather than increase them* Indian monetary policy in
JT) "The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen Thirties*, 
h.W* Arndt, 1944, p. 213.
(2) "India's Post-War Reconstruction and its International 
Aspects" by P. S. Lokanatham, p* 2*
the thirties could not, therefore, stimulate internal economic 
activity which was regarded as the objective of monetary 
management of that period*
SECTION 5 • International Implications of the Interna 1C .
s of the Major Economies
One of the main objectives of the internal expansionary 
policies of the thirties was to make the industries of a 
country more and more independent of foreigi markets* But 
the expansionary policies had the Inherent tendency of 
making the country concerned more dependent on forelgi 
countries in another respect* When the Income and purchasing 
power of the people were increased by expansionary measures 
such as public investment, the new income earners not only 
purchased more domestic goods but also more foreigpi con­
sumption goods* More-over, expanded Investment activities 
automatically necessitated the import of more foreign raw 
materials while more domestic raw materials, which were 
previously exported, began to be utilized by expanded 
domestic industries* All these factors Increased the Imports 
of the expansionist country, deoreased its exports and 
thereby turned the balance of payments against lt.(l) Wow, 
this deficit balance or net debts to the foreigners had to 
be settled in any case* Most of the major economies, 
particularly Great Britain and Germany, could not settle it 
by shipment of gold as they did under the gold standard 
regime* They could not also do by a policy of deflation 
which would have been tantamount to giving up the expansion­
ist policy itself* Hence, almost the only way to
(1) "Economic Journal", December 1946 "Art Deliberate 
Industrialization for Higher Incomes" p*550*
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correct the deficit h&l&nce was to allow the exchange rate to 
depreciate to make exports cheaper and imports dearer, and
thereby to increase foreign sales and decrease purchases from
' ' *
foreign countries, Por every amount of deficit balance there 
was an appropriate low exchange rate which would restore
a
equilibrium in the external p/yraent of the country concerned, 
hut this very potentiality of a lower exchange rate indicated
v
the further fact that if the exchange rate were lowered 
below the equilibrium rate it was possible to have a favourable
U )
balance. A favourable balance meant that a country sold
more goods to foreign countries than it bought from outside,
that is, it captured a corresponding extent of the foreign
market for its domestic industries.
The capturing of the foreign market by exchange depreciat-
ion assumed an extraordinary significance after the collapse
12)
of the world market by the great depression.
Competitive exchange depreciation, as this practice of
capturing the foreign market was styled, began from 1928,
that is, one year before the great depression started. In
that year, Prance stabilized her currency at one-fifth of its
value before World War 1 and this gave her a wide competitive
(3)
exchange advantage. Even before 1928, Prance was getting
(1) "Monetary Theory" by G.h. Halm, Philadelphia,1946,p.249.
12) "The Economic Lessons of the 1930*5" by 
H.W. Arndt, London, 1944 p. 32.
(3) Ibid. p. i J35.
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considerable advantage from her low exchange rate which
a
helped her to have/contlnuoua favourable balance from 1988
-  — {JJ- . « U  r..—  - — « -ly t.
of U»S.a» ihlu gold reserve was more than sufficient to 
ward off anyfcreasure on the franc in the first years of 
depression but,In fact* the use of this reserve was not
needed at least up to 1931-38 because France did not haws
(8)
any deficit balance* She depreciated franc gave her o 
decided competitive advantage over the dollar* sterling and 
mark and Increased her foreign trade* particularly export 
trade* In 1928 and 1929* By the end of 1929* her export 
Increased by 14$ from the level of 1928 and this Increase
was maintained In 1930 as well* In a sense* France was not
(»)
affected by the Great Depression at all up to 1931* 'ihe 
exchange advantage reaped by France was naturally resented 
and envied by other major economies who were not unwilling to 
copy her method In their turn*
In 1931* when Great Britain was faced with acute balance 
of payments disequilibrium and forced off the gold standard^ 
she allowed her currency to depreciate In two stages by 30/°*
(1) "The Economic Lessons of the 1930's, by H.W. Arndt,
London, 1944 p. 24*
(2) Ibid
(•) Ibid
(4) Ibid p. 99
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In fact* Britain had no other alternative* If ahe tried to 
restore equilibrium by deflation that vould have not only 
accentuated the exchange disadvantage from vhich she had 
been suffering until 1931 but would have involved the lower­
ing of British incomef imports, standard of living and increas­
ed unemployment and led to social conflict* Moreover, in 
the face of contracting world demand in 1930-31, British 
deflation would have contracted the world market to an 
immensely greater degree* As it happened, the depreciation 
of the sterling not only eliminated the overvaluation of the 
pound from which her export trade suffered so long, but it
gave to British exporters a competitive advantage in the world
(1)
market for at least two years after 1931, at the same time
giving protection on the British home market as opposed to
the countries outside the sterling area* Ihis depreciation
was considered by Americans to have increased Britain’s share
of world trade by 16% during 1932 over her trade of the
previous year and to have decreased the American share of
^ (2)world trade, (between 1929 and 1932) by 22>.
In 1931 Germany was faced with the problem of a deficit 
balance, much more acute than that of Great Britain* Ihe 
German Government could not, however, think of having 
recourse to devaluation so easily because public opinion In
(1) "Ihe Economic Lessons of the 1930*8 n by
H* W* Arndt, London, 1944 p* 99
(2) Ibid p. 74
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Germany identified devaluation with inflation from which
Germans had suffered so grievously In the early twenties and
(1)
which they did not want repeated again* The German Govern­
ment, therefore, tried to attain equilibrium by deflation even 
at the cost of political and labour strife but in the face of
hot money movements and flight capital, this measure complete-
(2)
ly failed* Even if the German Government tried to depreciate
the mark, these hot money movements would not have allowed it
(3)
to attain balance of payments equilibrium* The rapid and 
unpredictable movements of huge volraes of capital from one 
country to another that began from 1931 and acquired the 
notoriety under the title of ’hot money* movements were an 
altogether new phenomenon and were responsible for aggravat­
ing the balance of payments difficulties of many countries*
A fall in the exchange rate to correct an adverse balance of 
payments was taken as a danger signal of a further jLall, so 
that funds, Instead of flowing in, flowed out* As the 
fugitive funds took refuge abroad, pressure on the exchange 
market Increased and resulted in a further loss of confidence 
and a further flight of capital* A dear money policy to 
stop this flight simply aggravated the situation* Funds in 
search of safety rather than employment moved from countries 
with a deficit balance to countries with a surplus, thus
(1) "The Economic Lessons of the 1930’s, by
H*W* Arndt, London 1944 p* 181*
(2) Ibid p* 30 and p. 180
(3) Ibid p* 181*
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aggravating any discrepancies already existing. This was true not 
only of flight capital or hot money but sometimes also of panic
n )
withdrawal of foreign short term crsuits.
A country wanting to correct her deficit balance either by 
deflation or depreciation aimed at increasing her exports and decr­
easing her imports. But if at the same time a flight capital deve­
loped, the effect of deflation or depreciation to increase exports
and decrease imports was sure to be negatived if not reversed* In
the
September 1931 Great Britain was faced with the problem of/with-
v
urawal of foreign funds, the financing of which absorbed the oulk
of her foreign exchange • It was the excessive demand for foreign
the
exchange caused by/flight of capital that exerted m strong down­
ward pressure on British exchange and was the immediate cause of 
the suspension of gold payment and depreciation of the sterling*
But the depreciation Itself restored the confidence(in the sterling
of the people who sent capital abroad and the capital began to 
flow in Great Britain* Even if capital continued to flow out,
Great Britain could have stopped the consequent further deprecia­
tion of the pound by exporting gold from the Exchange Stabilisa­
tion Fund which she organised at the beginning of 1932* In fact
(2)
from 1932 9 Great Britain was faced with the opposite difficulty 
of inflow of capital and accentuated foreign demand for the pound
(1) "International Currency Experience", League of Nations 1944*
p*bG, 162 and 1b7.
(2) • Ibid p*BO.
which exercised an upward pressure on the British exchange
(1)
rate. The exchange rate of the sterling was not allowed to
rise above 30% depreciation level by constant sale of sterling
on the one hand 
to the foreigners by the Fund/and simultaneous Import and
(2)
accumulation of gold in the Fund on the other.
The policy of deflation in Germany could not however 
restore the confidence of the people who continued to send 
capital abroad and made her deficit balance yawn wider and 
wider • As the policy of deflation could not restore the 
confidence of the speculators, a depreciation of the mark, even 
if Germany could adopt such a policy, would have done it even 
sax less. To make either a policy of deflation or devalua­
tion successful it was essential for Germany to neutralise 
the hot money movement • But Germany did not possess sufficient 
liguid resources to organize an Exchange Stabilization Fund 
like the one in Great Britain. To meet the deficit balance 
Germany had no other alternative than to devise a rationed
(1) " International Currency Experience 4, League of Nations, 
1944. p. 143.
(2) " The Economic Lessons of the Nineteen Thirties by n.W. 
Arndt, London 1944, p. 98.
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adjustment of scarce foreign exchange among the importers who 
demanded a much bigger amount* For this purpose the govern­
ment took over all the available supply of foreign exchange
SoTKe. ( l )
and (fairly) distributed It among the applicants Inj proportion*
Exchange control automatically reduced Imports to the level
of available foreign exchange or exports* This in turn
meant that Internal production was inevitably modified and
adjusted to the pattern of foreign exchange rationing adopted
(2)
by the German Government* Shortly after Germany, France
also adopted a variant of exchange rationing in the form of
Import control*
Exchange devaluation of Great Britain and Exchange
Control of Germany and France seriously affected the American
export trade; at least Americans believed that they ; had
such effects* During the depression years, U*S*A* developed
a strong positive balance and xims x u  hxrodxxg a constant
(3)
Influx of gold* Ofcis gold import had a tendency to raise the 
American price-level and Inconvenience her export trade all 
the more* By adopting a policy of gold steriliaation, 
America neutralised the prloe raising effeot of the bulk of
(1} "The Economic Lessons of the lGSO’s11 by H.W* Arndt, London 
1944 p* 180*
(2) "Monetary Theory" , by G* H* Halm, Philadelphia 1946 p*243
—p *247•
(3) A part of this gold in consequence of American favourable
trade balance, vas diverted to Europe between 1931-1933
by short term capital movement* But after 1933 short
term capital movement vas reversed and gold began to
enter into America in huge quantities*
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the Imported gold* By thus withdrawing gold from monetary
circulation, America raised the world price of gold to the
level of the deflated dollar and thereby tried to maintain
her export trade* But this gold neutralisation policy by
Itself could do very little either to stimulate American
export trade or to feltlgate her Internal depression* To
stimulate her exports to a much greater degree, in support
of the domestic expansionary policy of the New Deal launched
in 1933, America decided to devalue the dollar that year .
President Roosevelt got the authority of congress to devalue
the dollar to the extent of 50#, but actually it was devalued
(1)to the extent of 41# only* The devaluation of the dollar
bu.'t
not only removed its overvaluation, even if it had any,j it
gave America an exchange advantage over others which amounted
to the raising of American tariffs by 60# and an export bounty
of 40#* This exchange advantage did not disappear until at
least 1955 or 1936* The dollar devaluation led to an almost
, (3)
immediate increase of American exports by about 100#*
But this increased American export increased world dis­
equilibrium vis-a-vis America* Even before devaluation, U*S*A 
was having a substantial favourable balance and from 1931 to 
1933, a huge volume of short term funds moved from America to 
European countries and met the bills for the net European
(1) "The Economic Lessons of the 1930tsw, by
H* W • Arndt London, 1944 p* 74
(2) Ibid p. 75
(3) Ibid p. 76
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Imports from U.S.A. But after devaluation and restabllisa- 
tlon of the dollar, the direction of hot money movement was 
reversed and flowed towards America. This increased the un­
favourable balance of the European countries very greatly and 
from 1954, America began to receive a huge Inflow of gold, the
bulk of which she sterilised, and kept away from her monetary
(1)
circulation.
The devaluation of the dollar certainly removed the 
exchange advantage of the pound, even if it had any at that 
time, in addition it made it definitely overvalued vis-a-vis 
the dollar. But Great Britain could not possibly hope to 
remove this overvaluation of her currency by a fresh de­
valuation. In April 1954, U.S.A. organised her exchange
Stabilization Fund mainly to stop any further devaluation
(2)
of the pound. 0he sheer size and offer of her stabilization 
fund to purchase sterling at the new rate was more than
sufficient to frustrate any British effort to devalue her
(3)
currency any more. Ah almost continuous Increase of gold 
by the British Stabilization Fund was caused, amongst 
other factors, by the constant upward American pressure on the 
sterling. By this rate war, America deprived Great Britain, 
Germany and France of much of their potential markets.
Though the pa th of depreciation was not open to Great 
Britain, France and Germany, they had to take other defensive
(1) "The Economic Lessons of the 1950*3" by
fi.W.Arndt, London 1944• p. 76
(2) "International Currency Experience", League of Nations,
1944 p. 144.
(5) Ibid . .
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measures to maintain their balance of payments equilibrium. Great 
Britain had to protect her markets by an expanding Imperial
Preference scheme and asking the Colonies to extend preference to
they
British Empire goods, which/did by further increasing import dutiei
d )
and giving rebates to Empire products. Germany had protected 
her currency and oalance of payments equilibrium by exchange
control and after devaluation of the dollar she was driven still
(2)
further to have recourse to bilateral controlled trade. Prance 
and other European countries which were even then clinging to the 
gold standard were the hardest hit. They were farced to a much 
greater measure of deflation as well as additional restrictions 
on their imports. Prices in Prance were reduced by 16% during
(3)
the year 1934. The import surplus was reduced to about one halj
Eventually France had to depreciate her currency but it was not
within her power to do so without the consent of U.S.A, and U.K.
Fortunately by 1936, both U.S.A. and U.K. were impressed that
depression in Prance did not after all stimulate their export
trade. Prance, therefore , succeeded in concluding the
Tripartite Monetary Agreement that yaar with U.S.A. and
U.K. and, thereby securing herself against retaliatory
(4)
depreciation , devalued the francs by in 1996 .
(1) "The .Economic Lessons of the Nineteen Thirties" by H.ttl.
Arndt, London, 1944 p. 106.
(2) Ibid p. 75.
(3) Ibid p. 75 and 76.
(4 )  I b i d  p .  143.
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devaluation was followed by a considerable degree of 
Improvement in the french economic activity for about 
months, but the abandonment of the gold standard gave 
rise to a flight of capital with which the French Exchange 
Stabilisation Fund and the entire French gold reserve could
1*9
not cope. The intervention of the erltlsh and American
Exchange Equalization Accounts in support of the franc was
12)
not of much avail. The persistent flight of capital
13)
completely frustrated the French reflation policy. The 
competitive exchange depreciation which vas started by 
France in 1928 with a considerable advantage, ended with 
France in 1937 with complete discomfiture to herself, 
despite the support of her former victims.
The Great depression by causing a serious shrinkage in 
the world demand, led the various major economies to recreate
their demand by reflationary measures on autarchic lines.
the
but as their reflated demand remained short of/ global 
productive capacity, there was a standing cause for scramble 
among them for market. If the rate of reflat ionary 
measures in the different major economies had been equal, 
the scramble for market could not have made its appearance, 
but as the rate of reflat ionary measures was different 
both in timing and Intensity, the struggle for
(1) "The Economic Locoons of the Nineteen Thirties” by 
H.W. Arndt, London, 1944, 144.
I2) Ibid p. 144.
(3) Ibid p. 144.
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markets was wa^ed among them almost continuously throughout 
the thirties* In the course of that struggle/International 
trade of the world was blocked by all kinds of restrictions 
If these obstacles to trade related only to the extended part 
of production effected by reflation, the new production 
would have been a net gain to the world* But the struggle for 
market extended restrictions to that part of/trade (and 
thereby to production) of the world which had existed before 
the reflatlonary measures were adopted and thereby throttled 
a part of this pre-reflation trade* Because of the blocking 
of a part of the pre-reflation trade, some goods that were 
formerly procured through International trade had now to be 
domestically produced* Ihls clearly directed the resources 
of production from more productive to less productive 
channels* For this reason. Increased production under the
reflatlonary policies was not followed by a commensurate
part of
increase in International trade* Moreover, the gain in that / 
international trade that continued was much reduced because
production in different countries did not strictly follow
the
the lines of/geographical division of labour* The following 
two tables giving the statistics of production and trade of 
the major economies and the world during the thirties reveal 
clearly the lag of international trade to production:
(1) "Money" by D* H* Robertson, London, 1948* p* 189
Growth of Manufacturing production during tha 
thirties I (Base: 1925-1929 —  100)
(1)
Year U *S .A • U.K. Germany. France. World.
1929 112.7 109 .9 107.9 112 113.3
1930 92.3 100 93.5 109.8 101.6
1931 75.8 90.3 78.3 96.2 90.5
1932 58*4 90.4 64.6 82.7 80.1
1933 69.7 96.7 73 94 89 .9
1934 75.8 109 .7 93.7 87.4 100.8
1935 87.5 116.2 107.4 65.6 114.2
1936 106.6 130.4 117.3 91.3 131.6
1937 115.8 140 127 97.2 144.7
1938 89.2 128.8 137.4 90 135
The Indices of manufacturing production In all the 
major economies as well as In the world In the late thirties, 
exceeded the high-water-mar k of production In 1929* The 
declining tendency of production In 1938 was caused by the 
short but sharp American crises of that year* The decline 
was, however, arrested and reversed immediately after* In 
contrast to this general growth of production, international 
trade In the late thirties was decidedly lower than the level 
it attained In 1929*
(Base: 1913 - 100)
(2)
Year U .S .A . O.K. Germany France World
1926-
29 157.3 97.4 86.1 79 104.3
1930 135.9 93.5 89 92.7 99.7
1931-
35 86.7 66.8 66.3 68.4 75.5
1936-
38 124.0 77.2 66.9 49 .4 92.1
(1) "Industrialisation and Foreign Trade",
League of Nations* p* 140*
(2) Ibid p* 157 and p* 162
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Thus, the International trade of 193&-38, though higher 
than the depression level of 1931-35, was much lower than the 
average of 1926-29, proving thereby that the growth of inter­
national trade was anything but commensurate with the growth 
of world production. Hence the new increased production was 
attained at least partly at the cost of the advantages of *tk«. 
international division of labour, which was recogplsed up to 
the twenties of this century as the objective of monetary . 
management. The monetary policies of the thirties which 
aimed at stimulating domestic economic activity did so, at 
least partly, by sacrificing this external objective.
SKCTION 6 . The plight of the Minor Economies in the
Currency"Struggle amory the aJor Economies.
The Currency dIqcs of t he thirties*
The autonomous reflatlonary policies of the major 
economies In the thirties exercised on the whole a beneficial 
expansionary effect on the rest of the world comprising the 
minor economies. But this expansionary effect did not come 
to the latter In proportion to the expansion of production 
in the major economies or global production, but attkemuch 
lower rate of the expansion of international trade7 through 
which this beneficial effect was spread among the minor 
economies. Moreover, due to the deflection of production
in the major economies from more productive to less pro-
t h e
duotlve channels,ygain from international trade was reduced 
and this qualitative deterioration could not but have 
diminished the advantages from international trade derived 
by the minor economies. I.t was of course open to the minor
207.
economies to 'undertake* autonomous and autarchic reflatlonary 
policies themselves. But due to the smallneae or their
ike.
economies and/res trie ted scope of division of labour within,
their autarchic expansionary policies were bound to be
Immensely less xefficient than those of the major economies*
For this reason, the expansionary policies of the minor
economies in the thirties, could not attain any spectacular
success* The external stimulus was thus much more potent
to reflate their internal economies than their domestic
expansionary policies* The deficiency in the external
stimulus during the thirties vas, therefore, an immensely
greater handicap to them than it was to the major economies*
In the course of the currency struggle of the thirties,
every major economy defended itself with the elaborate armour
of tariffs, exchange control, exchange devaluation, import
control, quota, bulk purchase and even direct barter* The
minor economies found the world market split up into as many
(1)
units as the number of major economies and with each unit 
they had to carry on trade, but subject to these restrictions* 
Being in dire need of carrying on trade, they had to enter 
into various types of bilateral trade agreements such as 
clearing and payments systems, reciprocal arrangements, quota 
system, bulk*purchase and even direct barter of commodities• 
These international barter arrangements, however, opened up 
a new possibility for the minor economies to have a free 
exchange system with a major economy by simply releasing this •
(1) nIhe Great Depression," by Lionel Robbins, London,1936* 
p* 96*
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mutually advantageous trade from all restrictions* nut such 
* **** exchange arrangement by a minor economy could not to 
extended to the other major economies, simply because one 
major currency could not he multilaterally converted into 
another* hence, the alternatives open to a minor economy 
sere either to have bilateral barter arrangements with each 
of the major economies or to have a free exchange arrcngiment 
with one major economy and barter arrangements with all the 
others* in fact, most of the minor economies of the world 
grouped themselves, each with one major econoey, and formed 
the three or four currency blocs of the thirties* Within 
each of these blocs there was no exchange control and trade
U )
was more freely conducted within than between these blocs*
The gold standard countries of hurope found themselves 
forming a currency bloc with France as the centre, and it 
continued until 1936 when France devalued her currency* nut 
this was not a consciously framed monetary area and various 
hinds of restrictions in their mutual trade abounded* partly 
for the latter reasons, but mainly because these gold standard 
countries were particularly depressed, this area could not 
develop into a monetary bloc in the true sense of the tezm, 
where trade could have some special facility to develop*
U.ii.A..under the Cordell null aystea, developed a type 
of dollar cure* within which trade became slightly freer* The 
Trade Agreement dot of 1974 provided the legal baaia for a
11) "The Heconetruction of world Trade" by
j.a. Condiffe, aew fork, 1940 p. 232 - 262.
policy of bargaining with foreign countries for reciprocal
reduction of trade barriers subject to a maximum reduction
(1)of 505* of the American Import duties• Bilateral bargain*
ing was to be reconciled with multilateralism by the in*> < w
elusion of the unconditional moat*favoured*nation clause
in all trade agreements* Between 1934 and 1939f U*S*A*
concluded trade agreements with twenty countries half of
these being with the tropical and semi*troplcal countries of
(2)
Latin America which depended largely on the American market#
The system of trade agreements covered by 19389 60% of
(3)
America’s foreign trade* More than half of her exports to
the agreement countries9 comprising about 30$ of her total
exports (on the basis of the export trade of 1937) received 
(4)
concessions* U»S*A* also had to give concessions in return
and reduced import duties on the 45$ of her dutiable goods
over and above the assurance that she would continue to
(5)
retain 65$ of the imports on the free list untaxed*
The results of these trade agreements were not un*
satisfactory* Though the volume of American foreign trade
on ly
in 1937 was/about 75$ of what it was in 1929 9 yet her share 
in the world trade increased from 9*9$ in 1933 to 11*8$ in 
19379 that ls9 by about 20$* Moreover9 while the American
(1) "Tla© Economic Lessons of the 1930’s" by







Ibid P* 83 ♦
Ibid P* 83
Ibid P* 87
export to agreement countries increased at d faster rate
“ ““ to - * - * • —  * •  —  -  ?  
countries in American imports appreciably declined* Thus
U #3 «A • made a good bargain by increasing her net exports to
agreement countries and thereby appropriating a part of
their market* Although the latter lost a part of their
market to America* probably they would have been still
worse off if the trade agreement system had not develop*
(2)
ed this additional trade#
rihe currency bloc that developed round Germany was
more impressive than the American dollar area# When In 
ike
1934$1 German exchange control system noerly broke down by
sheer scarcity of foreign exchange she adopted the co*
called New Plan to conduct foreign trado by a system of
(3)
clearing agreements# Under this system Germany entered 
into agreements with as many countries as possible* to e*» 
tabllsh one account in Germany and another account in each 
agreement country to which in^portera deposited the value 
of their imported goods in their own currency but to the 
credit of the foreign exporter* *o maintain the equality 
of accounts with every country* Germany had to change a 
her exchange rate constantly to keep the purchase and sale
CL
at parity •This resulted in/multiplicity of exchange ratee^ 
not only with different currencles,but also with the same 
currency for each major transaction* The clearing 
system was thus developed into a form of direct barter
(1) "The Economic Lessons of the 1930•s"
by H*W* Arndt* London* 1944* p* 86
(2) Ibid p* 84
(3) Ibid p*185
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and transacted nearly 65^ of Germany*a foreign trade without
(1)
requiring any gold reserve* Germany had absolutely no gold
had
reserve and her lorelgn trade/nearly come to a dead stop
because of the shortage of foreign means of payment• The
1' • ■clearing system revealed a new vista of International trade  ^
and enabled Germany to resume her foreign transactions*
’ '• * ; - • 'i. v£m 'VVi/; ■ ,y 2-/ ; ’ f *!*•■: r^V»Vv?F'-; • *2 '2* r-' • . • * » i,. . •:*; f • ’ V; ,v •*. -t j
In the buyer's market of, the thirties when sellers were
very eager to sell but buyers were so few, Germany easily
and began to purchase freely* In no time other countries
accumulated huge volumes of marks to their credit while
German exports had little foreign currency to their credit
(2)
in foreign accounts* Foreigners found It very difficult 
to liquidate their marks because they could not procure from 
Germany sufficient goods of suitable kind which they would 
like to buy* It now appeared that they had sold goods
without being paid* A number of W e £ e m  European countries
; ' ....
such as France, Switzerland and Folland refused to send
(S|
further exports to Germany without being paid* But this
course was not open to countries of South East Europe or
some of the countries of Latln>*Amerlca which were saddled
with excess supplies of exportable agricultural goods for
(4)
which Germany seemed to be the only buyer* as their
(1) *The Economic Lessons of the 19309s
by fi*W* Arndt, London, 1944, p* 186*
(2) Ibid p* 192-196
(3) Ibid p* 192
(4) "International Currenoy Experience^ League of Nations
1944 p* 180*
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clearing accounts accumulated and the Balkan exporters could
not get their payments, they were urged by their governments
to purchase manufactured goods from Germany rather than
elsewhere* By thus accumulating clearing debt3, Germany
Increased her economic stranglehold on the Balkan countries
to such an extent that she could easily turn the terms of
trade in her favour* Anyway, it must be admitted to her
credit that although she exploited her position to some
extent she did not do it to any serious extent until 1939
(1)
for political reasons*
It is undoubtedly true that the clearing system plan 
reduced 80% of German foreign trade to bilateral barter and 
thereby automatically led to the abandonment of the advantag­
es of comparative costs which she derived by selling her
manufacturing goods to the Industrial countries of Europe
(2)
and purchasing foodstuffs and raw materials overseas*
But under the circumstances of the thirties no other alter­
native was open* As Germans had no foreign means of pay­
ment, the volume of international trade which was made
possible by the clearing system, would not have been lorth-
(3)
coming at all* Ihe share of Germany in the world trade
U >
increased from 9*05^ in 1933 to 9.2^ In 1938* In the face
(1) "The Economic Lessons of the 1930 fs” ,
By iUW* Arndt, London 1944, p# 192-195
(2) Ibid p* 200
(3) Ibid p* 198-199
(4) Ibid p. 200*
of overfull employment In Ge many, even this slight Increase
should he considered as a significant achievement* Even the
Balkan countries which were exploited most by Germany cannot
be said to have been net losers* Despite their explolta­
in
tlon, they were better off than/the position to which they 
would have been reduced If Germany refused to buy their pro-
ll)
ducts* The New Plan was really a new method of Internationa 
al trade which brought into existence some trade which would 
not have otherwise taken place and thereby benefltted all 
concerned*
While the dollar area and Reichsmark area were 
organised by the major economies and enlisted the affilia­
tion of the smaller countries* the sterling area* the most 
significant currency bloc of the thirties was organised by 
the minor economies comprising the countries of the British 
Empire and a few other non-Empire countries depending on the
British market* by deciding In 1931* to keep their exchange
(2)
rates stable In terms of the sterling* While a number of 
these countries maintained the old parity with the sterling* 
the majority of them adopted a rate lower than their old 
parity to suit their own convenience and without any opposi­
tion from Great Britain* Some of them readjusted their 
rates subsequently after stabilisation In view of changed 
circumstances* -In no case did a sterling area country adopt 
a rate above its old parity* After de-linking from gold In
(1) ”The Economic Lessons of the 1930fsn ,
by E*W • Arndt, London, 1944 pv 2(J4*
(2) "International Currency Experience1*, League of
Nations* 1944 p. 47*
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1931* sterling depreciated to the extent of 30# in terms 
of gold* Kence even the countries which did not change
. vi.i 1 ' • ■ - ■ "" i. • •
their old parity with sterling enjoyed a depreciation to
that level In  comparison with countries outside the
sterling area* There was no exchange control within the
sterling bloc which represented a vast area where exchange
was completely free In a world with all kinds of trade and
(1)
exchange restrictions*
It was not difficult lor the minor economies of the
sterling area to maintain parity* In addition to the
fact that they started in 1931 with an equilibrium rate and
could readjust It if necessary* Great Britain during the
thirties* due to her quick recovery from depression* was
a rapidly developing market and this enabled the member
countries to accumulate sufficient sterling with whloh
they could meet temporary setbacks In their balance of
(2)
payments* without reducing their exchange rate* Ihe
control of foreign capital Issues* Imposed on the U*K*
in 1931-32 was relaxed for sterling area countries whloh
wanted to borrow funds from London In support of their 
13)
currency* In fact* no such loans were needed to any 
appreciable degree because the ordinary trade balance of 
the member countries proved quite adequate on the whole*
(1) "International Currency Experience1'*
League of Nations p* 50-54
(2) Ibid p* 54-60
(3) Ibid
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As the a ter Xing area was a voluntary association from 
whloh a member country could withdraw at any time* there 
waa no possibility of the minor economies being exploited 
by the U*K^as was the oaae In the dollar area or the Reichs 
mark area* But in the accumulation of sterling by the 
member countries lurked a possible danger* If Great 
BrItaln* like Germany* was ever compelled to make excessive 
purchases from the sterling area countries* the sterling 
balances of the member countries would be frosen like the 
mark»balances of the Balkan countries* During the thirties 
however* sterling area countries were not faced with this 
problem*
On the other hand* Great Britain was not put to any 
serious difficulty by being made the centre of the sterling 
area* Ihe expansionary policy whloh Great Britain was 
following at that time had no fear of being thwarted by an 
unfavourable balance of paynents from sterling area countries 
because she could use her own currency as a means of 
settlement throughout the area* As the other countries 
considered sterling to be their essential foreign exchange 
reserve* the unfavourable balance of Great Britain was
(2)
adjusted by automatic loans from the member countries*
But Great Britain had a special responsibility for the
4 ; *
sterling area as a whole vls-a-vls the non-sterling area*
(1) ”International Currency Experi once”*
League of Nations* 1944 p* 54*60
(2) Ibid p* 61-64
She had to keep gold reserves to meet the deficit balance, not 
only of herself but of the whole of the sterling area in relation
d)
to the outsiue world. The fluctuating balance of payments of
member countries with the outsiae world could thus easily affect
the gold reserves of Great Britain. The difficulty of Great
Britain and the sterling area in the late thirties came from U.S.A<
and the dollar area which maintained a favourable balance on curr-
(2)
ent account with the sterling area. U.S.A. aid this by so 
operating her Exchange Stabilization Account as to maintain an 
overvaluation of the sterling and the position of the sterling 
could any momemt be threatened by a change of American policy 
on this point.
Great Britain safeguarded her situation as well as that of 
the sterling area vis-a-vis the dollar by adopting a policy of 
general tariff and bilateral agreements of tariff concessions with 
non-Empire countries. Great Britain of the thirties was the bigg­
est import market of the world and in the buyers' market of that 
time she drove very hard bargains and succeeded to secure very 
valuable concessions for her trade.Great Britain generally shared 
the advantages of trade agreements with the Empire countries. In 
the l&ody-lees Pact concluded in 1933, ” it was agreed that any 
advantages which might be arranged for British goods should be 
extended to Indian goods, and that India should participate in 
any quota which might be allocated to the United Kingdom in mar-
(3)
kets in which limia had no independent quota*. The results 
(1^International Currency Experience*.League of Nations,
1944. p. 61-64.
(2) Ibid.
(5) Indian Economics Vol II by J.fi.Jather cn S.G.fieri. p. 537.
217*
of free exchange within the sterling area* Imperial
Preference and trade agreements were <*ilte considerable*
While in 1929 only 25*7^ of the total trade of the British
Empire was inter-Empire trade* it rose to 50j£ in 1959* The
(1)
sterling area recorded a phenomenal development of trade*
Thus* when in the thirties* the currency warfare of the 
major economies and its offensive and defensive armaments 
made international trade talmost impossible* the system of 
currency blocs revealed a new vista of trade and facilitated 
the trade of the countries concerned considerably* Currency
blocs* of course, did not raise the trade to the level it
-ed
would have attain/under a free multilateral system* but they 
made possible a volume of trade which would not have been 
forthcoming under the conditions of the thirties* In the 
relschmark and dollar areas* the centre-countries exploited 
the minor economies* though the latter were not net losers* 
by making the terms of trade more favourable to themselves 
and unfavourable to minor economies* In the sterling area* 
however* the centre country allowed Itself to be exploited 
by the minor economies each of which recorded a very 
significant gain in in terns tionaljtrade by their membership 
of the area* The membership of a currency area was thus 
the only means open to the minor economies in the thirties 
to attain a limited measure of the external objective of 
their monetary policy*
(1) "The Economic Lessons of the 1950*0° by
H* W* Arndt* London* 1944* p* 105 and p* 118
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SECTION 7 The External Aspect of Indian Monetary 
Polloy"ThnEh— UlrtT es:------------“  
When India decided in September 1931 to de-link her
currency* together with sterling* from gold* her balance of
had
payments situation/deteriorated to such an extent that if she 
had not taken that step at that time* she would* nevertheless* 
have been fcreed off the gold standard within a few months *The 
Indian balance of payments continued to deteriorate even 
after de-linking and reached its low-water-aark in 1932-35 
when its itive merchandise balance sank to a mere three
service* a substantial positive balance was a normal feature 
of Indian foreign trade* To maintain the servicing of her 
foreign debts it was absolutely neoessary to restore the 
favourable balance of trade by stepping up exports*
reason that the bulk of Indian exports consisted of agri­
cultural products on the sale of which depended the minimum 
of subsistence of millions of her farmers* After suspension 
of gold payments* several strong foroes eaae into operation 
which stepped up her exports and restored the balance of 
payments equilibrium as quickly as it deteriorated before 
1931*
The first of these factors that tended to improve 
India's balance of trade situation was the advantage of a 
depreciated exchange rate which the rupee had after de­
(1 to
In view of her necessity/pay a heavy foreign debtcrores•
Stimulation of exports was all the more necessary for the
(1) "Review of the Trade of India in 1933-34•"
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linking from gold in 1931* when India de-linked her 
currency from gold she decided at the same time* to maintain 
the existing ratio with sterling. Her commercial* financial 
and banking relations with sterling were so great that 
maintenance of a stable relation with sterling was vital to 
her economy and her decision to continue to be a member of 
the Sterling Area was spontaneous and almost instinctive.
As sterling* after de-linking* depreciated in terms of gold 
to the extent of 30^* the Indian rupee* through its stable 
sterling rate* enjoyed the same degree of depreciation with 
non-sterling countries after 1931. The price of Indian exports 
in the non-sterling markets fell instantaneously to the extent 
of 30> and this must have maintained or at least arrested 
the decline of Indian exports. It is not possible to isolate 
statistically the effect of the depreciated exchange rate but* 
nevertheless* its effect on the improvement of India9s trade 
situation as well as on balance of payments was undeniable.(2) 
The second factor* which worked in the same direction* 
was a heavy export of gold from 1931 to 1936 - an unprededented 
phenomenon in Indian commercial history. India had been
(1) "Review of the Trade of India in 1931-32" pp.16 and 17.
(2) Percentage share of the U.K. in the exports of India 
increased from 21 in 1929 to 30 in 1933 and to 32 in 
1937 while her share in the imports of India declined 
from 42 in 1929 to 41 in 1933 and to 32 in 1937.
"International Currency Experience", 
League of Nations* 1944. p.48.
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traditionally a sink for precious metals - import of gold 
being a normal phenomenon* But the Great Depression put the 
Indian farmer - particularly the produoer of money crops - 
In a precarious plight* An enquiry msde in the Punjab and 
certain other provinces revealed the fact that it was the dire 
economic necessity^that had forced the farmer to dispose of 
his gold hoards* There was* anyway* nothing unusual in 
this* The Indian farmer has always looked upon his gold as 
the last reserve to fall back upon In difficult times when he 
habitually mortgaged or pawned It to the local mahajans 
(money-lenders) but in the past* this pawning of gold did not 
go to the extent of exporting the metal outside the country* 
But the depression of the thirties was so severe and the 
disgorging of gold by the farmer so great that It was beyond 
the capacity of the gold dealer to keep the whole amount as 
his stock in trade* Moreover* the depreciation of the 
sterling and the rupee to the extent of 30)6 made the value of 
gold* in terms of rupees* rise to the same extent* While
the prices of all other things were falling In terms of
the
rupees*/prloe of gold was rising* The faxmera found the 
sale of gold to be a substantial help In their dire distress 
and sold off their hoards* The stooks with the bulllonists 
increased enormously both in <$uantlty and In value and the
(1) "India's Post War Reconstruction and its International 
Aspects* 11 by P*S* Lokanathan*
New Delhi* 1946* 
pp* 2  and 5*
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export of gold began* From 1931 to 1936* gold worth
Re* 282 crores waa exported out of India* This gold export
helped to Improve the balance of payments situation by the
full amount of Rs* 282 crores and maintained* to some extent*
(1)
the level of consumption of the Indian farmer*
The third factor that facilitated Indian exports and 
thereby Improved India's balance of payments situation was
' f )
the special fall of Indian prices in comparison with prices
in other countries which made her exports particularly cheap v
in the world market* This articular fall of Indian export
prices was caused by a combination of several factors* The
characteristic of the Oreat Depression was a special fall in
agricultural prices and the market for agricultural goods
collapsed more completely than the market for industrial
goods* Lowering of agricultural prices necessitated the
lowering of the cost of production of agricultural goods*
Indian exports consisted mainly of agricultural products and
agricultural production in India was extremely inelastic*
Apart from climatic fluctuations* the volume of agricultural
production remained the same whether prices of agricultural
(2)
produots rose or fell* Agriculturalist's Income end 
wages were the residuary of the sale-proceeds after meeting 
his out-of-pocket expenses* Due to this reason* the overhead 
charges of Indian agricultural exports could be reduced to
(1) "India's Post War Reconstruction and Its International
Aspeots*" by P*S* Lokanathan* New Delhi* 1946* pp*2 & 3*
(2) "Economic Problems of Modern India*" R*K* Mukarjee* Voi i.
London* 1939* pp. 330 - 339*
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almost any extent, but in most other countries, cost
structure of agricultural goods was not so flexible and
****** in most of these latter countries (including even
Japan, with very low rates of agricultural income) some
income of the farmer constituted a factor of production
and did not admit of any indefinite decrease. Probably this
was one ofthe reasons why the principal exporters of
agricultural products, on the onset of the catastrophic fall
of agricultural prices went on accumulating stocks from
1929 till the middle of 1932, when they registered a rise 
( 1 >of orer 6o>. After 1932, there was a slow and gradual
reduction in the stocks. This holding back of agricultural
products by the principal producers arrested the price-
reauction in those countries to some extent, but in India
there was no organisation to hold back stocks. Ordinary
Indian farmers were too poor to wait for any length of time
for their products to be sold, as the entire saleable part
of India’s products had to be disposed of promptly, she had
to maintain her foreign markets at any cost. This necessity
for competing and maintaining her sale in the world marktet 
led to a special fall in the Indian prices as will appear 
from the following table.
(1) "Reriew of the Trade of India in 1936-37",
pp. 2 and 3*
Indices of Wholesale Prices. (1929 *• 100)
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1957 1938
U.K. 87.5 76.8 74.9 75.0 77.1 77.9 82.7 95.2 88 .8
U.S.A. 90.7 76.6 68.0 69.2 78.6 83.9 84.8 90.6 82.5
Austra­
lia.
88.5 79.2 78.3 78.2 81.6 81.5 85.6 91.9 92.2
J apan• 82.4 69.6 73.3 81.6 80.8 84.4 98.9 •
GOOH 114.5
Canada• 90.6 75.4 69 . 8 70.2 74.9 75.4 73.0 88.4 82.2
India* 82.3 66.1 64.5 61.7 63.1 64.5 64.5 72.3 67.6
Now» this special fall in Indian prices stimulated in turn 
the exports of India and improved her balance of payments 
situation to a considerable degree*
The combined favourable effect of all these three 
factors became visible in the Indian import and export 
trade as well as in her balance of payments as will be clear 
from the table belowt
(1) "India's Post War Reconstruction and its International 











1929-30 ♦ 78.98 — 26.20 . 52.78
1930-31 + 62*95 - 26.63 ♦ 37*62
1931-32 ♦ 36.83 ♦ 55*65 ♦ 90.68
1933*33 ♦ 3*36 ♦ 66.92 ♦68.28
1933-36 ♦ 35.67 ♦ 57.23 ♦ 92.90
193*1-35 ♦ 23*62 ♦ 52.56 ♦ 75.96
1935-36 ♦ 30.53 ♦ 36.37 ♦ 66.90
1936-37 ♦ 77*77 ♦ 16*50 ♦ 92*27
1937-38 ♦ 63*19 ♦ 15.12 ♦ 58.31
1938-39 4- 63*21 ♦ 12.61 ♦ 55*82
Thttsf the total visible balance of trade from ita lowest 
water-mark in 1930-31 rose the very year India suspended gold 
payments and stood at 90*48 crores in 1931/32* Balance of 
payments 9 therefore f ceased to be a problem for India from 
that year* Indian foreign trade was no more handicapped
from any shortage of foreign means of payment* It was not»
that would
therefore9 unreasonable to presume/Indian trade / Increase
and regain its pre-depression level* But 9 in faetf Indian
trade continued to deeline for some years more and was much
below the 1927-28 level throughout the thirties^ as is shown
(1) "Beview of the Trade of India1 of the respective years*
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by the Indian quantum of trade.
d )
quantum of Indian Trade: ( Base 1927-28 - 100 )•
Year quantum of quantum of Price level of
Exports Imports exports imports
1927-28 100 100 100 100
1930-31 96.6 82.5 71.5 80
1931-32 82.5 70.6 59.2 71.7
1932-33 74.9 81.4 55.3 65.2
1933-34 86.2 72.7 53.5 63.5
1934-35 87.8 64.1 54.1 63.0
1935-36 81.4 86.6 56.9 62.1
1936-37 107.4 79.8 57.2 62.8
1937-38 103.1 95.7 ) (2)
1938-39 102.1 88.7 )
Prom the abore it is apparent that although the quantum 
exports increased , that of imports lagged far behind and this 
more than outweighed the increased quantum of exports, so that 
on the whole there was no increase in the quantum of total trade 
which stood appreciably below the 1927-28 level. The decline in 
Indian trade was partly & reflection of the deficiency in 
the global effective demand ( or market ) which persisted 
throughout the thirties ana partly cue to the excessive virulence 
with which depression afflicted agriculture exports. The balance oj 
of payments equilibrium attained by India thus kept hidden 
behind it a heavy loss in her international trade .
(1) * Review of the Trade of India"# 1956-37. p. 38
(2) Ibid. 1939-40. p. 98.
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the most important aspect of this lose was a serious 
deterioration in the terms of Indian fozelgn trade* a s will 
be apparent in the price-lists of imports and exports in the 
aoove table, the former remained higher than the latter 
throughout the thirties* It meant that the same volume of 
foreign goods was bought in exchange for a much greater 
volume of domestic goods* In other words, the terms of trade 
were very unfavourable to India during the thirties*
*n this connection the controversy that was waged in 
India almost throughout the thirties for a further devaluation 
of the rupee deserves to be mentioned* It was claimed by 
most of the Indian economists that a further dose of de­
valuation would have stimulated both India's foreign trade
U )
as well as her internal economic activity* hut, as the weight 
of evidence here Indicates, it is extremely doubtful now a 
further fall in the rupee exchange rate could have attained 
any of these objectives* Depreciation would have cheapened 
Indian exports all the more to foreigners* nut such lowering 
of prices coula not have increased the sale of Indian goods 
in countries outside the Sterling Area where exchange-control, 
import-quota and clearing agreements prevailed and there was 
a plethora of agricultural products everywhere hanging in 
every nook end comer of the world market* within the
U )  (a) •hinute of Dissent* by Bir i». Thakerdas, 
paras* 100-152*
"Hilton Young Commission Report 1926"
(b) "Economic problems of hodern India" by R*K* Mukerjee 
__________ wnd i i . L o n d o n -  1941» vol. 11* PP* 276-308*
227.
Sterling Area# Indian exporta ware already enjoying the 
benefits of free and stable exchanges as well as Imperial 
Preference and a further lowering of prices was unnecessary 
and would have only made her total sale proceeds smaller.
Even If an outside market could absorb a much bigger supply 
of Indian ejports# It was not possible for India appreciably 
to Increase her agricultural exports with an Inelastic pro­
duction# to take advantage of that market. With an lnelastlo 
volume of sales# a lower exchange rate of the rupee would have 
simply meant a smaller earning of foreign exohange and a still 
higher price of imports. With a smaller volume of foreign 
means of payment and a higher price of foreign goods the 
volume of Imports would have shrunk and the quantw of Indian 
foreign trade would have deoreased still further.
As regards the stimulation of internal economic activity 
which in the circumstances of the thirties could only mean 
Industrial production# further devaluation of the rupee could 
not have made the situation any better. Industrial production 
during the thirties could be Increased only by Increasing the 
purchasing power of the Indian agriculturalists. But a 
depreciation of the rupee# by reducing the sale-proceeda of 
the farmers9 products would have reduced their Income and 
purchasing power still more. It would have thereby depressed 
the industries further# rather than stimulating them. There 
was# therefore# absolutely no case for a further devaluation 
of the rupee on this ground.
Moreover# the whole contention for devaluation rested on 
the premise that the rupee was overvalued at la. 6d. sterling.
______________________
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If this were the case, India would hare developed an 
unfavourable balance with Great Britain. In fact, India's 
exports from a position of equality sharply declined from 
1931-32 to 1932-33, whila imports slightly increased. But 
the position of equality between exports and imports was 
as quickly restored in the following year^1933-34J and this 
deterioration of exports and balance in 1932-33, related 
only to trade balance. Including the exports of treasure, 
India had a highly favourable balance of payments with
I D
Great Britain and this positive balance went on increasing
every year. This led to an increase of India's sterling
earning and one indication of this was a rapid increase of
sterling in the central reserves of the country. While the
percentage of sterling in her central reserve was 42 in 1933
12)
it went up to 63 in 1934. This increase of her sterling 
reserve was an indication that the rupee was not overvalued 
in terms of sterling and therefore could not be the cause 
of the decline in India's foreign trade.
The cause of the shrinkage in the quantum of India's 
foreign trade lay elsewhere than in the particular exchange 
rate of the rupee. The collapse of the world market - and 
particularly the market for agricultural goods - was the 
main cause of this decline. The increase in productive
in­
activity in the thirties, over and above being adequate to
^1) "Review of the Trade of India* 1933-34, pp.139 and 164
(2) "International Currency gxperience", League of nation* 
1944, p. 57.
restore world-demand to pre-depression level, was effected 
under the protection of all types of trade restricting 
devices, such as tariffs, contingents and quotas, exchange, 
controls, etc. and was not, therefore, followed by a 
commensurate increase in the demand for foreign goods 
and consequently by a commensurate increase in international
U )
trade. Indian trade suffered in consequence of these 
developments in world trade.
in one direction, however, Indian foreign trade 
recorded a remarkable increase, while her overall foreign 
trade was on the decline, her trade within the sterling 
area expanded throughout the thirties. Though the 
sterling area was not exactly synonymous with the British 
Empire, yet it was not very far fiom it. The trade of the. 
British Empire can be roughly taken as a representative 
picture of the trade of the sterling area. While in the 
beginning of the thirties, India's trade with Great Britain 
and other Empire countries was smaller in volume than her 
trade with the rest of the world, it became considerably 
higher during the second half of the decade, as will be 
clear from the table which follows.
(X) "Review of the Trade of India", 1936-7. pp. 1 to 16
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(l)
India*s Trade with Great Britain 
(In orores of rupees)
1931/E 1932/3 1933/4 19U/& 1935/6 1936/7 1937/8 1938/9 1939/40
Export 45 28 48 49 52 66 64 58 76
Import
Total
45 49 49 54 62 48 62 46 42
90 77 96 103 104 114 . 116 104 117
Percent­
age of
Experts 27*9 28 32*2 31.6 31*5 32.2 33*3 34*1 35*4
Imports 35*6 56*8 41*7 40*6 38*8 36*4 29*9 30*5 26*2
Tima, India’s trade with Great Britain not only increased 
absolutely during the thirties, but while her exports to 
Great Britain continuously increased, imports from Great 
Britain almost continuously decreased* While India expanded
her market in Great Britain, the latter had her market almost
the
continuously shrunk* The expansion of^ Indian market in 
Great Britain and other Empire countries and the consequent* 
ial expansion of her trade with them was not only undeniable 
but considerable*
With a contracting world market and declining world 
trade It is Interesting to enquire about the causes of this 
phenomenal development of Indians trade with Great Britain 
and other Empire*countries• This increase is generally
attributed to the policy of Imperial Preference and the Ottawa 
Agreement, which came into effect In India from January 1st,
(1) Review of the IVade of India of the respective years*
